After a lifetime crowded with passion, violence, opportunism, controversy and arrogance, Akbar Bugti’s wish at the ripe old age of 80 to transcend his tribal limitations and personal rivalries and be dubbed a martyr for the cause of Baloch nationalism may well come true. How did this happen? What are its consequences?
Mr Bugti was pro-Pakistan and pro-Jinnah before the Partition. He expected his personal and tribal prospects to flourish in a democratic and federal Pakistan. But General Ayub Khan’s martial law and One-Unit scheme in the 1960s was inimical to such a setup. Resistance, incarceration, alienation and radicalization among the Baloch followed. After the disenfranchisement of the Bengalis led to war and secession, the Baloch papered over tribal rivalries and banded together to demand provincial and local rights in 1972. But Z A Bhutto’s Bonapartism sought to snuff them out. He rewarded Mr Bugti with provincial governorship for splitting with his nationalist Marri-Mengal colleagues. This was a grave error on Mr Bugti’s part. He was isolated and condemned thereafter by fellow Baloch. But he didn’t have the humility or wisdom to rebuild fences with them. So he became a loner, isolated from mainstream Baloch politics, dependent upon Islamabad for his political well being. As chief minister during Benazir Bhutto’s time, he earnestly negotiated the Bugti tribe’s contracts with Pakistan Petroleum Ltd and the federal government like a good trade union leader.
This local role was entrenched over time for two reasons. The Marris and Mengals combined to share power with Pakhtun elements in Balochistan while Mr Bugti sulked on the sidelines throughout the 1990s. Thus, as the province learnt to be flexibile regarding greater autonomy, Mr Bugti was inclined to brawl with governments in Islamabad. When Islamabad tried to cut him down to size him by propping up his local opponents, he became furious and vindictive. But a combination of new political developments in the post 1999 period made Mr Bugti’s isolated and prickly position dangerously untenable. This is what happened.
General Musharraf arrived on the scene with self-serving ideas “to rescue Pakistan from the clutches of corrupt politicians, feudal lords and tribal chieftains”. His agenda’s centre-piece was a local body system in which there was no room for traditional and relatively autonomous power-wielders. In Punjab and Sindh, this meant a scuttling of the landed and commercial support base of politicians like Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto; in the NWFP and Balochistan it meant the replacement of the big and rebellious Sardars and Nawabs by smaller tribal and middle-class elements. This strategy was seemingly clinched via rigging the 2002 elections and ousting Bhutto’s PPP from Sindh, Sharif’s PMLN from Punjab, ANP nationalists from the NWFP and the Marri-Mengal-Bugti triumvirate from Balochistan. The Military-Mullah Alliance was reinvented to strengthen the military’s domination over the country. Inevitably, however, there was resistance from the ousted players.
Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif were dependent on peaceful street protest to make their voice heard. But the masses were cynical and fatigued. However, the Baloch Sardars could recourse to the time-tested path of armed resistance by fiercely loyal tribesmen. Thus as Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif wearily inched toward a feeble Charter of Democracy, the Marris and Mengals set up the Balochistan Liberation Army and tried to nudge Mr Bugti to join forces with them. In the event, India and Afghanistan jointly sensed an opportunity to exact historical revenge from Pakistan’s military establishment by financing and training the BLA.
Mr Bugti was now impaled on the horns of a dilemma. He could swallow pride and join the BLA under the leadership of the Marris or he could fight his own battles with Islamabad. In the event, he opted to flirt with the BLA in order to extract concessions from Islamabad. But he overplayed his hand. Unlike politicians who relish long-drawn negotiations and are prepared to compromise, military commanders seek swift and outright victory on the basis of their might. So Genenal Musharraf wrapped up the Chaudhry Shujaat-Mushahid Hussain committee and closed the door on Mr Bugti. This provoked the BLA to recklessly tempt fate by attacking the IG-FC and lob shells at General Musharraf during a tribal gathering in Marri area in December 2005. The dye was cast for irrevocable military action against the BLA and Mr Bugti.
The final military action was predicated on the calculation that Balach Marri, the son of Khair Bux Marri and commander of the BLA, and Brahamdag Bugti, the heir apparent of Mr Bugti, would also be eliminated in one fell swoop, thereby decapitating all tribal resistance. The cruel irony, however, is that the main targets escaped and the frail old man who couldn’t even walk was felled by a hail of bullets and bombs from the gallant defenders of Pakistan.
History has a cruel way of making heroes and budding nationalisms need martyrs like Akbar Bugti for sustenance. His killing is significant. It should remind us of the crippling results of military dominance in Pakistan – dismemberment, violent sectarianism, Al-Qaeda and Talibanism – and warn us of the disastrous consequences for Pakistan if Balochistan is sucked into a new great game to redraw the map of the region.