The local elections in 2005 under General Pervez Musharraf are generating more heat and dust than those held under military patronage in 1962, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 2001. Why’s that? What is its significance?
There are two main reasons for the military’s obsession with local elections: self-perpetuation and legitimization of dictatorship. Having sacked and condemned ancien regimes ( national and provincial parties and politicians ) military rulers have constantly felt the need to create a new, non-party, local, civilian constituency loyal to them which also provides a fig leaf of legitimacy in the first instance . In the second instance , they have sought to groom local leaders for proposed provincial and national setups. But this ‘devolution’ strategy has failed to provide either longevity or legitimacy to its architects. Consider.
Gen Ayub Khan’s one party “basic democrat system” couldn’t save him when he ran into popular trouble and it was scrapped after his exit. Gen Zia ul Haq’s first two local elections in 1979 and 1983 were damp squibs because the most popular party in the country (PPP) was not eligible to contest, and the political route ahead was misty. Certainly, the prospects for democracy were looking dim after he crushed the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). But in 1987, the local elections were more inspired because the national polls had been held in 1985, and Mohammad Khan Junejo had allowed Benazir Bhutto to return from exile in 1986 and canvass for her party. Despite the non-party status of national and local polls, despite Gen Zia’s lordship, the political prospects for democracy were looking up at the time. Notwithstanding this, however, Gen Zia’s local government system crashed after he died in 1988 because it wasn’t sufficiently democratic or legitimate for the political forces which succeeded him.
Gen Musharraf’s local system was fashioned in 1999-2000 when he didn’t want to truck with anyone from the ancient PPP or PMLN regime. He wasn’t in pursuit of democracy either. Hence his emphasis on a non-party devolution of power (sic) to a new tier of government independent of any party political provincial or national setup; hence too its umbilical link to General Musharraf himself through hand picked, all powerful provincial governors. But that is precisely why the 2001 local elections were lacklustre. The prospects for democratic participation were dim because the mainstream political parties and leaders were left out. Before the 2002 national elections, it was clear that General Musharraf’s presidential referendum had failed to provide legitimacy to him. After the 2002 elections, it was equally clear that his non-party local system was out of step with the party provincial establishments conjured by him. Hence the subsequent debate and amendments to ‘reform’ the local system so that it is in sync with General Musharraf’s party political objectives of longevity and legitimacy after the next general elections in 2007.
Thus we have the current spectacle of “non-party” local polls in which candidates of the sole ruling party are contesting against opposition or independent candidates without a party name to identify them, a definite edge to the incumbent establishment. Thus General Musharraf and Co are openly canvassing for ruling party candidates. Thus all the signs of pre-election rigging to achieve “suitable results”: 16 districts in Sindh have been gerrymandered; the CEC won’t be confirmed until after these elections; opposition candidates have been arm-twisted to cross the floor; bureaucrats and policemen have been transferred to facilitate “positive results”; polling stations have been relocated; electoral lists have been revised. Etc. This will doubtless be followed by various post-election devices to entrench the ruling party in power so that it can sweep the 2007 party-based general elections. This is why the current local elections are generating so much enthusiasm today and this is why they are significant.
But will these elections stabilize General Musharraf and vitalize democracy in the country? We think not. To be sure, by virtue of his uniform, General Musharraf has fully usurped Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League. He has also been successful in bribing or forcing an increasing number of PPP supporters to switch loyalties, which will seriously undermine Ms Bhutto’s national and provincial prospects in 2007. More than that, the Supreme Court’s “timely” ruling last Tuesday whereby it has attached certain educational conditions for contesting elections (three years after the issue first came up in 2002!) will dilute the religious parties who were the principal beneficiaries of the PPP’s loss in 2002. So this time the PPP and the MMA are both being targeted and the principal beneficiary is the ruling PMLQ only.
That may make Gen Musharraf feel personally more secure. But will it make Pakistan less unstable politically in the longer term? Can the consolidation of one party rule in support of a military general in uniform ever be good for democracy? Can an un-institutionalized system survive its creator? The answers, my friends, have been blowing in the wind since the time of Generals Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq.