For centuries Afghanistan was a backwater of the sprawling empires of history. Even the Great Game of the 19th century which later triggered the creation of many new states in this region largely ignored this land mass because it had nothing to offer anyone. It was not located on any of the trade routes of contiguous continents. It was landlocked, lacked an agricultural economy and offered no raw materials which could be exploited for imperialist purposes.
Left to fend for itself, Afghanistan’s multi-national tribal mosaic remained inimical to the rapid development of modern state structures. Under the shadow of the USSR, however, a beginning was made by the tribal monarchy in the 1950s. But the deepening cold war put paid to that. Convinced that the Soviets would eventually use Kabul as a stepping stone to the ‘warm waters’ of the Arabian sea and threaten its Middle Eastern oil, the US buttressed the countries in the crescent of containment — Turkey, Iran and Pakistan — and focussed on a new, Greater Game to contain the Soviet bear in Afghanistan.
In consequence, Raza Pahlavi’s overtures to President Daud coupled with Henry Kissinger’s visit to Kabul in 1976 with offers of aid created the perfect backdrop for the Soviet-inspired coup in 1978 which was followed by direct military intervention. The eruption of the Iranian revolution which deposed the Pahlavi policeman in the region only made the situation more desperate for the US.
Zia ul Haq’s longevity was thus immediately assured. A rag-tag band of Afghans was cobbled to create a resistance, fueled by the most ambitious pipeline of arms and funds the Western allies and ever assembled in recent decades. The doubly-threatened oil rich states of the Middle-East, led by Saudi Arabia, were also nudged to pitch in for the greater glory of the Islamic Ummah’s ‘jehad’ against the infidels.
With the demise of communism and the end of ideology, the Greater Game is now over. But the ‘Jihad’ is apparently alive and kicking. Consequently there may be no respite for the Afghan state — it seems fated to be the victim of an ‘Islamic Game’ at the hands of opportunistic neighbours and squabbling internal factions.
The recent agreement on Negative Symmetry between the US and USSR will end the supply of military and economic aid by both superpowers to the warring Afghan protagonists. Clearly, the logic of this development — by making war more difficult — is to strengthen the efforts of the United Nations to affect a negotiated, peaceful solution acceptable to all vested interests in the Afghan conflict.
But there is another, more powerful, logic in contention. According to this, now is the moment to continue politics by other means — war — because the Saudis and the Pakistanis are not bound by the accord on Negative Symmetry to withhold assistance to the Afghan mujahideen. By militarily backing their favourites among the mujahideen, these powers say they should be able to secure a decisive edge over a relatively handicapped Najibullah and oust him from power. Accordingly, a military offensive to capture Gardez is already underway with the objective of provoking rebellion in Kabul.
This is a dangerous move. Chances are that, as in the past, a divided resistance may fail to capture Gardez. But even if the capture of Gardez acts as a catalyst to provoke a successful coup d’etat against Najibullah, we might ask ourselves: where do we go from there? To the negotiating table with a transitional regime in Kabul which is willing to talk to the United Nations on its terms? Most probably not. In the flush of victory and the scramble for power and territory, it is more than likely that the proponents of war will be recklessly spurred on to try and take Kabul.
Such a military strategy would undoubtedly derail the UN’s peace plans by sowing greater discord among the already fractious Afghan groups jealous of Messrs Hekmatyar & Co. It would also terminate Mr Akram Zaki’s painstaking Tripartite initiatives.
Neither Iran nor the other Afghan commanders, especially the powerful group led by Ahmad Shah Masoud in the north will countenance the capture of Kabul by the forces of Messrs Hekmatyar & Co. And Afghanistan will mot likely be partitioned among a number of warlords backed by ambitious neighbours like Iran, Pakistan and Soviet Muslim republic of Kazakhistan. In a new civil war, the enfeebled Afghan state may then disintegrate with a violence which will make Lebanese passions look like child’s play.
If Afghanistan is to survive as a country, its people must be given a reasonable chance to establish a new state structure according to the tribal pluralism of its society. Peace, not war, is a prerequisite for that. That is why Pakistan should exclusively support the Tripartite approach under the umbrella of the United Nations as the only way out.