The next few months promise to be full of hardcore news. Several consequential developments are on the cards and each will have implications far beyond the predictable. Individually or together, they could propose a watershed or turning point in Pakistan’s post-nuclear political history. Therefore General Pervez Musharraf should be forewarned so that he is forearmed.
1. The hijacking case against Nawaz Sharif in the anti-terrorist court in Karachi will come to a head soon. The prosecution has presented its material witnesses; the defense has cross-examined them; an explosive political statement from Mr Sharif is due; and then the judge will deliver his verdict. Several questions arise. Will the government try and postpone the hearings in the court until after President Bill Clinton has come and gone in end-March so that no embarrassing, democracy-related issues concerning the trial or verdict sour the atmosphere? If it does, a perception will be created that the government has obstructed the path of justice. That would be a plus point for Mr Sharif and a minus for General Musharraf. If it doesn’t, an anti-Sharif judgment will raise the political temperature in the country and risk a backlash in Washington that could strengthen the hands of those who are urging Mr Clinton not to visit Islamabad because that would amount to “legitimizing” the military overthrow of an elected regime.
2. President Clinton has announced his trip to India next month. If he decides to give Pakistan a miss, it will be seen in this country as “sleeping with the enemy”. This would amount to a “mother of all betrayals”, the earlier betrayals of Pakistan being the American aid cut-off in 1990 and Washington’s refusal to supply the F-16s or return the US$ 658 million paid in hard cash for them nearly a decade ago. Coming on the heels of continuing American apathy towards the cause of the oppressed Muslims of the world — at first in Kashmir, then in Bosnia and now in Chechnya — this would be a perfect recipe for an anti-American, xenophobic backlash amongst the people and national security establishment of Pakistan. The conceivable consequences of this, both in the short and long-term, for Pakistan, India and America, could be horrendous. But if Mr Clinton does grace Pakistan with a visit, the logic of the talks between the Americans and Pakistanis, based on a vested appreciation of the problems which concern them, could lead to fresh difficulties, rather than urgent solutions, for one or both sides. If the Pakistani government concedes the American demand to rein in the jihadi forces fomenting trouble in Kashmir, or stamps down on Osama Bin Laden’s terrorism or agrees to effect a temporary freeze of the Kashmir issue along the Line of Control, the disgruntled politicians who are at the receiving end of the stick from the generals, and the jihadi forces who are straining at the leash, will jointly seize upon the opportunity to accuse them of wilting under American pressure and selling-out on Pakistan’s vital “national interests”. That would certainly strain the regime’s credibility among the people of Pakistan. But if Islamabad refuses to budge its ground unless the Kashmir issue is resolutely addressed by the American President, and if Mr Clinton is faced with having to chose between India or Pakistan, he is likely to go home wishing he’d never come to Pakistan in the first place (remember, the issue for him at the moment is not whether to visit India or Pakistan but whether to visit Pakistan at all). In the event, US-Pak relations may be expected to deteriorate sooner or later and the debt-choked, dependent Pakistani economy will suffer greatly as a result.
3. India is deadly earnest in undermining whatever little American goodwill or strategic interest there remains for Pakistan. It sees Mr Clinton’s visit as a perfect opportunity to rupture the US-Pak relationship. Mr Atal Vajpayee’s overt belligerence, coupled with talk in India’s hawkish think-tanks of the necessity of a “limited” war with Pakistan, suggests that RAW could get up to dirty tricks in the days and weeks leading up to Mr Clinton’s arrival in the sub-continent. But if New Delhi-conspired events collude to sabotage Mr Clinton’s visit to Pakistan, we may be sure that Islamabad will remain true to form and not hesitate to repay this generosity in kind. In the unfortunate event, however, it could be India which might reap the sympathy and Pakistan the hostility of the world community (as in Kargil), with adverse implications for the military regime in Islamabad. Similarly, if jihadi-inspired acts against American interests in Pakistan or elsewhere in the next few weeks should serve to stiffen Mr Clinton’s resolve to rain death and destruction upon them wherever they might be, the sole loser will be Pakistan since it remains in the eye of the Islamic storm brewing in the world.
We expect the military government in Islamabad to have done its homework and prepared plans to negate any eventuality in the coming days that could have an adverse impact on its credibility, legitimacy or longevity. But if this turns out to be a forlorn hope, we will derive no pleasure at all from saying, “we told you so”.