Nawaz Sharif’s desire for “normalisation” of relations with India, however necessary or merited, has floundered on the rock of political opportunism. In 1997, Mr Sharif jumped into an “historic” accord with Mr Inder Kumar Gujral, the then Indian prime minister, only to abandon it later when New Delhi reneged on its promise to start “talks about talks” on Kashmir. But Mr Sharif was not suitably chastened by that experience. In February 1999, he went much further with Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee in Lahore. This time he effectively committed himself to a “speedy” “normalisation” of relations with India without even the fig leaf of a commitment by New Delhi to resolve the Kashmir dispute in a mutually satisfactory manner.
The Lahore Summit was doomed from the start. This is what we said on the issue (TFT Editorial “Defining moment of anti-history”, February 26-March 4, 1999): The transition from a status-quo, jehad-oriented, hawkish foreign policy vis a vis India to a forward-looking, moderate, peace-oriented foreign policy which Mr Sharif appears to be advocating is going to be very difficult. Such a transition cannot take place without Mr Sharif first cobbling a broad political consensus for it and then nudging the national security establishment to review its “historic” assumptions and accord its stamp of approval to a change of tack… But Mr Sharif has made no effort to take the security establishment or the Pakistani people into confidence. He has taken no steps to bring the political opposition on board his new nonideological “foreign-policy agenda”… Therefore our fear is that, like his many other hastily assembled initiatives on equally contentious areas of economy and law, this initiative too is likely to flounder on the rock of institutional confusion, political indecision and jehadi-counter pressure…Our cynicism on the Pakistani score is reinforced by our understanding of the hawkish and unbending attitude of the Indian security establishment, especially South Block (Ministry of External Affairs), which is opposed to any departure from its current perspective not only on Kashmir but also on Siachin and other contentious issues…”
Is it any wonder then that “Kargil” has “happened” even before the ink on the Lahore Summit has dried? Is it any wonder then that India has donned the “war-paint” and set bellicose pre-conditions for peace-talks? Is it any wonder then that the jehadi forces are shrieking a “sell-out” by Nawaz Sharif in Washington and vowing to fight to the bitter end? Is it any wonder then that the opposition is banding together to try and destabilise the government? Is it any wonder then that Mr Sharif had to fly to Washington for help and advice? Indeed, is it any wonder then that Washington has responded by reading out the Riot Act to Mr Sharif?
Let us now be clear about the content and implications of the “agreement” between Pakistan’s Prime Minister and America’s President in Washington on July 4th. The transcript of the White House briefing after the Clinton-Sharif meeting suggests an “agreement” along the following sequential lines: (1) The Simla Agreement between Pakistan and India has become sacrosanct. Multilateralism is dead. Long live bilateralism. (Round One to India). (2) The sanctity of the LoC must be respected. The status quo in Kashmir has been frozen. (Round Two to India). (3) Pakistan is responsible for violating the LoC. It must undo its transgression unilaterally by positively withdrawing its forces which are on India’s side of the LoC to positions on the Pakistani side. (Round Three to India) (4) Only after this has been done may the dialogue between India and Pakistan be resumed. Furthermore, this dialogue must remain within the confines of the Lahore Summit. (Round Four to India). Has Pakistan been technically knocked out?
Mr Sharif is desperately trying to put a gloss over his “surrender” in Washington. “Mr Clinton has personally promised to take an interest in Kashmir…Kargil has internationalised the Kashmir dispute…the trip to Washington has helped avert a calamitous war….”. Meanwhile, the Pakistan army’s spokesman has said that “there is no question of any pullout of Pakistani troops on the LoC” and the army chief has “reserved judgment” pending a discussion with the prime minister when he gets back to Islamabad. Several critical questions arise.
What if the army chief doesn’t agree with the Washington agreement inked by the prime minister? Indeed, what if he does, notwithstanding a certain sentiment in the armed forces? What if Mr Sharif decides to backtrack on his commitment to President Clinton? What if the Indians renege on any secret understandings with the American president aimed at making a Pakistani “withdrawal” palatable to the Pakistani prime minister, army and public? What if the opposition gangs up with the jehadi groups and a movement to topple the government gains momentum? What if the Lahore Summit is successfully revived and one Kargil is followed by other Kargils in time to come?
War or peace with India, good or bad relations with Washington, civilian supremacy or military autonomy, democracy or autocracy, economic autarky or dependence, xenophobia or globalisation — whatever comes to pass, Kargil 1999 is fated to become a turning point in Pakistan’s history.