Until recently, President General Pervez Musharraf was adamant that he would seek presidential re-election from the current parliament in late September as required by law, within two months of the expiry of his tenure as president on November 15. This implied that the general elections would be held after the presidential election – that is, between November 2007 and January 2008. General Musharraf also insisted that the uniform was like “second skin” to him. This implied that he would move heaven and earth to remain army chief. But the Supreme Court is expected to decide the CJP case within a week or two. If the CJP is restored, its fallout would be akin to a vote of no-confidence in the government.
So General Musharraf is compelled to seriously ponder a dissolution of parliament soon and early general elections, around September-October. In the event, since he must constitutionally seek presidential re-election between September and November, he will have to get it from the next parliament rather than the current one. How will he achieve that objective?
Free and fair general elections would probably fail to restore the PMLQ to power and upset General Musharraf’s apple cart. But it won’t be easy to rig them to obtain “suitable results” in today’s charged environment in which the judiciary has sprouted wings. Worse, any such attempt would provoke an election boycott by the combined opposition, which would de-legitimize the next parliament and the presidential election.
So the only workable option is to try and put the pending SC judgment on the CJP on hold while firming up an alliance/understanding with the PPP before the general elections which guarantees General Musharraf the presidency in exchange for sharing power with Ms Bhutto after the elections. There is no personal grudge or animosity between the two of them and the PPP broadly supports his reform agenda. It also helps to have the sanction of Washington behind such a proposed liberal platform.
This explains why talk of a “deal” between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto refuses to die down. On the negotiating table are chips denoting a withdrawal or cold-storage of corruption cases against Ms Bhutto, neutral caretaker administrations, safeguards against electoral rigging, and the scope of the power-sharing arrangement in the centre and provinces after the general elections.
The issue of General Musharraf’s uniform is trickier still. He insists it will be resolved “strictly within the ambit of the constitution”. But given the constitutional necessity of relinquishing charge as army chief before end 2007, he can resolve the uniform issue “constitutionally” only by getting parliament to amend the law that enables him to be both president and army chief at the same time. The constitutional amendment deal with the MMA in 2003 enabled him to occupy both offices only until 2004. After that the law regarding the status of the job of the army chief (whether or not it was a job of profit in the service of Pakistan) was temporarily changed by a simple parliamentary majority so that President Musharraf could hold two offices until 2007. Thus the resolution of this issue after the next presidential and general elections will depend on the respective strength and bargaining position of the PMLQ and PPP in the next parliament. If General Musharraf’s winning alliance is strong he could offer Ms Bhutto a sweetner in exchange for supporting parliamentary moves to retain the uniform. But if Ms Bhutto is stronger, she would settle for nothing less in exchange than a constitutional amendment to restore her to the prime ministership for the third time.
But if all this is problematic, why doesn’t President Musharraf get the current parliament in which he has a majority to elect him president again and also amend the law enabling him to retain his job as army chief?
That, of course, was the original prescription. However, he realized that both moves would be constitutionally challenged. So Mr Iftikhar Chaudhry, an unpredictable and anti-executive maverick chief justice, had to be sidelined before this strategy could be unfurled. But Mr Chaudhry refused to “disappear” and instead became a millstone around General Musharraf’s neck. Any attempt to railroad the current parliament today is likely to fuel anti-government protests outside parliament and compel the opposition parties inside parliament to resign and boycott the general elections. Worse, if Justice Chaudhry is restored, all these plans would go up in a puff of smoke.
Therefore General Musharraf has to pull himself out of the quicksand before the CJP is restored. He also has to hold general elections which are stamped with approval by the mainstream opposition and which yield results that are compatible with his plans. Alternatively, if he can find a way of postponing the general elections until the ground situation is better for him, he could achieve his objectives. But whatever route he takes, it is clear that he can no longer rely on the PMLQ to bail him out. That is why an appropriate deal with Ms Bhutto and a necessary understanding with the Supreme Court is so critical in these times.
One way or the other, we should expect a decisive move from General Musharraf soon.