Pakistan is currently involved in complex negotiations with US Undersecretary for International Security, Mr Reginald Bartholomew, over its status as a nuclear power. The final outcome of these crucial talks, which is some ways off, should determine whether Pakistan is accepted as an honourable member in the comity of democratic nations or is ultimately branded a “rogue regime” and isolated internationally.
Therefore, whatever decisions we take on untying the nuclear knot without jeopardising our genuine security concerns should be rational, enlightened and perceptive. Equally, for such decisions to be implementable and enduring, it is necessary that they be based on a consensus in society which, it should not be forgotten, is pluralistic in nature with several centres of power vying for supremacy.
Pakistan has three options. It can retain its status of “nuclear ambiguity”, it can test a nuclear device and put its bomb on the shelf or it can agree to a “temporary restraint” in its nuclear programme pending the acceptance by India of the 5-Nation proposals. Pakistan, of course, is committed to signing the NPT on equal-terms with India.
Clearly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain our ambiguous posture for much longer. The fact is that our nuclear programme is not hidden from the Americans — that is why US aid was cut-off last year — and we have already lost the moral high ground. Consequently, economic, political and military pressure on Pakistan is likely to increase if we refuse to budge. A logical outcome over time would be for Pakistan to be isolated internationally, shorn of economic assistance and crippled in conventional defence capabilities. Since diminishing returns have set in, sticking to this position cannot be advocated.
We could, alternatively, test a nuclear device and push for stocking a nuclear deterrent against India. Apart from attracting all the international penalties of being a “rogue regime”, an exhausting arms race with India beyond the “multiple-nuclear deterrent” stage (which is what it would logically amount to) is absolutely the last thing any rational Pakistani would want.
A third option merits serious consideration. Should Pakistan agree to a “temporary restraint” (rather than an unambiguous “roll-back”) on its nuclear programme which allows it to “skirt” the Pressler Amendment (thereby restoring sorely-needed economic and military aid) and gives the Americans sufficient elbow-room to pressurise the Indians to accept a non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime in South Asia?
This is an attractive proposition. It depends, of course, on our ability to sit with the Americans and hammer out the technical modalities of such “restraint” so that we can remain a screw-driver’s turn away from our present position yet allow them “sufficient” space to waive Pressler and shore up our conventional defences. The Americans would also be expected to lean on India and negotiate our 5-Nation proposals. We might be also advised, in the bargain, to insist on debt relief from our Western friends.
There is, however, one major problem with this approach. How can Mian Nawaz Sharif “sell” this idea to the public at large, in particular to the leader of the opposition Benazir Bhutto, without being accused, however unfairly, of “selling out” on Pakistan’s security concerns? Mian Sahib has hurled the most vile abuse against Bhutto =. His government has unleashed a horrible campaign of repression against her party. His mentor, the President, is seeking to dismember her party and disqualify her for seven years. How can anyone reasonably expect a legitimate response from an opposition denied all legitimate forms of expression?
No, if the sufficient condition for obtaining international legitimacy is to appropriately “restrain” our nuclear programme, a necessary condition to sell such “restraint” at home is to cobble together a national consensus in support of the cause. Without mending fences with the opposition and taking it into confidence, much as former prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo did before Pakistan signed the Geneva Accords, talking to the Americans on the nuclear issue would be akin to putting the cart before the horse.
The real irony is that Mian Sahib has publicly accused Ms Bhutto of “leaking” nuclear secrets to foreign journalists (which is a load of rubbish) while he is secretly negotiating with the Americans to find a way out of Pakistan’s nuclear impasse. He did much the same thing during the Gulf war — while publicly supporting the Allies against Iraq he accused Bhutto of pandering to the Americans!
The Americans should not be oblivious to the spite with which the government and the opposition in Pakistan treat each other. As things stand, there is no possibility of any national consensus on how Pakistan should deal with the US in order to untie the nuclear knot. Mr Reginald Bartholomew would be advised not to put all his nuclear eggs in the basket proffered by Messrs Ghulam Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif. Pakistan desperately needs to put its own house in order before it should be taken seriously by its friends abroad.