The Indo-Pak Joint Statement from Sharm-el-Sheikh has stirred a hornets’ nest in India for seemingly being “pro-Pakistan”. But the irony is that it has largely gone unsung in the anti-India lobby in Pakistan. What is the reality behind the text?
Indian critics say Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had no business de-linking terrorism from the composite dialogue and allowing mention of terrorism in Balochistan in the joint statement. They say that by so doing, India has (a) relieved pressure on Pakistan from bringing the culprits, particularly the Lashkar-e-Tayba, responsible for Mumbai, to task, and (b) tacitly admitted that India may have a hand in stirring up insurgency and terrorism in Balochistan and thereby provided Pakistan with a tit-for-tat excuse for continuing to dangle the sword of state-supported terrorist actors over India’s head.
But the real yardstick of any agreement or understanding is not just the text but the spirit or intention of the parties behind it. Indeed, sometimes a particular text may be used to facilitate a difficult path to progress in conflict resolution. Consider.
The de-linking of terrorism from the composite dialogue makes it easier for the Pakistan government – if it really wants – to proceed against the Lashkar-e-Tayba – whose front Jamaat-ad-Dawa enjoys considerable popularity as a social welfare organization – without being accused by its internal detractors of doing so “under Indian pressure and conditions”. At the same time, it enables the Indian government to go-slow on any meaningful element of the composite dialogue until the Pakistan government actually delivers on the anti-terrorist front. The facts support this interpretation.
Fact # 1: Pakistan has handed over a dossier to India that acknowledges not just the Pakistani origins of the perpetrators of Mumbai but their Lashkar-e-Tayba links, where they trained in Sindh, and how they carried out the land and sea operation. The dossier contains handwritten diaries, training manuals, Indian maps, operational instructions for sea and navigational training, etc, seized from LeT hideouts. This is unprecedented, considering that at one time Islamabad was not even ready to admit that Ajmal Kasab was Pakistani. It demonstrates Pakistan’s pledge to crack down on such elements in the LeT that did Mumbai or may be planning to repeat the outrage.
Fact # 2: Pakistan has arrested five LeT activists and charged them with the crime of Mumbai. Twelve others are listed as absconders. A couple of them have confessed. They are being tried in an anti-terrorist court inside a prison stronghold. This is also unprecedented. No Pakistani has ever been tried in Pakistan for carrying out or abetting an act of terrorism outside the country.
Fact # 3: Pakistan has since arrested over 500 alleged terrorists linked with the LeT and Jaish Mahammad and is planning a careful crackdown in Southern Punjab where these militant organizations are based. Its tentative approach towards Hafiz Saeed is aimed at avoiding a violent and powerful backlash that could derail a calibrated anti-terror policy.
Fact # 4: Pakistan’s ISI has directly briefed the military attachés at the Indian Embassy in Islamabad. It has expressed a willingness to talk directly about terrorism and security with India’s intelligence and defense agencies so that any cloak of ambiguity or lack of transparency arising out of any civilian intermediaries is removed from the reckoning. Certainly, in view of the perceived autonomy of the ISI from the civilian government in Pakistan and its central role in the past in nurturing the LeT, this development should raise the credibility quotient of any commitments on terrorism made by the Pakistani side. There is some evidence, too, of renewed contacts between the two original and successful back channels in the persons of Satish Lamba of India and Tariq Aziz of Pakistan.
Fact # 5: Pakistan has also provided evidence of the Indian role in stirring up a tribal insurgency in Balochistan and fueling the Pakistani Taliban via its consulates in Afghanistan. Therefore the mention of Balochistan in the joint statement is an Indian quid pro quo for Pakistani action against the LeT. It suggests that Delhi is ready to take its hand out of Balochistan. The fact that the Pakistani interior minister, Rehman Malik met Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently and said that Bramdagh Bugti, the leader of the Baloch insurgents in Kabul under the protection of Afghan intelligence, would be neutralized, should not be missed. Indeed, the news is that Mr Bugti has since left Kabul for the UAE and efforts are being made by Islamabad to woo the Baloch dissidents back into mainstream politics.
There is one additional development after Sharm-el-Sheikh that may be critical. This is the surprising confession of Ajmal Kasab in court that links his actions to his terrorist friends in Pakistan. Has Kasab entered into a secret plea-bargain with the Indian authorities at the prompting of the Pakistanis? Certainly, a willful admission of guilt by Kasab is going to strengthen the Pakistani prosecution’s case against the LeT terrorists who are being tried in a Pakistani court.
We are sanguine. The joint-statement shows the way forward. Both Pakistan and India are likely to emerge as winners. The media in India should do its homework instead of succumbing to vapid nationalism.