Washington might be changing tack in South Asia. Until last year US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott was intent on pressurising Pakistan to cap its nuclear programme. Last week, however, US defence secretary William Perry acknowledged Pakistan’s national security concerns, agreed it could not roll back its nuclear programme unilaterally and hinted that “ways and means” to skirt the Pressler amendment might be found to allow some relief to Pakistan.
Mr Perry also claimed that Pakistan was a “moderate” Islamic country which had a “key role” to play in regional security. This is a far cry from earlier threats by the US to declare it a terrorist state. Similarly, Washington is now upfront about the view that durable peace in the subcontinent cannot be assured until the “fundamental” dispute of Kashmir between India and Pakistan has been resolved. Contrast this with the desperate backtracking in India last year by Ms Robin Raphel, assistant secretary of state for South Asia, after one of her statements (that Kashmir was disputed territory) stirred a hornet’s nest in New Delhi.
Equally significant is Mr Perry’s assessment of the dangers of missile proliferation in the region. Until recently, Washington tended to downplay the implications of the serial production of the “Pakistan-specific” Prithvi missile by India. US officials used to clutch at the dubious distinction between “deployment” and “production” of missiles and argued that there was no evidence that India was aiming to deploy these missiles against Pakistan. Now the US realises that if India proceeds with the production of Prithvis, Pakistan will launch a similar programme, and a dangerous, new arms race will be triggered in the subcontinent. Consequently, the US administration may now make redoubled efforts to restrain New Delhi from going ahead with its missile programme (failing which they might be persuaded to enter into talks with Pakistan whereby the deadlock over the transfer of M-11 missiles from China might be eventually addressed).
Washington also has a new perspective on China which should lead to a more balanced approach vis a vis Indo-Pak relations. In the past, the US accepted the Indian argument that bilateral arms limitation talks with Pakistan were a non-starter because of India’s perceived threat perceptions of Beijing. But Washington is now convinced that China does not pose any security threat to India. This would imply that the US may lean on India to start bilateral negotiations with Pakistan, a position long advocated by Islamabad but consistently rejected by New Delhi.
Why has the US shifted its stance vis a vis India and Pakistan? How does it now hope to achieve its objectives of non-proliferation in South Asia? The shift in US policy basically stems from two factors:
(1) Washington has finally come to realise that it will get nowhere as long as it sticks to a ‘hard’ line against Pakistan and a ‘soft’ one against India. The Pakistani position (no unilateral disarmament under any circumstances) has proved enduring because it is strategically and morally strong. That is why American efforts to browbeat and cajole Pakistan to fall in line have failed to take off. On the other side of the coin, it has become apparent that by mollycoddling New Delhi various US administrations have only made it more dogged and resistant to advice. A more “even-handed” approach, it seems, might conceivably yield some dividends.
(2) Washington is also worried about the implications of two significant fault lines which have appeared in Pakistan during the last four years. One is strident anti-Americanism which cuts across all segments of state and society (because Washington is perceived to have treated an old friend rather callously). The other is Islamic extremism which is simmering among the urban middle-classes (because the West is thought to have launched a fresh crusade against Islam). Under the circumstances, ostracising a large, generally moderate country armed with nuclear weapons like Pakistan could prove extremely dangerous for world security.
The US hopes to advance the objectives of peace and security in South Asia by creating fresh avenues for leverage with both India and Pakistan. The formation of a Consultative Group in the defence establishments of both countries is aimed specifically at this purpose.
Despite shrill propaganda by anti-US elements in both countries, it is already clear that Washington intends to tread carefully and fairly. For instance, while trying to alleviate Pakistan’s hardship over the issue of a refund for the F-16s and the supply of certain spare parts, Mr Perry was at pains to emphasise in New Delhi that Washington would not enter into any joint defence production or military supply agreements with India which could upset the conventional defence balance between the two sides.
Benazir Bhutto and General Abdul Waheed deserve kudos for nudging Washington on to the right track. Pakistan’s position has been vindicated. The pressure has lessened. Washington is beginning to listen to us again. That said, however, we should remain cautious and alert. There is a long way to go before the utility of Mr Perry’s recent visit begins to show concrete results.