Most Pakistanis tend to believe that Mr Nawaz Sharif’s trip to Washington was a “total flop”. It was a flop, they say, because the Americans didn’t budge an inch from their step-by-step nuclear agenda for Pakistan in exchange for step-by-step cash injections to Pakistan’s stricken economy from the IMF/World Bank/ADB, including a limited debt moratorium from the Paris/London Clubs. That is why, it is pointed out, the IMF high command has duly postponed a decision to restore assistance to Pakistan while the Paris/London Clubs are not expected to make any announcement of any debt moratorium until end-January or February at the earliest. The business community has responded to this “bad” news by pulling the stock market down and international credit rating agencies have further downgraded Pakistan’s credit worthiness to CC minus.
The American non-proliferation agenda is formally maximalist. The US wants Pakistan to (1) sign the CTBT immediately and provide parliamentary ratification of it by September 1999 (2) freeze the production of uranium immediately and enable Washington to inspect compliance (3) amend the constitution to forbid the export of nuclear know-how and technology immediately (4) freeze the production of missiles immediately and refrain from deploying them (5) refrain from embarking upon a nuclear weaponisation programme (6) make durable peace with India on a bilateral basis (7) help extradite Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan.
On the flip side of the coin, Mr Sharif’s position has been billed as equally maximalist. Pakistan, he said publicly, would sign and ratify the CTBT by September 1999 provided (a) the “coercive environment” was removed (by which is meant the linkage of sanctions and economic and military assistance with the nuclear agenda) (b) a solution to the Kashmir issue was mediated by a third party, preferably the United States. (c) the US$ 501 million outstanding against delivery of the F-16s is paid in full to Pakistan immediately. Mr Sharif made no public comment on any of the other items on the US agenda.
It is, however, not known what secret relaxations were made by either side in their respective maximalist conditionalities during the brief one-on-one chat between Mr Clinton and Mr Sharif. What is known is that, despite their “hard” and “uncompromising” public positions, both sides anticipate “good news” in the near future. In fact, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz has already gone so far as to suggest that the US will not only allow the IMF and Paris/London clubs to “bail out” Pakistan soon, Washington will also remove the other “coercive factors” from the equation by settling the F-16 issue to Pakistan’s satisfaction and restoring conventional military supplies to Islamabad which were cut off in 1990.
What are we to make of the seeming contradiction between the stiff public positions adopted by the two sides and the optimistic note struck by them in promising “good news” soon?
From the Pakistani point of view, we may assume this “good news” to mean (a) confirmation of the IMF’s US$ 5 billion cash/credit/debt moratorium package in stages (b) receipt of a satisfactory cash/credit/in-kind package to offset the F-16s account. From the American point of view, the “good news” would imply (a) a Pakistani signature on the CTBT in early 1999 (b) a quick acceptance by Mr Sharif of most of the IMF conditionalities. In other words, a quick acceptance by both sides of the minimal conditionalities imposed by the other, with the process moving ahead step-by-step, on a Cash against Delivery basis: First, Islamabad would implement some of the economic preconditions demanded by the IMF; then the IMF/World Bank/ADB would release credits of about US$ 1.3 B; this would be followed by an implementation of the rest of the IMF conditionalities by Islamabad; then the Paris/London Clubs would weigh in with their debt-deferment package of about US$ 3 B and the US administration would “settle” the F-16 issue to Pakistan’s “satisfaction”. Finally, Pakistan would reciprocate with a March or April signature on the CTBT. In the interim, deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbot’s forthcoming visit to Islamabad would firm up this short term process as well as try and chart the medium term route on the other items on the US-Pak agenda in 1999.
The mutual short-term agenda is quite “do-able” by both sides, even though it means that Mr Sharif will have to eat his words on some IMF conditionalities like retail GST, utility rates, single exchange rate, devaluation, IPPs, etc (in fact, he has already taken some steps in this direction). However, an early signature on the CTBT could turn out to be a bit problematic, particularly if (and it is not an insignificant “if”) India throws a spanner in the works (by testing another nuclear or thermonuclear device, for example, or categorically rejecting the CTBT) and compels a rethink in Islamabad, or if the opposition is successful in making an issue out of it and compels Mr Sharif to wriggle out of his commitments to Washington. In the event, a backtracking on an early signature on the CTBT by Mr Sharif could pose serious problems in US-Pak relations and create further difficulties for Mr Sharif on the economic front.
The real problems in the US-Pak relationship, however, will begin to emerge after Pakistan’s accession to the CTBT in 1999. That is when the US will demand definite progress on the other items on its nuclear agenda, including an effective delinking of Pakistan’s strategic stance on fissile material production, missile production/deployment and nuclear weaponisation from that of India’s and link these demands with further economic assistance from the IMF etc in the next fiscal year when Pakistan’s debt repayment crisis will be, if anything, even more severe than this year. What will Mr Sharif do then?
There is precious little that Mr Sharif can do in such a situation. Signing the CTBT is no big deal because Pakistan doesn’t need further nuclear testing to establish its nuclear status. But it is altogether another matter to agree to a freeze on the production of uranium and open uranium producing sites for international inspection, or halt research on missile development and weaponisation, because all these programmes are intrinsic, historical elements of a national security doctrine which is rigidly knotted into the concept of some sort of “par” or “balance” with India, as in the case of conventional military strength and weapons. For example, if India is presumed to have enough enriched material for 100 bombs enabling massive second strike capacity, Pakistan expects not to settle for anything less than 30 bombs along with appropriate second strike capability. And if Indian enrichment continues unchecked, so too must Pakistan’s in order to remain at “par”. Similarly, if Indian serial production of missiles remains a factor to reckon with, so too should Pakistan’s in order to retain the military “balance”. The same logic applies to the nuclear weaponisation programme. How, it may then be asked, will Mr Sharif cope with the American agenda without demanding and obtaining a radical overhaul of Pakistan’s strategic military doctrine from the country’s defense establishment? Indeed, how can any civilian prime minister, without full control over the country’s nuclear programme and without a popular mandate to enforce a shift in conventional strategic wisdom, succeed in a situation in which the economy is acutely impoverished and both state and society are highly militarised?
The national security dilemma has, in fact, been accentuated by the weight of ideology (clash of Muslim and Hindu civilisations coupled with the ascent of jihad on the agenda of Islam), history (three wars, dismemberment of Pakistan and continuing genocide of Muslims in Kashmir) and political/institutional underdevelopment (military/bureaucratic rule for nearly 35 out of 51 years since independence). Asking Nawaz Sharif to accede to the American agenda would be like asking him to commit political hara-kiri in the prevailing environment. Caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, where, then, does Mr Sharif go from here, even if he is granted some temporary reprieve upon signing the CTBT?
A less dim-witted prime minister than Mr Sharif might have read the writing on the wall two years ago and moved swiftly to tighten belts, put Pakistan’s finances in order and reduce its dependence on loans, grants and aid from the Western powers so that when the nuclear crunch came the country would have been strong enough to resist it like India. But Mr Sharif has instead squandered valuable time and energy in the pursuit of naked power without responsibility and plunged the economy into acute crisis. A less reckless prime minister than Mr Sharif might have postponed nuclear testing until such time that the economy was strong and resilient enough to withstand its fallout. But Mr Sharif chose to bask in illusory glory and fell headlong into a trap laid by India. A less myopic prime minister than Mr Sharif might have had the vision to start negotiating entry into the CTBT a day after the nuclear tests and spared Pakistan the anguish and hardship of the long-drawn out sanctions. But Mr Sharif has instead dragged Pakistan to the brink of default and committed himself to the CTBT only after jeopardising national security nine months down the line. A less insecure prime minister than Mr Sharif might have promptly activated the Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS) and invited the military establishment to squarely share responsibility for finding an appropriate and acceptable solution to Pakistan’s national security dilemma in the face of unrelenting American pressure (see pp 7). But Mr Sharif has instead sought to involve the armed forces in an opportunistic quest for political domination domestically. If anyone has snatched strategic defeat in 1998 from the jaws of electoral victory in 1997, it is Nawaz Sharif. Where does Pakistan go from here?
Down and out, we fear, unless there is a quick change of leadership. The time to put the economy on its feet again is narrowing in inverse proportion to the increasing pressure of the American non-proliferation agenda on our conventional national security doctrine. Therefore we urgently need a leadership with courage, integrity and vision: the vision to chart a new strategic map for Pakistan which links economic independence with military strength; the courage to take bold decisions in pursuit of this objective; and the integrity to implement these without fear or favour.