Both India and Pakistan should brace themselves. In 1994 they will come under American pressure to abandon long-held positions on nuclear proliferation and Kashmir.
But India remains pigheaded. Its grandiose visions of acquiring a Super Power status are totally unrealistic. (See the excellent article by Ross Munro, an old India ‘hand’, on pp 7-9 of TFT). Therefore, it stands to reason that India should be compelled to make major concessions on both issues. Equally, one may expect that India will do its damndest to slip off the hook.
US President Bill Clinton intends to enact a new Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) which gives him greater leverage to achieve nuclear non-proliferation objectives in South Asia. Given the Democratic Party’s hold over both houses of Congress, we may assume that the Symington, Pressler, Solarz, etc, amendments will all become history in 1994. Therefore US economic and military aid will be dangled before Pakistan, including spares and F-16s, on two conditions next year: (1) that Pakistan should comply with US demands to allow inspection and verification of its nuclear programme even if India should pointedly refuse to do so. (2) that Pakistan should do this sufficiently early next year so that the US administration is able to request Congress to earmark funds for Pakistan well before the US budget is announced next October for fiscal 1994-95.
In pursuance of this strategy, the US has already made some headway. It may have “advised” Pakistan to withdraw its draft resolution in the Third Committee of the United Nations censuring India for human rights violations in Kashmir. In exchange, the Americans seem to have “persuaded” India to talk to Pakistan next January on “all aspects of the Kashmir dispute”. What is the significance of these talks?
Ms Bhutto has said that the talks are a “significant gain” for Pakistan since India has never agreed to discuss the status of Kashmir in the past. That may be so. But it is worth asking what “gains”, if any, Ms Bhutto expects to reap from these parleys. If the Indians once again drag their feet over Kashmir, and there is no reason to believe that their position has changed, how will Ms Bhutto explain her decision to let India off the hook in the UN last month?
We are told, however, that the talks may nonetheless point to the outlines of an acceptable “settlement” over Siachin. In that case, Ms Bhutto could claim her decision to hold talks was a tactical victory. True, but if “Siachin” is not promptly settled, Pakistan would be under renewed pressure not to sabotage its future prospects over Siachin by shaming India at the UN Human Rights Convention in Geneva next February. Once that opportunity is also missed, India could be emboldened to backtrack and leave Pakistan in the lurch all over again. In the event, Ms Bhutto will have a lot of unpleasant explaining to do at home.
But let us be optimistic. Let us assume that the Americans will be able to lean on India to settle “Siachin” to Pakistan’s satisfaction soon. What then? Obviously, the US will argue that it is now Pakistan’s turn to take the next initiative. And what might that be? Clearly, it would be permission to inspect and verify Pakistan’s nuclear programme, secretly if necessary. In exchange, Washington will offer to earmark substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to Pakistan under the new FAA.
What will Ms Bhutto do then? Without the approval of GHQ, there can be no such deal with the US. If GHQ disagrees, US-Pak relations may further sour. But if both army and government are persuaded of its necessity, how will Ms Bhutto sell it to the people of Pakistan, considering that Mian Nawaz Sharif will accuse her of “treason” for bartering away Pakistan’s “sovereignty” without a similar and simultaneous gesture from India?
This would suggest that the Pakistani government is in a veritable cul-de-sac. Barring concrete progress over resolving the Kashmir dispute during the forthcoming talks, even a settlement over Siachin could become problematic for Ms Bhutto.
A better bet for Pakistan might have been to put India on the mat in New York last November and once again in Geneva next February. It would have sent the right signals to Washington and New Delhi: that we will not allow India to buy time in order to crush the resistance in Kashmir.
The real test of Pakistan’s diplomatic mettle lies in nailing India down on Kashmir. A longer term strategy to mobilise world opinion for Pakistan’s cause still serves our purposes better. If prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s diplomacy is weak-willed, her government will be threatened by a severe backlash at home. If it is naive and bumbling, Pakistan risks being further isolated internationally.
US aid is important. But without a consensus between Ms Bhutto, Mr Sharif and General Waheed on its terms and conditionalities, it would be foolish to start negotiating with the Americans over Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The Americans must be persuaded that the road to nuclear non-proliferation in the sub-continent lies only via Srinagar.