Senator Mushahid Husain has called upon the government to release Asif Zardari, Javed Hashmi and Yousaf Raza Gilani from prison as part of a “confidence building process to reduce political tensions at home and pave the way for national reconciliation”. He also advised NAB to practise “across-the-board accountability” by nabbing “the thieves in the opposition and in the government”. So far so good. But then came the sting in the tail. Mr Husain stoutly defended General Pervez Musharraf’s bid to cling to his uniform. He used a novel argument: “Let the Musharraf establishment clean up the ugly mess left by the Zia establishment”. Predictably, therefore, Mr Husain laid into certain army chiefs and generals who had manipulated politicians and politics “for their own short term political benefits”. Inevitably, former premiers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were also hauled over the coals because they had played footsie with the “establishment”.
Mushahid Husain is secretary-general of the PMLQ. He was slotted in this important position by the Musharraf “establishment” (what a curious name for the military) for his energy, intellect and pragmatism, and tasked with strengthening the current establishment’s “one-party” democracy system. So he has not made this statement out of the blue. Indeed, he could not have made it without the establishment’s prodding. It is therefore a most significant peep into the establishment’s mind and raises some critical questions.
Is there a sincere realisation in the Musharraf-establishment that the “one-party” democracy system has failed to deliver and a national reconciliation is therefore in order? But if that is the case, why did the prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, appear to dampen such prospects by saying that the matter of the freedom of these three gentlemen was in the hands of the courts and not in the domain of the government? Clearly, the intervention by Mr Aziz exploits the government-party separation quite adroitly by leaving the political initiative firmly in the hands of the government without closing the door to the inducements offered by the party secretary-general.
Should we therefore look at Mushahid Husain’s intervention as a tactical manoeuvre to sideline the troublesome MMA and scratch the back of the PPP in a scramble to soften opposition to General Musharraf’s decision to be both army chief and president of Pakistan? Have we forgotten that precisely such tactics were employed by the Musharraf establishment in 2003 when it pried apart the MMA from the PPP-PMLN and persuaded the mullahs to help pass the 17th constitutional amendment legitimising “one-party democracy”? Certainly, Mushahid Husain’s attempt to link these proposed CBMs to the requirement that General Musharraf retain his powers as army chief for another three years, lends credibility to this line of reasoning. It is also certain that if the opposition doesn’t break ranks, General Musharraf will find himself with a dysfunctional parliament and possibly even agitation on the streets, compelling him to rethink the utility of his “one-party democracy” system.
According to informed sources, the government is already talking to Ms Bhutto along these lines. In exchange for supporting General Musharraf’s bid to be both army chief and president, and cooperating with him on a host of controversial issues that include building the Kalabagh Dam, she has apparently been offered a deal whereby (a) Asif Zardari can be bailed out of prison (b) she can return to Pakistan and contest the cases against her freely without fear of being harassed or arrested (c) she can become chairperson of the Senate (d) she can be assured of fair elections in 2007. Apparently, the government wants a decision from Ms Bhutto one way or the other before Eid so that it has sufficient time to gear up its forces to do whatever is necessary to ensure continuity and stability before the cut-off date of 31st December 2004.
A recurring theme of our editorials since 2000 has been the need for a grand truth and reconciliation process between the establishment and the political leaders of Pakistan in the grand national interest. Another significant TFT argument has been the requirement of a working relationship, if not an alliance, between a reformed military establishment and a reformed Peoples Party of Pakistan that cements their common current objectives in pursuit of an anti-mullah, moderate, modern, Pakistan aligned profitably with the international community and at peace with its neighbours, especially India. But General Musharraf has rubbished such ideas until now, on one occasion quite rudely threatening to “kick Bhutto and Nawaz”. If he now realises that the “ground reality” has changed and demands joining hands with one of them and creating a “two-party democracy”, it is only because as a pragmatic survivor a political about-turn comes as easily to him as a military salute.
The odds of an effective Musharraf-Bhutto rapprochement are even. Neither side trusts the other. General Musharraf is a military chameleon. Ms Bhutto is an artful operator. There are many ifs and buts in the reckoning. However, one thing is for sure: the last thing that General Musharraf needs or Pakistan can afford is a political deadlock which scatters parliament to the wind, forces the liberal Peoples Party into an embrace with the immoderate MMA and stiffens opposition to critical national projects on the agenda of the day.