THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT INDO-Pak tensions are set to abate. The bad news is that the promised thaw could be elusive, with powerful vested interests on both sides vying to throw a spanner in the works.
Obviously, behind-the-scenes American channels have been working overtime to facilitate the tentative moves by both sides. On March 31, the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, said that “the whole of the subcontinent’s problems” are part of the US’ “broad agenda”. Nor was it a coincidence that Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, made his opening move in Kashmir on April 18 even as his confidante and national security advisor, Brajesh Mishra, was parleying in Washington. The US played a good hand by withdrawing Mr Robert Blackwill, the overly anti-Pakistan US ambassador to New Delhi, as an indication of its resolve to balance both sides of the equation. And the clincher will probably come next week in the form of Mr Richard Armitage, deputy to Mr Powell, who helped cool down tempers twice in the recent past. Significantly, Mr Armitage is expected to nudge both countries into some confidence building measures like a restoration of trade, travel and full diplomatic links, before slipping into summitry mode later in the year.
Several questions arise. How come Mr Vajpayee has ever so subtly shifted from India’s post-Kargil 1999 aggressive stance and held out an olive branch to Pakistan? How come General Musharraf has discreetly offered to reverse Pakistan’s aggressive post-1990 Kashmir-focussed stance vis a vis India? How come the Americans are stepping into the fray much more assertively than in the past? Clearly, there must be something in it for all three parties.
The Americans don’t want a conflict on their hands in this region while they are embroiled in the Middle East and West Asia (Afghanistan and Iraq). That means they want to restore the South Asian status quo ante. That means they want India to forget about grasping at any pre-emptive logic to attack and destabilise Pakistan and change the status quo. But that also means that they don’t want Pakistan to continue provoking India in Kashmir by fuelling militancy in a bid to change the status quo. But why should India and Pakistan listen to Washington?
Pakistan is still dependent on American support and goodwill for the wellbeing of its economy. It is also hoping to receive military aid from America. Hence this is a classic, short-term, carrot-and-stick situation. For India, however, there are carrots galore in store. A longer-term strategic economic and military partnership with the US long coveted by the rising Indian bourgeoisie cannot be spurned easily. In Pakistan’s case net losses may accrue, and in India’s case net gains may be lost, if the Americans are openly thwarted.
But forget the Americans. There is something in this intrinsically for both countries. Pakistan and General Pervez Musharraf both stand to gain from reducing tensions with India. For one, the Pakistani economy’s revival is dependent on fiscal space for development expenditures and poverty alleviation. But continuing defense expenditure overruns on account of border hostilities with India would put paid to General Musharraf’s efforts on that score. Equally, the buoyant stock exchange, the improving environment for privatisation based on foreign investment, and the budding domestic investment climate would all evaporate if the spectre of conflict were to reappear on the horizon. A failing economy would also adversely impact General Musharraf’s political agenda. On the other side, India and Mr Vajpayee would stand to lose if the dividends following the relatively successful recent elections in held-Kashmir were to be sacrificed at the alter of renewed desperation on the part of the Kashmiris following an increase in Pakistan-supported violence in the valley. Equally, Mr Vajpayee would lose the goodwill of ordinary Indians still keen on peace with Pakistan but also desirous of a largely homespun settlement in Kashmir that seems within their grasp. Both these establishment approaches also seem to correspond to the feeling among ordinary Pakistanis of putting “Pakistan First” (which expressly means putting Kashmir on the back burner) and the feeling among ordinary Indians of getting rid of their “obsession” with Pakistan (which expressly means focussing on global outreach). Pakistan has accordingly stopped talking of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. It has also stopped talking about Kashmir as the “core” issue. In other words, it has gone back to the pre-Kargil Lahore Summit formula of February 1999. All that remains is to exchange India’s demand for a permanent end to “cross border” infiltration with a composite dialogue with India which meaningfully leads to a peace dividend in which the people of Kashmir can also participate voluntarily and democratically in any decision regarding their future.
The substance of this exchange can be discussed behind the scenes. But for the public confidence building process to begin, face saving on both sides requires at least a statement from General Musharraf disavowing the export of terrorism (as he did in January 2002) and a statement from Mr Vajpayee confirming that the Kashmir dispute is open for negotiations between India and Pakistan and between India and the Kashmiris. How about it, gentlemen?