The elation in the PML(N) camp is palpable. Nawaz Sharif has got something up his sleeve. This view is all the more credible when we consider his recent support to the one day strike called by the Milli Yekjheti Council coupled with a dash to London to cement some sort of an agreement with MQM chief Altaf Hussain. What is Mr Sharif up to now?
Pundits think that he is planning on launching a street movement to destabilise the Bhutto government and force an early election. It is suspected that the MQM and the MYC will join hands with him while the business and trading community will back them to the hilt. Apparently, the idea is to start with a few strike calls during Ramadan and slowly heat up the campaign by spilling it into the streets by March. The agitators will then get aggressive and compel the government to bung them into prison. As the jails fill up, the campaign should gather momentum and become shrill. Mr Sharif will then be ready to throw the gauntlet — mass, violent protests, continuous strikes and possibly even resignations from the national and provincial assemblies.
This smacks of Bangladesh in 1995 or the PNA movement in 1977. Can Mr Sharif achieve his ends — immediate elections or an in-house change as a prelude to fresh elections later this year?
We think not. Prime minister Benazir Bhutto is, in the short run, quite capable of crushing the power of the street and sitting out the strikes. It is also seriously questionable whether Mr Sharif can cobble a PNA-type of alliance to confront the government continuously and violently for a few months running. Equally, the business community may not have the spunk to shut down its trade and incur huge losses for any length of time in support of a dubious change of government. In the event, Mr Sharif’s huffing and puffing may not bring Ms Bhutto’s house down. It may, on the other hand, leave him up the creek without a paddle.
But, for the sake of argument, let us give the devil his due. Let us assume that by March, Ms Bhutto finds herself besieged by a PNA-type movement. How will that help Mr Sharif?
A PNA-type movement can only provoke a 1977 type of anti-politician response from the powers-that-be. But the soldiers of 1996 have nothing in common with those of 1977 — if anything the new army chief is the exact opposite of the one in 1977. And if the opposition is hoping for a benign army intervention in its favour, Mr Sharif and the MQM and the mullahs should understand they are barking up the wrong tree. If anything, this time round they may get as much, if not more, of the stick than Ms Bhutto. So where will this approach get them?
Before they launch their campaign, Mr Sharif and his allies should get some things crystal clear: (1) President Farooq Leghari is not going to use his discretionary 8th amendment powers to fire Ms Bhutto in order to have fresh elections. For one, he doesn’t believe in being an overly intrusive President. Two, he is opposed to the use of his 8th amendment powers. Three, he knows that after Justice Nasim Hasan’s Shah’s historic judgement, the 8th amendment has lost its teeth. (2) The new army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, is a professional soldier par excellence. He is said to abhor politics. He has vowed to concentrate only on two major issues: (a) modernise and vitalise the army to meet external threats (b) blunt the threat from India and rebuff the pressure from Washington. Therefore those who are thinking of knocking at his door should think again. They are going to be met with a stunning and contemptuous silence.
The possibility of an in-house change may also be discarded. Ms Bhutto is a tough nut to crack. She will use all the power and patronage at her disposal to thwart any no-confidence move.
Why, then, is Mr Sharif bent upon destabilising the government? Further instability is the last thing this country needs. Apart from adversely affecting business and foreign investment, this is especially so because of the many problems Pakistan faces on the foreign policy front in 1996.
Afghanistan is in a royal mess. Relations with Iran are bad. India is threatening to get up to its electoral tricks again in Kashmir. A nuclear test at Pokhran is not inconceivable. The United States has not stopped breathing down Pakistan’s neck on our nuclear programme. The CTBT is coming up, followed by the FMT. And so on. Under the circumstances, what do we need? A stable political consensus or a demonstration of renewed and violent disunity?
Mr Nawaz Sharif and Mr Altaf Hussain should give up confrontation. It only undermines the national interest. In turn, Ms Bhutto should offer them a stake in the system. She can do this by agreeing to discuss terms and conditions for a free and fair election in 1997-98.