Two months ago, we analyzed the developing political situation in Pakistan and editorialized (“Watch out for the General!”) on the role of COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani in months to come. Last week, as predicted, General Kayani got an unprecedented three year extension in service until November 2013 from the Zardari government. The terms of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, President Zardari and Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry end in February, September and December 2013 respectively. This has prompted Mr Gilani to claim, rather optimistically, that all of them will go home three years hence.
If General Kayani’s extension was a fact foretold for many political reasons – he had done a great job fighting the war against the Taliban, continuity in the midst of strategic success was absolutely necessary, the Pentagon was comfortable with him, etc etc – the controversial chronicling of the run-up to the announcement has cast a shadow on his achievement.
On May 23, a story was put out that the Corps Commanders had reposed their faith in General Kayani and endorsed an extension for him. On July 16, the military leaked a story that the extension announcement was expected within 72 hours, which meant before the arrival of the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, to Islamabad on July 18. However, when quizzed, Mr Gilani parried and Mrs Clinton sidestepped the question, setting tongues wagging. Then three eminent columns appeared in a row to question the wisdom of such a move, followed by a spate of letters for and against, with some wondering whether there might be an “American hand” behind the initiative.
That is when GHQ panicked. It had tried to get a favourable announcement before Mrs Clinton’s arrival on July 18 precisely to thwart any such speculation. But now, with the controversy threatening to get out of hand, it decided to lean on Mr Gilani and obtain a hurried three minute announcement on July 22.
Unfortunately, the tactic backfired. Mr Gilani’s nervous readout at an hour’s notice clearly implied either unbearable pressure from GHQ or the US or, worse still, both. Under the circumstances, the media and public opinion have tilted against the decision. The mainstream opposition PMLN remains opposed to it, while the other parties are only lukewarmly supporting it because it is a fait accompli. Some prominent columnists, whose opinion General Kayani is said to admire, have criticized the decision on one count or another.
But the worst is still to come. One section of the media is already saying that if General Kayani doesn’t back up the SC in its running battle with the government it will mean that he has done an unsavoury deal to ignore Mr Zardari’s shenanigans. Another is espousing exactly the opposite view – that the General will be tempted to prove his independence by secretly supporting the Supreme Court in destabilizing the presidency and government, which would be bad for democracy. Either way he loses. What next?
General Kayani is a thoughtful soldier. This situation cannot be to his liking. He has two options: to ride out the controversy, continue with his good soldiering and stay clear of politics regardless of any provocations or exhortations by any other state institution or media that would stir the embers again. Or he can stand above the fray, refuse this dubious honour and allow the succession principle to prevail in the army, thereby showing his confidence in his alma mater and colleagues to shoulder the task of guiding it in the future. Certainly, the last thing he should countenance is the suggestion by some reckless journalists that he should bid to reform the structure of the defense forces and become the Commander in Chief of all the three services in a unified command. That would unleash another unhealthy controversy involving disgruntled supporters of the autonomy of the air force and navy, which would erode the morale of the armed forces as a whole.
General Kayani has had an eventful nine year career as DG-MO, DG-ISI, VCOAS and COAS. He was part and parcel of some hugely controversial decisions taken by General Pervez Musharraf, including in 2007-08 the ouster of CJP Chaudhry, the commando action on the Red Mosque, the imposition of the Emergency, and the NRO deal with Benazir Bhutto. But it is equally true that, as Army Chief, he ensured a fair election in 2008, nudged the reluctant Zardari government to restore the Chief Justice to office and fought the war against the terrorists brilliantly when the occasion demanded it. Now, if he decides to stick around for another three years, he will find the going tougher than in the last nine years not just because of the baggage he is carrying but also because of the conflicting expectations of him by fiercely contending domestic and international political players.
Our own view remains consistent. In order to protect institutional integrity, the terms of service of army chiefs, judges and bureaucrats, however good or indispensable they may be, should not be extended. Similarly, in order to protect the process of democratization, the terms of elected governments, however bad they may be, must not be cut short by vested interest conspiracies and witch hunts under the garb of sham constitutionalism.