General Pervez Musharraf is about to renege on his pledge to quit the post of Chief of Army Staff before 2005. He is abetted by the PPP deserters, the former prime minister-in-attendance as party whip and the former finance minister as the new prime minister-in-tow. Last week he claimed that 96% of Pakistanis wanted him to remain COAS. On cue, the official news agency then dug out a six month old American survey on world attitudes towards the US in which it was also noted that 86% of all Pakistanis viewed General Musharraf “favourably”. This statistic was juxtaposed with a so-called joint survey by a domestic news agency and an obscure Islamabad newspaper to claim that nearly 70% of Pakistanis wanted General Musharraf to be both President and COAS. Now the Punjab Assembly has given him a resounding two-thirds thumbs-up in the “national interest”.
This demonstration of civilian servility isn’t surprising. Barring honourable exceptions, it is characteristic of Pakistani politicians. If civilians haven’t always connived in military takeovers, they have certainly flocked to dictators after the event. Still, it is nauseating for parliaments to demean themselves by renouncing the very principles of democracy and civilian supremacy they are supposed to protect and uphold.
General Musharraf’s perception of “popularity” is a more interesting concern. When he seized power, he was welcomed by the domestic media and the religio-liberal opposition because they despised Nawaz Sharif for his bid to grab all power. But he was shunned internationally and President Clinton refused to shake his hand in public. How times have changed. The home media is crying out for more democracy and the religio-liberal opposition is baying for his blood. Meanwhile, the international community, especially the US, is lauding him to the high heavens as the ideal leader of the Muslim world.
Nonetheless, the suggestion that 86% Pakistanis think “favourably” of him should not be confused with the thought that 86% might vote for him in a free and fair election, or that the “favourable” sentiments of 86% Pakistanis can be translated to mean support for him as army chief in the foreseeable future, or even that they approve of his current “guided democracy, pro-US” policies. Indeed, the “favourable” factor probably doesn’t extend to his war against Al Qaeda since the American survey also noted that 65% of all Pakistanis viewed the terrorist Osama bin Laden “favourably” and that nearly everyone in Pakistan hated the Americans. In net terms, that would mean that no more than 21% (86% minus 65%) of Pakistanis view General Musharraf’s pro-America and anti-al-Qaeda policies “favourably”. In a free and fair election, this sentiment would spell curtains for him. How, then, is the “popularity” factor to be distinguished from the index of “favourability”?
With General Musharraf, what you see is what you often get. His sincerity, integrity and devotion to Pakistan are irreproachable. He is not as vindictive, callous or uncaring like many of his political predecessors. Certainly he is more enlightened and moderate than most. Charges of nepotism or personal corruption cannot be laid at his door. One cannot lavish such praise on even our most “popular” politicians. When Pakistanis say they think of him “favourably”, it is these virtues that spring to mind. Just imagine what would happen if his “personally favourable” factor could be superimposed on to his “policy popularity” chart to yield a good “political popularity” graph? How can that happen?
If General Musharraf sticks to his uniform per se, it will make him less, not more, popular politically. This is because civilians may bow and scrape before the high and mighty military out of fear, or opportunism, or a bit of both, but deep down in their hearts they detest being lorded over by unrepresentative, unaccountable, self-righteous and arrogant men in uniform. Nor can a military-bureaucratic system of technocratic government, however statistically efficient, provide an answer to the everyday problems of ordinary people. “Democracy” to folks is not about “press freedom” or “civil rights” or “professional merit”. Far from it. It is about reposing trust in those politicians who, regardless of personal flaws, can and will politically mediate the everyday conflict and chaos of a dysfunctional state system in which sheer existence is predicated on the four pillars of “nalka, naukri, thana and katcheri” (literally, the tap, the job, the police station and the courts). It is in this context that mainstream political parties which service these four-pillars of people’s sifarish breathe life into the political system and those that stand on piety like the religious parties of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, and those that stand on national security like General Musharraf’s army, or those that flog anti-corruption manifestos like Imran Khan’s Justice Party can never win the votes of the people.
The conclusion is obvious enough. The sooner General Musharraf says bye-bye to his unholy alliance with the MMA, the sooner he stops goading Pakistanis into empty national security paradigms, the sooner he abandons his unaccountable democracy which is neither terribly efficient nor too people-oriented, the quicker he will become truly popular. An alliance with the mainstream, moderate and pro-people parties would do him and the country much good. His favourable personal ratings would then be transformed into democratic popular scores.