International concern about the possibility of a devastating fourth war between Pakistan and India is not altogether misplaced. They came to the brink after the eruption of armed rebellion in Kashmir in 1990. Because both are nuclear powers, the new buzzword in Washington is Confidence Building Measures (CBM) to promote peace and security in the sub-continent.
American-sponsored CBM initiatives were launched in 1990 to nudge both sides to negotiate outstanding problems. These CBM fall into two categories: (1) Unofficial dialogues between intellectuals and policy analysts. (2) Proposals for arms limitations, easing border tensions and promoting better communication between the armed forces.
Unfortunately, however, the unofficial dialogues have stalled at two critical junctures: (a) The Indians argue that Kashmir is a “problem” between the two countries, not a “dispute”. Therefore, they would like to put the Kashmir “basket” on one side and negotiate on other issues. The Pakistanis, however, insist that Kashmir is a “core dispute” which impinges on all other matters; therefore, without tackling it first, it is not possible, nor indeed desirable, to make headway on other CBM fronts. (b) The Indians insist they won’t sign the NPT because it is “globally” iniquitous. Pakistan says it will sign the NPT only when India does so. (c) The Pakistanis are agreeable to curbing arms proliferation by banning new weapons systems. No, say the Indians, our ballistic missile programme is necessary to affect a strategic balance with China.
In essence, therefore, the Indian position is quite indefensible. New Delhi advocates bilateralism over Kashmir (but refuses to talk to Pakistan), regionalism over conventional arms limitation (refuses to talk to Pakistan) and globalism over nuclear policy (refuses to talk to Pakistan).
On the official military side, a number of proposals to avoid escalation which might lead accidentally to war are being implemented now. A Hot Line exists between the DGs- Military Operations. Both sides have agreed to share information about military exercises. An agreement not to violate each other’s airspace has been ratified. Lists of nuclear installations not to be targeted in the event of war have been exchanged.
But fundamental disagreements persist in more crucial areas. The Indians refuse to sign a no-war pact, refuse to allow international observers along the volatile Line of Control in Kashmir, refuse to withdraw to pre-conflict positions in Siachin, refuse to declare South Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, refuse to sign a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, refuse to renounce the nuclear option.
There are good reasons why the European CBM experience, which the Americans are so keen to transport to the sub-continent, cannot prove meaningful in our context. (1) There was an absence in Europe of any significant territorial disputes between the contending power blocs. Here, the core issue is the dispute over the territory of Kashmir. (2) The European protagonists were about equal in power potential. Here, India is a paramount, hegemonic power. (3) The ideological cold war was central to the East-West conflict. Here, communal conflict has deep, historical roots. (4) Chances of premeditated war were negligent in Europe. But Pakistan has twice consciously triggered war against India (1947 and 1965) while India did the same in 1971. “Operation Brasstacks” was another example of a pre-meditated strategy to intimidate Pakistan. (5) CBM were concurrent processes within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Regional cooperation, however, has been very slow to take off in South Asia. The purposes of CBM are (a) to communicate credible evidence of feared threats (b) to provide reassurance by reducing uncertainties (c) to constrain opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity. Thus CBM are supposed to be credible, tangible and unambiguous. They should be seen as a means to reduce disinformation or misinterpretation and errors. Transparency is the most important objective. But there are serious doubts whether India and Pakistan are genuinely interested in promoting transparency, in cementing a live and let live policy. That is why there is no agreement on whether CBM should precede or follow a cooperative political relationship between them.
The main stumbling block is, of course, Kashmir. In response to this, the nuclear question is deliberately shrouded in ambiguity and uncertainty as a matter of strategy by both sides. Nor are the “mental maps” of both countries conducive to effective CBM implementation: (i) India has problems dealing with Pakistan bilaterally since it envisions itself as a global, multilateral power — hence it imagines CBM as enhancing Pakistan’s status and diminishing its own (ii) In the aftermath of Ayodhya, political uncertainty, instability and the rise of militant anti-Pakistan Hindu extremism make it even more difficult for governments in N Delhi to talk to Pakistan without being targeted by Hindu extremists as making “concessions” to its arch enemy.
Therefore US policy makers would do well to dissuade India of its hegemonic ambitions in the region. Simultaneously, they should concentrate on the one CBM which matters for long-term security. Until Kashmir is resolved, the sub-continent is fated to live under the shadow of the nuclear bomb.