As most countries queue up to enter the 21st century, some like India seem poised to leap ahead. Others, like Pakistan, are conspicuous for lagging behind. “Measured by any index”, explains one foreign analyst, “India is undoubtedly the preeminent and pivotal power in South Asia”. In contrast, another influential foreign strategic thinker is worried that Pakistan “faces the prospect of instability to the point of chaos”. How ironic. Not so long ago, Pakistan was billed in think tanks abroad as a “pivotal state” in South Asia even as India was reported to be stumbling into its most “dangerous decades”. What sort of signals are emanating from Pakistan to create such negative perceptions abroad?
Yesterday, Pakistan was acknowledged as the world’s fourth largest democracy, warts and all. Today, it has been shoved to the backwaters of Burma and beyond. Yesterday, it was applauded for its policy of nuclear restraint. Today, its nuclear threats and ambitions are the stuff of western nightmares. Yesterday, it seemed to bask in the sunshine of the Lahore peace summit. Today, it is scowling in the chill of Kargil. Yesterday, its civil society was admired for its uniformly moderate Muslim behaviour. Today, significant elements are openly espousing violent jihads not just against India but also against the United States and Russia while the organs of the state stand by in acquiescence. Yesterday, its state institutions were broadly secular and in conformity with those of the developed world. Today, some of them are overtly ideological and others are laying down unrealistic cut-off dates and criteria for “Islamisation”. No wonder Pakistan looks completely out of step with the global village.
Two concrete examples on two critical issues of peace and security demonstrate our confused meanderings in foreign policy and statecraft. In late 1998, the government of Pakistan announced that it had “delinked” its position on the CTBT from that of India and would consider signing the treaty as soon as the “coercive environment” of post-nuclear test sanctions had been lifted by the Unites States. Since the prime minister and the army chief seemed in agreement, the foreign minister and the foreign secretary were duly dispatched to Washington to start negotiations. In due course, the United States significantly diluted the Pressler amendment and cobbled a debt relief package of US$ 4 billion from the Paris and London Clubs to bail out Pakistan. But by late 1999, Pakistan’s position on the CTBT had suddenly become tenuous. Its new foreign minister was blowing hot and cold. And, like true weathercocks, certain serving and retired generals and foreign-office types had begun to argue against signing the CTBT. Indeed, the defining phrase of yesterday—“coercive environment”—has been replaced by the qualifying phrase of today—“developing consensus”—as the main hurdle pending a signature on the CTBT. In effect, any quest for a worthwhile tactical initiative on the CTBT seems to have been abandoned in favour of clutching at India’s coattails once again.
The second issue relates to Kashmir policy. Yesterday, Islamabad discreetly deprived Kashmir of its “core” issue status and relegated it to the “outstanding” level of less intractable problems. Today, Kashmir has become a “core” issue again. Yesterday, confidence-building measures and track-2 diplomacy vis a vis India were de rigueur in Islamabad. Today, we are posing strict conditionalities for a resumption of dialogue with New Delhi. It is as though we have determined to play on New Delhi’s wicket at all times.
The same sort of confusion and lack of clarity seems to mark domestic policy. Three months ago, both the Chief Executive and the Finance Minister assured us that the dispute with Hubco would be settled within 30 days so that foreign investor confidence would be restored. Ninety days later, however, the 30-day deadline remains unchanged. We were also warned that GST and agricultural income tax would not be delayed, come hell or high water. Now we are assured that the day of reckoning has been postponed for six months at least. Then NAB was supposed to hold everyone, high or low, accountable. Now the judiciary and the army have been accorded the honour of sacred cows. Loan defaulters were on the top of NAB’s hit list. Now they have been relegated to the bottom. Corrupt politicians were to be uprooted in the blinking of an eye. Alas, “white-collar” crime rarely leaves any tracks behind. The day after the military takeover, the ECL had bloated to over 5000 names. Now it has been reasonably pared down to more “manageable” proportions. The hijacking case against Nawaz Sharif was said to be cut and dried, that is why it was the first to be launched. Three months later, the charges against him have yet to be framed and the judges are becoming stroppy. Last month, there was no question of restoring the assemblies. This month, politics has been reaffirmed as the “art of the possible”.
Yes sir, we know patience is a virtue. Yes sir, we understand radical reforms can’t be wrought overnight. But sir, you will appreciate there is too much at stake for us to suspend judgment when evidence of political immaturity and lack of strategic thinking begins to litter the bleak landscape of our beloved country.