It doesn’t much matter whether Javed Jabbar resigned or was sacked. What matters is why he had to go. In fact, it may be worth asking why eleven other provincial and federal bigwigs before him threw in the towel and called it a day barely a year in government.
Apart from the lone provincial minister for health from Balochistan, Khadim Changezi, who was arrested last May for being a loan defaulter, all the others clearly had a grouse or two either against some overbearing general or some unpalatable government policy or decision. Sindh Governor (retd) Azim Daudpota departed on May 24, claiming differences over Kalabagh Dam policy. Later, however, he homed in to the truth when he complained that the Karachi corps commander, Lt General Usmani, had reduced him to a puppet governor by running the show. A couple of other Sindh ministers were also sent packing when they aired views contrary to military wisdom.
The case of the NWFP governor, Mohammad Shafiq, who resigned on August 13, is equally, if not more, interesting for the light that it sheds on the sort of views that are unpalatable to the generals. Once again differences over the Kalabagh Dam were cited. But once again, the truth was otherwise: he was forced to acquiesce by the local corps commander to a ban on cable television demanded by the fundos of the province. Which bring to mind the case of Derek Cyprian, the federal minister for minorities. A Christian who could not stomach the separate electorate system and the blasphemy law conceded to the fundos, he preferred to resign on August 16 rather than live with the life-long guilt of having betrayed his cause.
This brings us full circle to the case of the two information ministers — Shafqat Mahmud and Javed Jabbar — who “resigned” their provincial and federal portfolios respectively within two weeks of each other. Both claim they left for “personal reasons”. Since both are hale and hearty, this is more likely another way of saying that they would rather not reveal the truth. Discretion clearly being the better part of valour, who can blame them? General Pervez Musharraf has already sounded off about the corruption, negativism and lack of patriotism in the press. The last thing we want is a harangue that the better among his cabinet ministers are incompetent and lack motivation, for that would demoralise us and erode whatever little confidence is left in the military regime. Are other resignations in the offing?
We wouldn’t be surprised at all. General Zulfikar Ali Khan, the powerful WAPDA man, is being generous when he confines his remarks to the dismal formulae of the Finance Minister, Mr Shaukat Aziz. And vice versa, we’re sure. Nothing personal in all this, of course, but perceptions of the national interest differ radically. Another general in charge of the OGDC visibly scowls when mention is made of the intentions of the Privatisation Minister to sell the company in question. Elsewhere, the corps commanders’ zealous monitoring teams have become a power unto themselves, berating high and low bureaucrat alike, with the result that the sulking civil servant is bogged down in fear and loathing. What is going on?
It is clear that when the generals seized power, they quickly determined that an outright martial law would pose more problems than render solutions, especially since the international community would reject it out of hand. Equally, they were sure that they did not want to share power with the civilians since much of their agenda required “sorting out the civilians” in the first place. So a facile solution was wrought. The generals would call the shots and a band of timid civilian puppets masquerading as experts would provide a fig-leaf for international respectability. Thus it transpired that the federal and provincial cabinets and the National Security Council were more or less stocked with civilian non-entities while power began to revolve around the army chief’s favoured few in GHQ and ISI, devolving to the NAB on the one hand and the corps commanders’ monitoring teams on the other. Thus were governors and ministers made redundant and resentful and thus was a sham civilian set-up revealed to be a grand disorder in the eyes of the cynical public.
In theory, this seemed a neat arrangement. In practise, however, it is already splitting at the seams. This mishap should not have mattered because it did not seriously impinge on the reality of power. But the perception of a government at odds with itself created by the mishap has come home to roost. How can hapless civilians be blamed for bleating, true to form?
The so-called dyarchy of power is an unmitigated disaster. Every civilian resignation or sacking ostensibly for “personal reasons” will unleash a host of suspicions about motive, cause and effect, each of which will anger the supergenerals and exacerbate the divide between them and their civilian partners. Either they must have the guts to go it alone and take full responsibility for their actions or they must restore civilians to power. Clever-by-half mid-way houses are inherently unstable and fated to crumble.