India and Pakistan were prodded by the international community to try and build the blocks of peace. But if India was under pressure to demonstrate benevolence in the region in exchange for big-power status in the world, Pakistan was left in no doubt about the linkage between peace and economic bailout by the IMF. Therefore the argument that India was negotiating out of a position of relative weakness vis a vis Pakistan is patently false. Indeed, if Pakistan or its state intellectuals insist on extracting mileage out of misplaced concreteness, the Indian response, as its prime minister has now iterated, may become more rigid and intransigent when the second round of talks is held. This will not serve Pakistan’s interests if its government is seen as trying to score points rather than searching for real peace.
More homework also needs to be done behind the scenes by both sides before the two leaders meet again in Islamabad. In fact, it would be a good idea if the foreign ministers can build on the substance of the 8 or 9 points discussed in the Summit and get the text of a joint declaration/statement approved and readied before the second Summit.
The Indians are, of course, right when they say that negotiations should not be conducted in the glare of the media. This suggests that if the Pakistanis try the same media tactics again, they will provoke the wounded Indians to react, and the second Summit will founder on the rocks of mutually destructive propaganda. In the event, Pakistan may be held responsible as the party sponsoring such tactics on both occasions.
Whether or not the Agra Summit was always vulnerable to BJP hardliners, as Pakistani hawks insist, the fact is that the Indian hawks were provided a perfect excuse to spike the declaration after Pakistan’s decision to go public with the Pakistani president’s breakfast meeting with top-notch Indian newspaper editors. This was an extraordinary intervention. On the plus side, it provided General Pervez Musharraf an unprecedented opportunity to reach out to the hearts and minds of ordinary Indians, which he did with devastating effect. On the minus side, it compelled the Indian hardliners to drum up the issue of “cross-border terrorism” as a new element in the proposed Indo-Pak equation. Thus the formidable challenge ahead will be to convey the same message to the people and opinion-makers of India while delinking the issue of Kashmir’s centrality with “cross-border” terrorism.
It is, however, unlikely that the Indian government will provide another grand opportunity to General Musharraf to talk directly to the Indian people. But even if such an opportunity should present itself, not much advantage may be gained by repeating the same point again and again. This is borne out by the dismissive manner in which the Indian media and public have responded to General Pervez Musharraf’s press conference in Islamabad the day after the Agra Summit. In the mind of the Indian public, General Musharraf’s “Kargil-warrior” mystique and the idea of Kashmir’s centrality were inextricably linked during the Summit. But the first is naturally wearing thin with overexposure and the second is likely to be finessed with the counter-idea of “cross-border” terrorism.
The time has therefore come to pick up the gauntlet thrown by India in supporting greater people-to-people contacts between the two countries by means of a soft visa regime, freer flow of information and renewed cultural interaction. This will promote the cause of Kashmir articulated by General Musharraf rather than hinder it. Indeed, There can be no greater ambassadors of Pakistani “sincerity” and “ground realities” than the people of Pakistan, even those who are opposed to military rule in Pakistan.
This people-to-people approach should not be mistaken by the Pakistani establishment as a “confidence-building” measure proposed by India in order to sideline the Kashmir issue, in line with its “less contentious issues” strategy. Instead, it may be viewed as an element of Pakistani strategy to win its cause in the hearts and minds of India rather than in the exclusive killing fields of Kashmir. It may be recalled that all guerilla wars for liberation or freedom in the annals of history were successfully concluded only after public opinion in the oppressing country was won over to the cause of the oppressed people, thereby pressurizing their own governments to let go without further bloodshed. Thus the ball that was kicked into flight so beautifully by General Musharraf during his “hardtalk” with the Indian editors should be caught in motion by lay Pakistanis and carried to the goal post across the border. This can only happen if the Pakistani leadership has the courage of its convictions and allows its people to express theirs with the same candour as General Musharraf.
Finally, some clarifications may be in order. Not losing is not the same thing as winning. Today’s hero could end up as tomorrow’s villain. Passion should not be confused with patriotism. Patriotism is not the same as nationalism, and neither is the monopoly of the military or its hawkish defenders. The divide between hawks and doves doesn’t translate into right and wrong. Confidence should not degenerate into cockiness. Personal success should not be equated with national vindication. And sometimes less is more.