Much has been made of the recent talks in Islamabad between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan. Prim e Minister Nawaz Sharif says that the inclusion of Kashmir in the agenda for future negotiations between India and Pakistan is a “major achievement” of his government. Some commentators agree with Mr Sharif that the joint communique is a “significant breakthrough” on Kashmir for his government. A few are delighted that Pakistan has made definite progress “without compromising” its well-known positions. What is the truth?
Two crucial points should be noted about the wording of the joint communique. The foreign secretaries have agreed: (1) “to address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides including… Jammu and Kashmir”. (1) “to set up a mechanism, including working groups at appropriate levels, to address all these issues in an integrated manner”. The key phrase in (1) is “issues of concern”. The Pakistanis would have dearly loved to substitute this for “disputes of concern”. Both the Indians have got away with “issues”. This allows them, at a later stage, if necessary, to take the position that Pakistan’s alleged abetment of the guerilla war in Srinagar is an “issue of concern” to New Delhi “because Kashmir is an integral part of India” ― a position that all Indian leaders, including Prime Minister I K Gujral, have consistently taken domestically.
The second point refers to future discussion of all these “issues in an integrated manner”. The Indians would have dearly loved to discuss each “issue” separately on its own merits to that progress could have been made on the lest contentious “issues” quickly (like Siachin, Sir Creek, Trade, Visa restrictions, etc) while the more difficult “issue” of Kashmir could have been put into cold-storage pending sufficient confidence-building measures. The Pakistanis have therefore done well to insist on an “integrated” approach to all the “issues” bedeviling relations between the two countries. If there is no progress on Kashmir, Islamabad can always begin to drag its feet on the other “issues” by insisting that India is not following an “integrated” approach.
Both sides therefore appear to have stuck to their old positions. The Indians have not admitted that Kashmir is a “dispute” while the Pakistanis will not discuss the other issues unless Kashmir figures prominently in the negotiations. Where is the breakthrough?
If there is a “breakthrough”, it is mainly for Western diplomatic strategy in South Asia. The foreign secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan were modelled on the format made popular by America’s ‘Camp David’ peace expertise in the track-two diplomacy in South Asia funded by the Ford Foundation and some German peace NGOs. The fundamental strategy of the talks is to indefinitely extend the scope of bilateral discussions and thus create an environment for bilateral settlement over the long haul. That is also the European experience of CBMs in conflict-resolution.
That said, we may note some conclusions from the strategy adopted by both sides in Islamabad.
*This may be the first time that the governments of both countries have abandoned their traditional style of stating maximalist positions in anticipation of an early deadlock and taken up the format used in track-two diplomacy ― namely, making “baskets” out of “issues”, prioritising them on the basis of the prejudices of the two sides and predicating their discussions over an indefinite time-frame. The ‘basket’ which includes economic relations is featured last in the list of issues, which allays the Pakistani fear that the Kashmir issue might be obfuscated through talks on bilateral trade.
*The Gujral doctrine can be observed in Secretary Salman Haider’s ;’concession’ on Kashmir, namely, that India is prepared to discuss Kashmir unconditionally. Over the last seven years, since track-two diplomacy started, Mr Gujral’s friends in the Institute of Policy Research in New Delhi have been criticising Indian governments for brickwalling any discussion on Kashmir.
*Both governments are under pressure domestically and have expressed views on Kashmir that are irreconcilable. Mr Gujral is presiding over a weak United Front government and can be toppled if he deviates from the position expressed by his own party stalwarts: that far from yielding Occupied Kashmir to plebiscite under UN resolutions, India should demand the return of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit from Pakistan under the accession agreement between the Maharaja of Kashmir and Prime Minister Nehru.
*Mian Nawaz Sharif leads a strong government in Pakistan and has been able to withstand pressure from the ‘jehad’ in Kashmir. He has continued to repose confidence in Mr Gujral despite reassessment by the Pakistani media after the Male thaw. But he has had to carefully limit his formulation of policy to the traditional demand of plebiscite without the possibility of a third option. Fortunately, however, he has retained enough ambiguity to make bilateral discussions possible.
*Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have failed between India and Pakistan and proven useless since the Brasstacks exercise alarmed the world. But the biggest CBM are the talks themselves. This time they are formatted in such a way that “deadlocks” are not expected to appear in the medium-future, as in January 1994.
*In the interim period, the two prime ministers are expected to keep the friendly environment intact and may even nibble at the periphery of the Kashmir crisis by scaling down hostilities. Mian Nawaz Sharif’s call that both India and Pakistan should withdraw troops from Kashmir has leaned on the ambiguity available in the UN resolution calling for this withdrawal. This could shroud an undertaking that ‘jehad’ may be scaled down in return for significant army withdrawals from the valley by India.
*The reason why economic relations have been put in the last basket is the postponement of the SAARC free-trade area from 2002 to 2105. Pakistan has gradually increased its items under trade with India and has recently offered to sell 3000 mw of electricity to India which will balance bilateral trade. But because India cannot force Pakistan to open trade and award MFN status to India, Indian trading circles have told Mr Gujral to offer “concessions” to Pakistan on trade instead of forcing the hand of Mian Nawaz Sharif under the WTO fiat.