Religio-political forces in Pakistan, which have been molly-coddled by civilian and military governments since the time of General Zia ul Haq, constitute a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, they are propped up as an integral element of a “national security strategy” devised to secure some sort of military advantage in Afghanistan and political leverage in Kashmir. On the other, they are visible threats to the fabric of democratic government and civil society in the country. In fact, as the world recoils from an image of Pakistan wrought by such gun-toting fundamentalists bent on waging jehad against the West, the price of this dubious state strategy becomes prohibitive.
Nothing demonstrates this more forcefully than the increasingly threatening postures adopted by some such elements. Certainly, it is questionable whether the Jamaat i Islami is within its constitutional rights to exhort the corps commanders of the Pakistan Army to remove the COAS from office (in effect, stage a coup d’etat). Worse, nothing undermines the efficacy of the state or erodes the writ of law than a policy of “selective appeasement” as demonstrated by a meeting between the Lahore Corps Commander and the leader of the Jamaat i Islami on this issue.
Other worrying examples abound. Alarmed by the spectre of JI and other religio-political activists rampaging on the streets, the government was quick to backtrack on procedural modifications to the controversial blasphemy law, in the process losing considerable credibility at home and abroad. Yet when some minority and human rights organisations decided to march peacefully in Karachi the other day against the excesses of such laws and the injustice of the separate-electorate system, the police was ordered to beat them black and blue and arrest them in the scores. If the first was an act of capitulation disguised as a “tactical retreat” (“we don’t want to open unnecessary fronts”), the second was a manifestation of might against right in defense of a dubious “law” and a non-existent “order”.
Equally illuminating was the government’s response to a threat by another religio-political group — the Tanzimul Akhwan — to march on Islamabad and demand the enforcement of shariah. The groveling attitude of the officials who met with the leaders of this group, including a federal minister, and promised all manner of concessions to them confirms our fears just as much as it raises their hopes — demand a mile and you will be a given a yard; and every yard is another step along the route to capturing state power. Therefore we are not at all surprised that the interior minister, Gen (retd) Moinuddin Haider, was told to buzz off when he ever-so-gently chided the bearded ensemble at Akora Khattak not to perpetuate a negative or bad image of Pakistan.
General Moinuddin Haider, like his boss General Pervez Musharraf, is among the best faces of this regime. Both are temperate and pragmatic persons, who prefer not to speak with forked tongues even when real politik demands otherwise. Indeed, one of their strengths is their ability to project a degree of sincerity or compulsion in what they do or don’t do. That, however, is precisely why they are not hot favourites with the likes of Qazi Hussain Ahmad or Maulana Sami-ul-Haq. But the issue here is not one of personalities. It is one of approach. If the military establishment, of which both Generals are card-carrying members, is so dependent on religio-political groups for its long-term (this is the critical factor) foreign policy agendas in the neighbourhood, why should it clamp down on its allies at anyone’s insistence or instigation? The fundos know this and have time and again shown an inclination to exploit this factor to the hilt. Indeed, that is why it is increasingly looking like a case of the tail wagging the dog rather than the other way round.
This could have adverse short-term consequences for national security apart from the insidious longer-term damage to state and society. A case in point relates to the peace process initiated by New Delhi with the backing of the United States. We do not know whether India is sincere or whether it is posturing. But one thing is already clear: whichever side is perceived to sabotage the process by adopting an unduly intransigent attitude at any stage of the game will be condemned in the corridors of power all over the world. Thus aggressive posturing for maximum negotiating strength by either side is fraught with risk. In India’s case, a denial of visas to the Kashmiri leaders or a continuing refusal to agree to a meeting between its prime minister and the Pakistani chief executive, without sufficiently valid or palatable reasons, would hurt its cause. In Pakistan’s case, diminishing returns are bound to set in if suicide attacks by the Mujahideen continue on key military or civilian targets in India, thereby giving India a good excuse to abandon the peace process and hold Pakistan responsible for its breakdown. Thus the link between the Pakistani state and religio-political elements could spell trouble for the country on more than one count if it is not firmly calibrated. The moot question is whether Islamabad has the will and ability to do that.