If General Pervez Musharraf’s coup was neither welcomed nor condemned by significant sections of domestic and international opinion, the fact is that certain quarters were deeply apprehensive (“the military’s record is bad…”) while others were quietly expectant (“the military can sweep the decks…”). In the event, however, everybody agreed that, sincerity notwithstanding (“the road to hell….”), the military regime would be judged by the quality of its performance.
Soon thereafter, General Musharraf unveiled his seven point blueprint to reinvent “true” democracy. If this merely confirmed apprehensions that a mission statement without a timetable or roadmap was a contradiction-in-terms and hence doomed to failure, it also raised expectations that his radical, social-democratic agenda was the answer to our myriad problems.
The first signs of political confusion or misplaced concreteness in Rawalpindi were manifest soon enough. The selection criteria for the various cabinets and the NSC raised apprehensions and dulled expectations. The favoured few were largely “non-controversial” but they were generally more stolid than solid. Certainly most could not be classified by any stretch of the imagination as do-ers or go-getters. Eyebrows were consequently raised. It was all very well for socially stigmatized candidates to be disregarded but people did wonder how the generals expected to make so many sizzling omelettes if they didn’t want to select people who knew how to break eggs? How did the generals expect to change the status quo without taking “controversial” decisions”?
Two opposite conclusions followed. General Musharraf was so hamstrung by status-quo opinion that he was unable or unwilling to chose an object-oriented (“right person for the job”) team. Alternatively, he deliberately chose men and women who would quietly acquiesce to policy decisions taken by hands-on generals in GHQ and ISI.
Six months down the line, it’s clear that GHQ is running the show and its civilian team, barring notable exceptions, is a fig leaf only for international respectability. But apprehensions are rising and expectations have plummeted. The public perceives a lacklustre performance by the generals. Fortunately, however, GHQ seems aware that something is amiss. An internal review has consequently been ordered. Should the composition of the civilian team be changed? Is the agenda lacking in some sense? How should the message be propagated?
We believe that the above questions are secondary to certain more fundamental questions which are being avoided. (1) Should the generals have adopted a hands-on approach in such adverse domestic and global circumstances instead of choosing a dynamic civilian prime minister and ordering him to assemble his teams and deliver within a certain timeframe, or else? This is the strategic approach that COAS General Abdul Waheed, ably backed by CGS General Farrukh Khan and DG-ISI General Javed Ashraf Qazi, adopted in 1993 with such excellent results. And this is the approach their counterparts of today have overconfidently spurned. (2) Should the generals have raised expectations by insisting on such a maximalist agenda and then found themselves misfiring on every cylinder? Once again, the minimal, do-able agenda of 1993 is instructive. (3) Shouldn’t a policy review emphasise the message as much as the medium? In other words, instead of focusing on how to get an imperfect message across, shouldn’t the generals be wondering on how to right the flawed message?
Pundits or ideologues will advise GHQ on the micro-management of politics and economics in order to consummate public expectations or revive flagging national morale. But all such well-intentioned advice would amount to missing the wood for the trees.
General Pervez Musharraf must recognise the basic limitations of his enterprise in this post-cold-war timeframe and democratic age. He should view matters in the context of his depleted and dependent domestic economy. He must comprehend the domestic implications of continuing regional tensions. He must dispassionately neutralise his powerful international opponents instead of plunging into a clash with them in a fit of rage. He must extract time from the international community in order to create the economic space for changing the political will of the people of Pakistan so that they can stand on their own feet and become self-reliant.
General Musharraf insists that he cannot give a time-frame for full democratic restoration because he doesn’t want his plans to be derailed by the obstructionists. But that is only because he has a maximalist agenda in mind. If he had a minimal agenda — get rid of 100 crooked politicians, create a new legal framework order and negotiate debt-rescheduling with the international community – he wouldn’t have to worry about giving a timetable at all. Indeed, the unfinished reform, accountability and good governance agenda could be taken up later via a powerful National Security Council and through the terms of the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people after institutional checks and balances have been imposed on them.
Think about it General Musharraf. Do you want to risk being derailed in pursuit of a maximalist agenda instead of being anointed in extension of a minimal agenda?