Each passing day in Afghanistan brings a fresh bout of hope and despair. All Afghans are weary and crave peace. But they are being propelled towards war by fierce emotions of ethnicity, language and region.
That it has turned out this way is largely Islamabad’s fault. Ironical, isn’t it, when Pakistan has always had the most to lose from continuing instability in Afghanistan.
The Russians left three years ago. That should have been the end of jihad and the beginning of a search for peace. But no. For Gen Hameed Gul and the ISI nothing short of a military victory over Najibullah was acceptable. Consequently Gul chose Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to deliver his flawed ‘vision’ of liberating Central Asia for Islam. Three years later, Gul’s ‘strategy’ has turned out to be as misplaced as the man himself. In the process, however, Pakistan has distanced itself from the other players in the game, especially Ahmad Shah Masoud, and undermined prospects for leverage.
In January the new COAS drummed out Gul for subverting legitimate authority. A dramatic change in Afghan policy followed. Pakistan lent its shoulder to the UN and persuaded Najibullah to quit. Suddenly, it seemed a peaceful settlement was at hand.
Alas. Prodded by Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Gul, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wasted six crucial weeks mollycoddling Hekmatyar. Benon Sevan’s peace plans began to go awry last month when Najibullah announced his intention to quit after a UN-Pakistan sponsored interim council was in place. Immediately, his opponents in the Watan party, along with elements of the Afghan militia and the squabbling Mujahidin, scrambled to fill the power vacuum by making new alliances and seizing towns and territory. Najibullah warned Pakistan that he couldn’t hang on for long. He urged the UN to constitute an interim government quickly.
What did Mian Nawaz Sharif do? He squandered another three critical weeks in April talking aimlessly with Hekmatyar & Co. instead of arm-twisting them to fall in line. The dissidents refused to nominate their candidates to the council of “neutral Afghans” proposed by the UN. On April 16, a junta of mainly Persian-speaking Afghan generals and militia leaders deposed Najibullah and seized power.
For two years Najibullah’s political intransigence and military strength were seen as the only stumbling blocks to peace. After him, it was striking how quickly the Afghan state splintered along ethnic, linguistic and regional lines. That events on the ground would quickly outrun the peace process should have been anticipated in Islamabad. But it wasn’t. The PM was blissfully traipsing in Geneva and Austria while Masoud and Hekmatyar were digging in for war.
Pakistan has paid a heavy price — refugees, drugs and guns — for supporting the 14 year Jihad. Most troubling, if Pushtu nationalism revives in Afghanistan, there could be a spill-over effect on Pakistan’s large Pushtu population in NWFP and Balochistan. A more assertive cross-border Pushtu nationalism could revive calls for a separate state, a threat that has been submerged in Pakistan since independence.
Early this year Pakistan seemed poised to emerge as the leading beneficiary of any post-Najibullah arrangement. A peaceful Afghanistan would reopen the ancient trade routes to Central Asia which have much to offer Islamabad. Today, however, Pakistan is looking very much like a loser by default. Despite the fitful impulse for a stable government in Kabul, the compulsion for long-term strife remains the dominant threat ahead.
Unavoidably, a fiery debate is sure to be triggered in Pakistan over “Who lost Afghanistan?” Already, people question the wisdom of persuading Najibullah to announce his departure before the UN plan was operational. Mian Nawaz’s prolonged honeymoon with the Afghan spoilers backed by Qazi Hussain Ahmad has not escaped censure either. At the very least, Pakistan should have reached some form of cooperation with Masoud earlier, instead of blindly backing Hekmatyar to the hilt.
Pakistani fundamentalists, especially the Jamaat, have played a murky role. It is in Pakistan’s national interest not to take sides in the current intra-Mujahidin conflict. At the end of the day, there will indeed be an Islamic government in Kabul. But Qazi Sahib is backing Hekmatyar because of his Pushtu origins and particular brand of fundamentalism. Clearly Qazi Sahib is fueled not by his country’s national interests but by his party’s political programme.
Here is yet another example of how Nawaz Sharif’s alliance with the fundamentalists is costing Pakistan dearly. Why is he hanging on to them? Their ‘threat’ to any government in Islamabad has always been bloated out of all proportion to reality. It is time they were told where to get off. Afghanistan is as good a place as any to ditch them.
If internecine conflict remains on the agenda of Kabul mainly because of Mr Sharif’s inexplicable relationship with particular fundamentalists, Pakistan’s relations with Iran and Central Asia will certainly sour. Each Muslim country bordering Afghanistan would then be tempted to stake a claim to its own zone of influence. And that is absolutely the last thing Pakistan wants.