The Friday Times: Najam Sethi’s Editorial
The civil-military leadership of Pakistan has taken nine months to settle issues with the US arising out of the Salala incident last November that could have been better resolved in nine days. As a result, Pakistan’s international isolation has grown, its economy has foundered and the domestic credibility of the civil and military leadership has been eroded. There will be adverse short and long term consequences of this gross policy miscalculation. Consider.
Seven months months ago, in exchange for reopening the NATO supply lines, the US was ready to “apologise”, pay compensation, give “assurances” that Salala would not be repeated, respect Pakistan’s “sovereignty” and release over US$2 billion in Coalition Support/Kerry Lugar funds. But we said no, we wanted much more – an end to drone strikes, twenty times the current transit fee, no military hardware in NATO trucks, reduction in CIA footprint, etc. Indeed, after the military cunningly passed the buck to the Zardari government three months later, Senator Raza Rabbani’s bipartisan parliamentary committee deliberated for another three months to churn out a list of 35 demands which COAS General Ashfaq Kayani and President Asif Zardari reduced to half a dozen before signing on the dotted line in the next three months. And what did we get from the US?
We didn’t get an “apology” from President Obama like the Afghans did earlier. Instead, Hilary Clinton said “we’re sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistan military” but added “we are both sorry for losses suffered by both our countries.” We didn’t obtain a halt to drone strikes. We didn’t get a penny more on transit fees. And NATO trucks will still carry uninspected military hardware (listed as supplies for the Afghan National Security Forces). So how did we miscalculate?
We thought we had the US over a barrel because the Northern Network was unfeasible. In the event, the US spent $1 billion dollars to resist our pressure. We thought boycotting the Bonn and Chicago moots would compel NATA to listen to us. But the US went ahead anyway, formulating its end-game strategy for Afghanistan without input from us.
We thought we could hang on without CSF, Kerry Lugar aid and the IMF. But we couldn’t. The rupee has lost nearly 10 % of its value, the budget is broke and domestic debt has soared.
We also miscalculated the intensity of counter pressure by the US. First, President Obama ratcheted up pressure in the US Congress to stop economic and military aid to Pakistan pending restoration of NATO supply lines. Second, the US Congress raised the spectre of declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism by threatening to label the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Tayba as global terrorist organisations, the implication being that economic and military sanctions would follow under international law. Third, Washington persuaded Riyadh to hand over Abu Jindal, the LeT activist who organized and orchestrated the Mumbai attack in 2008, to India, raising the threat of formally linking the ISI to international terrorism. Fourth, it is openly committed to aligning with India as a strategic partner in Kabul as part of the New Grand Silk Route linking emerging markets.
The Pakistani military miscalculated on two fronts. It underestimated America’s resolve to fashion the Afghan end game according to its own national interests. It also overestimated the Zardari government’s anxiety to please the Americans by taking sole ownership of the decision to restore the NATO supply lines. In the event, the Americans didn’t blink and the Zardari government took refuge behind parliament to protect its flanks from the opposition on the home front. The net result, to Pakistan’s great disadvantage, was an inordinate delay in diffusing the crisis.
The military and government are both hoping that US funds and weapons will flow to ease their respective problems. But the opposition and media are likely to exploit the anti-American public sentiment to blast the belated agreement. Resumption of drone strikes and American exhortations to “do more” against the Haqqani network will reinforce anti-Americanism in the country and lead to criticism of both our military and political leaders for “selling out” to the Americans.
The rupture between the Pentagon and the Pakistani military was triggered by bitter strategic differences about the future shape of Afghanistan. It cannot be papered over by the latest terms of “reconciliation” between them. Other flash points are bound to occur in the run-up to 2014. The problem is that the GLOC point of rupture has also isolated Pakistan among the 47 influential countries that comprise NATO. Worse, the continuing tragedy is that Pakistan’s civil-military leadership has been unwilling and unable to formulate a new national interest paradigm for Pakistan in which regional and global integration and internal stability rather than international isolation and political and economic anarchy come to characterize Pakistan.
There have been unforgivable debacles of miscalculation and overreach on the watch of the current civil-military leadership in Pakistan. It is time for a change of guard.