Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said last week: “In the long run, resolution of the border in the east in Kashmir is a very important outcome…I think this is a key part of what needs to happen in the future.” The following day, the New York Times editorialized: “Mr. Obama also must keep nudging India and Pakistan to improve relations. That may be the best hope for freeing up resources and mind-sets in Pakistan for the fight against the extremists.” The NYT also endorsed President Obama’s view “that reducing tensions between the two nuclear rivals, though enormously difficult, is ‘as important as anything to the long-term stability of the region.’” These statements support an earlier observation by General Stanley McCrystal, head of NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan, that India should consider winding down its Consulates in Southern Afghanistan because of Pakistani worries about their role in fomenting unrest in Balochistan and Waziristan.
Is the US persuaded that Kashmir must be resolved and trust built between the nuclear enemies, without which Pakistan’s security establishment cannot be co-opted into supporting US Af-Pak strategy because of the “India factor” in Afghanistan?
The cold reality is that no solution on Kashmir is likely in the short term. One, India is currently focused on demanding that Pakistan take action against the Lashkar-e-Tayba before reopening the composite dialogue. However, this action is not likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, if there is another Mumbai-type incident in India – which is what the terrorists want – the two could arrive at the brink of war. Two, whenever the Kashmir issue is taken up, it will have to start from the flexible point at which it was abandoned by General Pervez Musharraf and Dr Manmohan Singh in 2007 rather than the original maximalist positions of both countries. But this is not possible during the besieged PPP regime of President Asif Zardari which is accused by the military establishment of being “soft” on India and America. New Delhi’s recognition of this fact is reflected in two ways: first, it wants to know who it should talk to in Pakistan, General Ashfaq Kayani or President Zardari; second, it has, with the backing of the other Kashmiri parties, started the process of thawing with the Hurriyet Conference directly by bringing it into the trilateral negotiation loop – the announcement of a troop reduction in Kashmir is meant as a domestic confidence building measure in this regard. Therefore all this American talk about helping resolve Kashmir is a non-starter.
There is a second issue that merits a response. The NYT also reports that Washington has warned Pakistan that its forces will chase the Taliban into Pakistan if Islamabad does not get tough with the insurgents. This “blunt message” was delivered to Pakistan’s military and political leadership in November when the US National Security Advisor, Gen James Jones, and White House Counter-Terrorism Chief, John Brennan, visited Islamabad. This is interpreted as meaning that the US would expand its Drone attacks beyond the Tribal Areas and its Special Forces could put boots on ground and conduct raids in Pakistani territory against Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. “We’ve offered them a strategic choice”, a high level source told the NYT, to do the job or let the Americans do it. “Our patience is wearing thin”, “the Taliban sanctuaries (in Pakistan) are a cancer in the region”. If this threat materializes, its consequences could have negative implications for all the players in the region.
Washington admits that Pakistan’s position is ambiguous on this count. Certain Afghan Taliban groups led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar are viewed as long term Pakistani “assets” in the region because they are disposed to be friendly towards Islamabad and hostile to India. It is unlikely that the military establishment will help the Americans in eliminating them. Indeed, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has now said that he is ready to negotiate with Mullah Omar, and the Pakistanis and Saudis are part of a British sponsored back channel move to bring “moderate” elements (Pakistani assets) of the Afghan Taliban into the loop and drive a wedge between them and Al-Qaeda. The US will either have to go along with this strategy and establish a joint mechanism with Pakistan to focus on and eliminate Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban who are attacking Pakistan’s security establishment, or go after the pro-Pakistan Afghan Taliban with a vengeance and risk alienating Islamabad. Certainly, if the Pakistani military is not on board any special operations aimed at these groups, we may see a military sponsored, media-fed anti-US protest movement in Pakistan that would seriously destabilize the Zardari government and sour US-Pak relations to breaking point. This would compel the US to back down or plunge ahead. In the former instance, it would undermine President Obama’s 18 month deadline for starting troop withdrawals; in the latter case, India’s help in “sorting out” Pakistan would be taken for granted, setting the stage for violent civil strife, war, anarchy and even dismemberment.
Nuclear-armed Pakistan is a key “principal” in the region. Its views, concerns and interests regarding the future of Afghanistan can only be ignored at great peril to all the “principals” in the region.