With the melting of the snows on the passes of Kashmir, comes the Indian army. Confrontation, and bloodshed, follow not far behind it. Already villages in Azad Kashmir have been shelled and upto 3,000 residents have had to move to safety away from the line of control. In one recent incident, a pick up travelling from Muzaffarabad was fired open by Indian troops killing two passengers and seriously wounding six. As tensions mount, a Pakistan army spokesman describes the firing as provocative.
A year ago we were in the same position. In the intervening time the Indian Army has managed only to blacken the name of India as the brutality of its repression of the Kashmiris has become apparent to the world. The uprising continues unabated, indeed it has strengthened.
The war-threatening rhetoric of last year has also started again. Indian Prime Minister, Chandrashekar, warned last week that Pakistan would “pay a heavy price” for its “meddling” in Kashmir. The rhetoric is likely to get shriller yet as the Indian elections near. Thankfully despite the bombast, war remains a remote possibility. The costs of such an adventure, both diplomatic and monetary, would be prohibitive.
Yet the present state of affairs — some like to call it the phony war — also has its costs, and they are heavy. For the Kashmiris, the price they pay is in blood, ad it is only their spirit — and the feeling that they have nothing left to lose — that allows them to continue paying.
For the Indians and the Pakistanis the main cost is the festering state of relations between the two countries. And this hurts. It hurts our economies as tanks are built instead of schools. It hurts our security as both countries wage a low intensity war against each other. It hurts our trade and it hurts our culture, so much of which we share.
For Pakistan, with the diminishing of the Soviet threat, our tense relations with India are the only rationale behind our massive defence spending. The cost of sustaining this effort weakness the economy and gobbles up government funds that could otherwise be spent on health and education — one reason for the country’s appalling literacy rate. Our present rate of defence spending simply precludes a healthy economy. Yet while tensions with India remain, chances of a cut in defence spending are less than negligible.
Defence spending increase last year as a direct result of the tensions over Kashmir. With the suspension of US military assistance, which until recently has been running to the tune of $250 million a year, the demands of the military on this year’s budget will again be substantial.
It is against this background that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s low key policy on Kashmir is to be criticised. While his reticence avoids aging of old platitudes on UN resolutions, however worthy, moves us not one iota towards a solution of this lingering problem. His policy is so low key as to be almost invisible.
As the other extreme, calls for active support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters in terms of training and arming them are downright dangerous. If acted upon they would destroy the Kashmiri cause for such a policy would ensure that India never felt confident enough to allow the Kashmiris their right to self determination.
Both policies lack imagination. And it anything is to break the stalemate over the lingering Kashmir issue, it will be imagination. As the Indians have shown a singular lack of it, perhaps Pakistan could provide it.
And one such imaginative idea is Benazir Bhutto’s idea of a Camp David like process. The crass choice of term should not blind us to the possible usefulness of a third party acting as a mediator. India must be persuaded that the loss of Kashmir will not weaken its hold over other secessionist states. The historic uniqueness of Kashmir’s position within India is recognised by its own Constitution. Yet India will still have legitimate security worries. A third party may help to sooth them.
Standing on its own, this suggestion is likely to make little headway. For without international recognition of Pakistan’s place in this dispute, and confidence on the part of India that its security is not threatened by Pakistan’s interest, this idea cannot take root. On both these counts, Pakistan’s foreign policy has failed in the past. It has remained confused and ineffectual, and in the Prime Minister’s recent statements on Kashmir, it has reached its anodyne apogee.
It is as if the problem could be wished away. It can’t. And by ignoring it, we harm not only ourselves. We hurt the Kashmiris for more. Although the main responsibility for solving the problem rests with the Indians, we must do what we can do help and facilitate a solution.