There are two ways of looking at Pakistan on its 57th birthday. One, we can view it statically as a dysfunctional state system in which the social, political and economic indicators of progress like law and order, justice, provincial autonomy, security, health, education, employment, representative government, accountability, national consensus, social cohesion, civilian supremacy, all remain dismally poor. General Pervez Musharraf calls this the “half-empty glass” approach – the negative factors may be true but don’t tell the full or ‘real’ story of Pakistan today.
Two, we can look at Pakistan dynamically as “a work in progress”, a nation in the throes of dialectical change, moving painfully, haltingly towards a self – sustainable future. In this scenario, there is movement in the direction of higher economic growth, expanding private sector, freer media, bigger development expenditures and greater regional and international cooperation. More critically, we may even discern an extension of the “writ of the state” across the social and geographic landscape of the country aimed at curtailing the armed non-state actors who have usurped many of the rights of civil society in the last three decades. The dynamics of this state “deconstruction” – the “half-full glass” approach – could arguably constitute the elements of a welcome and necessary paradigm shift in the nature and functioning of the Pakistani state. Is this true? Which picture of Pakistan reflects its situation accurately?
A dynamic approach is always more realistic than a static one. While indicators of the level of state functionality are important, what is more important is to uncover the nature and direction of change in these indicators and to ascertain whether or not this change is temporary and expedient or intrinsic and enduring. How does Musharraf’s Pakistan score on this front?
General Musharraf’s 1999 coup was not premeditated as a harbinger of any reformist change, let alone paradigm shift, in Pakistan’s polity. In fact, his first two years were marked by concerns of personal survival and maintenance of the national status quo. If 9/11 hadn’t happened, compelling him to change some elements of his foreign policy, we might have continued going down the tube. But while General Musharraf was compelled to jettison or sideline oppositionists in his kitchen cabal, he was still not prepared to foreclose the era of jihad in the region by non-state actors. In fact, he was adamant that the Kashmir jihad could be clinically separated and de-linked from the Taliban-Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11 and continued as before. This “institutional” thinking led to the “national” failure at Agra, which triggered the jihadi attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi, which provoked India to a year-long eye-ball confrontation with Pakistan, which jeopardised the economic prospects of the country at the very time when crucial economic space was available as a result of cooperation with the USA. This chain of events compelled a shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy and led to the opening with Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2003 that was eventually translated into a “composite” rather than “core-issue” dialogue with India. General Musharraf’s strength lay in understanding the compulsions of state craft when confronted by the force of necessity rather than in anticipating and foreclosing the correct options at every point as acts of conscious reformist zeal or vision. This conclusion is best substantiated by the manner in which General Musharraf has handled his domestic, compulsion-free agenda. A classic status quo military strategy was followed to undermine the mainstream parties and ally with the religious parties in the elections of 2002. But soon thereafter the regional peace dialogue was joined with the international war against terrorism. However, when this agenda began to supersede the Islamic-jihadi paradigm, it provoked hostility from the MMA, jihadis and Al Qaeda. This culminated in assassination attempts on General Musharraf, his Karachi corps commander and his prime minister-in-waiting, compelling him to extend the war against Al Qaeda terrorism to the domestic non-state Islamist actors long nourished by the military for its “institutional” needs.
General Musharraf’s call for “enlightened moderation” in the affairs of state and society is a measure of his conclusions and convictions at the end of his compelling journey so far as leader of Pakistan. His new policy framework is externally manifested in the form of a serious peace dialogue with India, an unprecedented flexibility on Kashmir, an unremitting hostility towards Al Qaeda and a profitable alliance with the US. Domestically, it is marked by a crackdown on Islamic terrorism, by attempts to initiate curriculum reform and negotiate revision of the Hudood and other anti-women laws. The establishment, finally, of an enlightened Council of Islamic Ideology is a forerunner to a similar refurbishment of the Federal Shariat Court. All these acts reinforce each other and constitute the core of his new state philosophy. Are they, however, sufficient to enforce the paradigm shift necessary for self-sustainable growth of the Pakistan-nation-state?
No. While the direction of change is right, the momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass. In addition, two core elements are still missing from the equation. First, the jihadis have not yet been “packed up”. Apparently, the military’s argument is that until a “satisfactory solution” on Kashmir is found, this card cannot be abandoned unilaterally. This reflects an unfortunate hangover of institutional thinking at variance with the national interest formulated under the new rubric of “enlightened moderation”. The sooner General Musharraf realises this, the better. Certainly, the jihadis are in no two minds about packing him up along with his enlightened views. The cost of obtaining a solution to Kashmir on the back of the jihadis has proven both elusive and exorbitant. It is time to give up this failed strategy unilaterally. Second, the MMA has also got to be packed up so that the doctrine of “enlightened moderation” can take root across the country. But this cannot be done by force. It can only be done democratically on the basis of a new round of free elections in which room is made for the moderate mainstream parties to naturally pack up the reactionary politico-religious parties.
As long as General Pervez Musharraf’s agenda doesn’t address these two core concerns, his doctrine of “enlightened moderation” will remain an opportunistic philosophy incapable of protecting, enhancing and projecting the true national interest. Indeed, the proof that General Musharraf is finally his own man rather than a man of necessity only, and that Pakistan is irrevocably embarked upon a journey of creative rediscovery on its 57th birthday under his leadership, will only come when he moves pre-emptively to resolve these two issues of his own free will. Then the glass will truly be “half-full” and it would be an exhilarating experience to drink from it.
On that optimistic note, Happy Birthday Pakistan!