We know that many army officers have been arrested and are being interrogated for their alleged involvement in an abortive coup. There is speculation about their exact agenda because Islamabad and Rawalpindi don’t want to say much until they have got to the bottom of the matter. That is perfectly reasonable.
What is not acceptable is the attempt by certain quarters to portray these adventurers as “patriots” representing the popular will. Nor is it correct to try and absolve them of subversion by propagating the falsehood that they were only trying to help the jihadis in Kashmir. The fact is that a group of army officers tried to smuggle a truckload of arms into Rawalpindi in order to overthrow the established constitutional order of the state.
This coup attempt, however naive, should not be shrugged away like the Rawalpindi or Attock conspiracies which were against the government in power. Some of the recently detained officers were known for parading dangerous extremist views aimed at overthrowing the Pakistani state in the garb of “Islamic revolution”. If this is a disturbing revelation, it is not altogether unexpected.
In the last two decades, the ethos and mindset of the officer corps has undergone a slow but radical transformation. The officers of earlier decades were largely drawn from cosmopolitan landed elites which had a stake in the order bequeathed by colonialism. In contrast, today’s officers are recruited from the urban middle-classes which are homespun, nationalistic and conservative. General Zia ul Haq added a new cultural dimension to this economic and political phenomenon by painting it in Islamic colours (“Faith, purity and jihad in the name of Islam” became the new slogan of the army under him in comparison to the Quaid’s “Unity, faith, discipline” ) and the “jihad” in Afghanistan strengthened this trend. The cut-off in American military aid to the Pakistan army in 1990, followed by the Western invasion of Iraq, has served to reaffirm a sense of nationalistic morality among the officers while the genocide in Muslim Bosnia and Muslim Kashmir has provoked Islamic outrage. If the “clash of civilisation” theorists want to find budding converts, all they have to do is to scratch the lower and middle ranks of the Pakistan army.
Simmering disgruntlement amongst officers has become palpable because the political system of “democracy” appears out of step with the requirements of state and society. The responsibility for this perception, unfortunately, lies at the door of our bickering and corrupt political elites. An added source of frustration is the absence of any significant urban, middle class representation in the leading political parties of the country. The erosion of middle class incomes by inflation and the paucity of respectable jobs in a sputtering economy has fueled resentment against a system which is not delivering.
The abortive coup should therefore serve as an eye opener for our rulers — for those in Islamabad as well as the ones in Rawalpindi because it was aimed against both these interests. In the case of Rawalpindi, there may be an added source of disquiet or anxiety.
General Abdul Waheed, the COAS, has presided over a difficult political period in which the role of the army chief has attracted, however unfairly, some adverse comment from one side of the political divide. Now there is unhealthy speculation about the possibility of an extension in General Waheed’s tenure. Some quarters claim that the government has asked him to stay on as COAS for another year because he seems well disposed towards it. Others insist that he will turn down the offer even if it is made to him because it would confirm suspicions of his partisanship and tar his impeccably professional career. Whatever the truth, one thing is clear: as long as the matter of the COAS’s extension or succession hangs fire, uncertainty will persist not only in society but also within the army.
Public opinion, as reflected in the editorials of leading newspapers, is against the idea of an extension to the army chief just as it is in favour of a civilian government completing its term for once in our history. People say that, at the very least, two elected governments have to complete their full term and two army chiefs have to go home on time before Pakistan can be presumed to be politically stable.
A related question concerns the choice of a successor to General Waheed. While it is not our business to say who is the right candidate for the job and who isn’t, we can certainly insist upon a number of principles. Seniority, professionalism and administrative experience are obvious criteria. But it is equally important that the new man should arouse universal respect rather than controversy of any kind. The army deserves a true soldier as its chief to attune it to the challenges of the post-cold war era.
General Abdul Waheed has been an exemplary chief. It is now time for President Farooq Leghari, who has sworn to uphold the integrity of the state, to nominate the new chief quickly and for the right reasons.