A clutch of important Pakistani leaders visited Saudi Arabia last week. These included General Tariq Majeed, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and General Ashfaq Kayani, COAS. There is speculation that maybe Mr Nawaz Sharif too paid a secret visit there recently. Mr Sharif’s trips to Riyadh always set tongues wagging, given his close links to the Saudi monarchy which is singularly responsible for his rising political fortune. Mr Sharif, interestingly, was in Dubai for a day last Tuesday, probably to meet President Asif Zardari who made a detour before turning around and flying off to Japan for the critical moot of the “Friends of Pakistan” consortium. The FOP is deliberating how much economic assistance to give Pakistan over the next few years and Saudi Arabia may turn out to be the biggest single donor in it.
Are these meetings, therefore, all about propping up Mr Zardari’s government and Pakistan’s economy? Is Mr Sharif hoisting the national interest above his party political interest by putting in a good word with the Saudis on behalf of Mr Zardar? Is General Kayani also backing up Mr Zardari for the grand sake of democracy?
Not at all. None of the political players is doing anything without a core vested interest. Indeed, there is a seamlessness about political developments in Pakistan since that fateful day of March 16 when Mr Zardari was out maneuvered by a combination of Army and America, and Mr Sharif was raised as a smart alternative to Mr Zardari in Washington. The fact that visiting American, British and EU bigwigs have probably met Mr Sharif as many times as they have President Zardari, says it all.
In consequence, we have seen their joint handwork in unmistakable terms. First, Mr Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry was restored as chief justice of Pakistan. Second, and as a consequence of Mr Chaudhry’s intervention, Mr Shahbaz Sharif was restored as chief minister of Punjab by a specially constituted bench of the Supreme Court. Third, Mr Zardari decided to constitute a bipartisan parliamentary committee to determine how to implement the Charter of Democracy and get rid of the 17th constitutional amendment, which empowers the office of the President and stops Mr Sharif from becoming a prime minister for the third time. Surely, this was not done happily and voluntarily. Fourth, the decision by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani to invite Mr Sharif’s PMLN to join the federal cabinet and claim a stake in government is not gratuitous. It suggests there is pressure from certain quarters to get Mr Sharif to take greater responsibility for certain unpalatable decisions regarding the “war against terror” and belt-tightening the economy. Fifth, Mr Zardari’s decision to place the matter of the Nizam i Adl Regulation in Swat, which cements a dubious peace deal between the local government and the Taliban, before parliament and get its stamp of approval unanimously, implies that Mr Zardari has finally succumbed to pressure and didn’t want to take sole responsibility in the event of its failure. Sixth, the release of Maulana Aziz, the firebrand Lal Masjid religious leader, from prison on the orders of the Chaudhry-led Supreme Court, on April 15, against the inclination of the Zardari administration, signals an army/ISI interest because he might prove an intelligence asset in the three-way tussle for leverage between the Army, Taliban and America. Similarly, Mr Sharif’s cooperation suggests a movement towards a “national government” as a prelude to a mid-term election, which remains the PMLN’s most outstanding demand.
Still, there are wheels within wheels. Washington first put all its eggs in Benazir Bhutto’s basket and then in Mr Zardari’s. But President Musharraf didn’t survive the political fallout of the elections. So Washington quickly transferred its affection to General Kayani. However, this didn’t pay off because General Kayani was angered by the Obama administration’s allegations of “double dealing” by the ISI and crude attempts to nudge Mr Zardari to cut the secret agency down to size. So Mr Sharif was brought on board, to give the civilian government greater muscle and popular backing. That is where the Saudis come in, right behind Mr Sharif.
Mr Zardari has been considerably weakened in the last month or so by a string of bad political decisions which have alienated him from the army and most Pakistanis. Meanwhile, the US is frustrated because it is unable to have its way fully with Islamabad. The recent assertion of “gaps” between Washington and Islamabad, at the behest of the hardline army, including a refusal to give a blank cheque to Mr Holbrooke, is a measure of the bumps that lie ahead.
Mr Zardari wants nothing less than a Marshall Plan to bail out Pakistan and stabilize his PPP government. But the US is tying money and weapons to a proper quid pro quo from the army and ISI. However, both are not ready to accept Mr Zardari’s pro-US prescriptions because of long-held views on regional security. So the US is compelling him to bring Mr Sharif into the loop because of his popular backing. But Mr Sharif has his own agenda. He is using Saudi money and clout to guarantee a passage back to power sooner than later. Which power or actor will ultimately prevail and what will be the fate of Pakistan in these tumultuous times remains to be seen.