Mr Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, received a mixed reception in both countries recently. In Kabul the government of President Hamid Karzai has been bristling with resentment at official leaks by Washington about the corruption in the presidency and mis-governance in the Kabul administration. Indeed, there has been “informed” speculation in Washington about Mr Karzai’s fate, with several unabashedly pro-US candidates in the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan vying for Washington’s support against Mr Karzai.
In Islamabad, the situation was, if anything, more complex. The government of President Asif Zardari is squirming between an irresistible force (US) and an immovable object (Pak army). Mr Zardari wants something like a Marshall Plan from the West, led by the US, worth US$30 billion to bail out Pakistan over the next five years or so. He also recognizes the Al-Qaeda-Taliban network as the core threat to the stability of his government and the security of his country. So he is suitably “soft” towards the Americans. But the Pak army, which is autonomous if not independent from the government, isn’t on the same page. It retains a stranglehold over the tactics and strategy of national security, into which is woven the powerful fabric of its own institutional interests. Its outlook is long-term while that of the civilian government is short-term. And it is readily able to tap into the vast reservoir of anti-American and anti-Zardari sentiment in the country, media and establishment to flog its interests and point of view quite effectively.
Washington has accused the ISI of playing a “double game”. It alleges that while cooperating with NATO to take out Al-Qaeda operatives in the urban and tribal areas of the country, the ISI has been protecting the leaders and forces of the Afghan Taliban and facilitating their movement and attacks across the border into Afghanistan. Consequently, Washington’s attempts to undermine and weaken the ISI have not amused General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief. The current ISI bears his unmistakable stamp and he is unequivocally still in charge of it. Gen Kayani was its DG before becoming COAS, an unprecedented development in Pakistani military history. More significantly, he has handpicked and promoted the current ISI chief, General Shuja Pasha, which is also unprecedented because this prerogative is a prime ministerial one, normally giving the ISI chief a degree of autonomy as a go-between GHQ and the PM’s secretariat. But not this time round. Gen Pasha is as apolitical as they come. He was DG-Military Operations and personally supervised the military intervention in the tribal areas and Swat. He was originally fated to retire as a Major General and take up a UN assignment. But by promoting and shunting him to the ISI, Gen Kayani has established a firm and direct control over both military operations and intelligence. Therefore the more Washington attacks the ISI, the more GHQ is angered, alienated and estranged, which is proving counter-productive as far as US-GHQ cooperation is concerned. This is one reason why Washington’s proposal for joint US-Pak military operations in the tribal areas has not been embraced by Pakistan. It is also another reason why Washington’s attempts to establish joint intelligence sharing between the ISI, Afghan Intelligence and CIA is not likely to get too far.
Washington’s tactics of wooing General Kayani publicly are also misplaced. Given the rampant anti-Americanism in the country and national security establishment, the last thing General Kayani wants is to be seen as being too “friendly” (read “servile”) with the “untrustworthy” Americans. Therefore Admiral Mullen’s continuingly gushing remarks about General Kayani (which amount to saying “he’s my buddy”) are making the Pakistani army chief squirm in his lair. Worse, they are compelling him to take an unnecessarily adversarial position behind the scenes by leaning on the civilian government and manipulating the media to counter American “bullying” on Af-Pak affairs. Hence the quite unprecedented statement by Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, at the conclusion of Mr Holbrooke’s visit about the existence of significant “gaps” between the American and Pakistani positions on how to go about prosecuting the “war on terror”. Indeed, the brevity of the remarks, the body language of the two sides, and the insistence by both that no blank cheque will be given to the other, were not terribly encouraging signs.
The Pakistani national security establishment also finds Washington’s pressure for short term gains in time for Congressional elections back home next year unacceptable. It is not going to squander its longer term Afghan-India strategy and assets at any such American altar. Therefore its message to the Pakistani government is: dig your heels in and don’t give in to Washington’s political bullying, military cajolements or financial enticements. Given the intrinsic nature of civil-military relations, the weak Zardari government and exclusive operational hold of the army and ISI on military ops, the conclusion is foregone.
If Washington isn’t more careful and discerning, US-Pak relations will head into a short-term trough. Anti-Americanism is rising. The Zardari government is already on the defensive for various domestic reasons. And the Taliban-Al Qaeda network has brought terrorism to the urban areas of the country, demoralizing the thinly stretched civilian security forces and confusing the people.