General Pervez Musharraf made the bed and now he has to lie in it. But he might not find much peace there. The politicians are at it, clueless about how to tackle a hung parliament-situation in which at least three parties are strutting about like all-time winners. The PML (Q), also known to its bitter rivals as the King’s Party, has tried on everyone for size but cannot take the final plunge without a nod from General Musharraf. Sometimes it doesn’t much like its proposed partners and sometimes the general doesn’t quite like them because of the conditions imposed by the would-be coalition. Meanwhile, every leader is saying he would like to form the next government on the basis of a general consensus about the irreducible plight of the common voter. But the fact is that no one, including General Musharraf, wants to sink his self-interests for the sake of the nation. Divisions are deep and very personalised.
Gen Musharraf thought he had the PML (Q) under his wing and that the party would be grateful for services rendered to it. But there were signs even before the elections that different thoughts were crossing the minds of the party leaders. The PML (Q)’s “new” leaders, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and cousin Pervez Elahi have joined forces with the unbeatable Sheikh Rashid Ahmed of Rawalpindi. Both cleave to the old PML legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq and feel as comfortable in the presence of the religious parties as they feel shaky in the presence of the PPP. Meanwhile, Gen Musharraf fits the old paradigm of army takeovers in Pakistan: he thinks he knows what Pakistan’s national interests are and has an abundant contempt for civilian politicians. But there is one big difference which the PML (Q) may find unpalatable. He interrupted the fundamentalist trend in post-Zia Pakistan and clearly leaned in favour of a liberal polity.
In theory, at least, General Musharraf should find the PPP more to his liking than the MMA. At least the former merely wants to negotiate power sharing with him while the latter wants to get rid of him. Thus one might expect him to lean on the PML (Q)) to make a deal with the PPP. But there are two problems to consider here. The first is his personal view, shared by the army in general, that Benazir Bhutto is not “loyal” enough to Pakistan, although God alone knows why the army’s definition of “loyalty” should be any more acceptable than that of a popular leader. The second problem is the fear rising in the breast of the PML (Q) high command that riding with the PPP might dilute the right-wing credentials of the party and, given the international environment, the disease of liberalism might destroy the religious fibre in the top leadership. As it is, there are a number of disguised liberals in the party who joined because they did not like the PPP leadership for personal reasons. If the General can overcome these two self-inflicted prejudices, he wouldn’t have to worry about his reform agenda and the concerns of the international community.
Can Gen Musharraf cohabit with the religious parties as desired by the PML (Q)? People think the Pakistan army leans heavily on the clergy to validate its ideological standing. In fact, before the volte-face in Afghanistan, it was correct to say that Pakistan was at the mercy of two weaponised entities: the clergy and the armed forces. And after the elections, evidence has emerged that the government paved the way in many ways for the MMA even though it badly miscalculated the extent of its success. But the General has to remember the fact that the MMA doesn’t like him personally and politically: General Musharraf has personally riled them up and he has blocked their jihad to take over the state and its security organs in pursuit of their Islamic visions.
General Musharraf could, of course, enable significant floor-crossing to fill the gaps in the PML (Q)’s quest for a majority. But this would stink and also expose the next government to repeated defections. Similarly, if he sticks exclusively with Chaudhry Shujaat and Sheikh Rashid, he runs the risk of exposing his economic reforms and his foreign policy to all kinds of hazards. An MMA-PML (Q) coalition will sit uneasily together mainly on these two issues. Right-wing Leaguers will feel themselves in agreement with the clergy but will point to Gen Musharraf and shrug their shoulders while the civilian government suffers the consequences of a lack of belief in the situation it inherits from General Musharraf.
If the MMA helps form the next federal government the international community won’t like it one bit and General Musharraf will have to contend with the consequences. But if he tries to force the PMLQ-MMA coalition to continue his policy of collaboration with the international coalition against terrorism, he might end up having to use (a watered-down?) Article 58-2(B) against the coalition at home. That would reinforce instability rather than diminish it. Worse, much worse, he could end up alienating both the international community and the MMA, which would take us back to the beginning and put a huge question mark on the political future of General Musharraf himself.