General Pervez Musharraf’s announcement on August 14 purports to be a transparent roadmap for democratic revival. However, it is anything but that. It situates the general elections at the edge of the supreme court’s cut-off date rather than early next year which might have been more welcome as a confidence-building measure. This suggests that he means to lord it over the civilians for as long as possible before handing them a slice of power.
The 14 month gap between now and then also implies that he is not terribly sure how he should transfer some power to party-political elected assemblies. Thus he is playing his cards close to the chest because he doesn’t quite know how to trump or finesse the hands of his potential political adversaries. Indeed, some people may find it ominous that he had nothing to say about the party-based status or otherwise of the forthcoming elections, leaving his spokesman to later shed some light on the matter. Clearly, the announcement has been made as a sop to international opinion rather than out of any real concern about reviving civilian rule.
The government proposes to take no less than nine months to debate the pros and cons of various possible constitutional amendments before carrying them out. As if that is not ridiculous enough, we have not been told how this is to be done. Presumably, it will be no different than the “debate” conducted by General Tanvir Naqvi and his loyal band of laptop wannabes over the form and content of the local elections scheme, aided and assisted by their evergreen, strategy-regurgitating hacks. In other words, the military troika around General Musharraf will lay down the amendments for their touts to flog before a captive audience, and that will be that. These constitutional amendments will ostensibly relate to the issue of “checks and balances on civilian power”. On the face of it, this sounds reasonable enough, given the unbearable extremes to which former prime ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif went in trying to accumulate all power and decimate all manner of opposition. But if our elected representatives are to be checked for the good of the country, who will check the “checkers”? The political record of army generals Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq is hardly any better, if not worse, than that of our most errant politicians. Indeed, as the experience of Benazir Bhutto in government suggests, what is to stop the uniformed “checkers” from checkmating the civilians and making a mockery of prime ministerial government? Equally, the insistence that political parties should be compelled to act in a reasonable and responsible fashion should not be taken to mean electoral engineering in order to outlaw or bypass them.
Several other questions need credible answers. How will General Musharraf become a legitimate president? Will he tilt in favour of some sort of dubious device, like a rigged referendum as in the case of General Zia, or is he inclined to take the route taken by General Aslam Beg when he leaned on Ms Bhutto in 1988 to “elect” Ghulam Ishaq Khan as president?
The fate of General Musharraf’s coup-making colleagues is also hanging in the balance. Will they all be retired, one by one, or will some be chosen over others to stick close to him on his long journey? Who will ascend the NSC along with him and in what form? As much as the outcome of the elections, the country’s fate depends critically on the sort of choices he will make about such men and matters in the months to come. After all, one of them may be called upon to consolidate or scuttle his legacy in the event of some unforeseen happening or circumstance.
In the final analysis, however, the outcome of the elections will determine the extent to which General Musharraf and his merry men are able to erect a political system of their liking. Ideally, of course, it would be marvelous from their point of view if no political party were able to muster a majority in the National or Provincial Assemblies, thereby making it easier for the ubiquitous intelligence agencies to mould the disparate factions into flexible national or provincial coalitions. But in the event that this is not possible – on current form, the PPP is most likely to stage a thumping comeback – how will the brass deal with the situation?
General Musharraf has demonstrated a practicality in affairs of state that has served his purposes well so far. A good example is the deal struck with Nawaz Sharif. But the task may become harder in the run-up to the elections, especially as regards the ability of a resurgent PPP to throw a spanner in his works. Will he rig the elections or will he carry out wholesale disqualifications of the PPP? Or will there be a deal with Ms Bhutto as well?
It has been a piece of cake so far. But the going will get tough as the tough get going towards the goalpost.