The Brown amendment to the Pressler amendment has been passed by the US Senate. The House of Representatives is expected to nod approval soon. Barring a major now between Congress and President Bill Clinton over the Foreign Affairs Appropriations Bill to which the Brown amendment has been tagged, the Pressler amendment should be “repealed” partially by next month. When that happens a small though significant step will have been taken to restore some equilibrium to US-Pakistan relations.
It is a small step because the repeal is a “partial”, one-time waiver which only allows the US government to ease certain restrictions imposed on Pakistan by Pressler since 1990: (a) Washington will return some military equipment sent for repairs by Pakistan. (b) It will supply some new military equipment ordered by Pakistan. (c) It will enable the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation to insure US private investment in Pakistan. (d) It will help Pakistan cope with narcotics control, population planning and terrorism. The net worth of this package, already paid for by Pakistan, is only US$ 368 million. About US$ 20 million or so may also come Pakistan’s way every year under (d) above.
More meaningfully, however, the Brown amendment to the Pressler amendment does not allow the US government to supply US$ 658 million worth of F-16 aircraft ordered and paid for earlier. The US position is that if these aircraft can be sold to some other country, well and good, Washington will give the proceeds to Pakistan; but if there are no buyers, it so chooses, go to court and try to recover its money. Nor does Brown dilute the tough Pressler restrictions on fresh economic and military assistance to Pakistan ― we will still be unable to buy military equipment or spares from American companies.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the significance of this step: (a) It vindicates our position that it is morally wrong for America to keep our money and our equipment. (b) It supports our argument that the return of this equipment will not change the military balance between India and Pakistan and should not fuel an arms race in the sub-continent. (c) It helps remove some of the mutual distrust and animosity in US-Pak relations generated by five years of often bitter altercation. (d) It eliminates the element of wishful strategic thinking on both sides: America now understands that our nuclear programme is not negotiable; and we have learnt that we must stand on our own two feet henceforth. (e) It obliges both countries to seek ways and means to cement their relationship not via tied military and economic aid as in the past but through cooperation in free-market trade and investment.
It also vindicates the American establishment’s view: Pressler has served its purpose of freezing Pakistan’s nuclear programme and restraining its military ambitions; continued, unrestricted application could be counter-productive because it might eliminate whatever little “leverage” Washington retains with Islamabad on nuclear and missile proliferation issues. More significantly, it should put a dampener on reactionary forces in Pakistan who have exploited the Pressler imbroglio to fan anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in the country.
This “repeal” has been predicated on the fact that the Pakistani President, Prime Minister, Opposition Leader and Army Chief ― the establishment ― have spoken with one voice on the subject: F-16s or no F-16s, Pakistan’s national security cannot be bargained away; despite Indian provocation, we have shown restraint on our nuclear programme because we are a responsible nation.
On Pakistan’s side, the visit of army chief General Abdul Waheed to Washington last year marked a turning point in US-Pak relations: some plain talking by the COAS finally persuaded Washington that diminishing returns had set in on Pressler. It was prime minister Benazir Bhutto, however, who clinched the argument for Pressler’s repeal with President Clinton and leaders of Congress during her trip in April. On the American side, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms Robin Raphel, laid much of the ground for a sympathetic hearing in the White House. And it was President Clinton who boldly pledged to undo the wrong done to Pakistan. In the end, Senator Hank Brown piloted the amendment through. All these people deserve credit for a job well done. But where do we go from here?
America wants both India and Pakistan to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty due next year. Although Pakistan has a defined position on the NPT (we’ll sign it when India signs it), we have yet to formulate a credible strategic view on the other two treaties. This should be done quickly so that there are no “misunderstandings” with Washington later. For much the same reason, we should let Washington know how we intend to proceed if India goes ahead and deploys the Prithvi missile. Washington and Islamabad can rebuild their relationship in the future only if their political motives and security concerns are mutually transparent and credible. If either side tries to be clever by half, there will be trouble.