“The peace process is almost irreversible”, enthused General Pervez Musharraf in Delhi last Sunday. Manmohan Singh, the Indian PM said he found General Musharraf “candid and sincere”. On the record, they agreed to ply more passenger busses and even trucks laden with goods across the LoC in Kashmir, and establish a bus link between Lahore and Amritsar as well as a rail link between Sindh and Rajasthan by early next year. Pakistan was nudged to activate the Joint Economic Commission and convene a Joint Business Council soon. Cooperation was stressed regarding the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Consulates in Karachi and Mumbai were approved. The issues of Sir Creek and Siachin were raised. Off the record, it was agreed that the Siachin dispute could be taken up where it was abandoned in 1992 after the de-militarisation near-accord of 1989, and the Baglihar Dam issue could be unofficially reopened for a hard look by India in line with the “letter or spirit” of the Indus Waters Treaty. Indeed, Mr Singh may even succeed in accommodating Islamabad’s passionate interest in Jinnah House in Mumbai. In exchange, Pakistan has all but abandoned the linkage between liberalizing trade and progress on a Kashmir solution that was so rigidly argued by PM Shaukat Aziz in Delhi last November. Who would have thought all this could be achieved on the sidelines of a cricket match?
Pakistan’s subtle and significant policy shifts on critical issues are noteworthy. The summit at Agra in 2001 had foundered on the juxtapositioning of the core conditionality of Kashmir by Pakistan with the core conditionality of cross-border terrorism by India. But in Delhi last week, the words “core” and “conditionality” were conspicuous by their absence, as in the Lahore Summit in 1999. Indeed, the only formal reference to the “issue” (not “dispute”) of Jammu and Kashmir came by way of an understanding by both leaders “to continue their discussions in a forward-looking and purposive manner for a final settlement”. And the only formal reference to “terrorism” came by way of an oblique counter reference to the Joint Statement of January 2004, a joint condemnation of the attempt to disrupt the bus service across the LoC and a joint pledge “not to allow terrorism to impede the peace process”. The icing on the cake was an enigmatic but far reaching statement by Musharraf before the Editors Guild of India. “The LoC cannot be permanent (Pakistan’s position), boundaries cannot be altered (India’s position), and borders must be made irrelevant (soft borderstheir mutual current position). Somewhere in this context lies the final solution to Kashmir”. Note that this is an even more radical and abridged context to the J&K dispute than the “7-options approach” articulated by Musharraf some months ago in Islamabad. Indeed, Delhi 2005 is echoing with Simla 1972. Clause 6 of the Simla Pact notes that both governments are committed “to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including…a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations”.
Have we come full circle to the beginning? Are we on the verge of a long period without conflict, as happened after Simla until the outbreak of revolt in Srinagar in 1989? Musharraf admitted that he had had a change of heart. But he explained it by alluding to the fact that “the world has changed radically since Agra”. He didn’t elaborate. But we can briefly tell you how the Pakistani military establishment has been compelled to change some of its policies.
The Al-Qaeda attack on the US provoked a US attack on Afghanistan. The US threatened Pakistan: “With us or against us?” Naturally, we couldn’t afford to be against the mighty US and risk our “national assets”. So we wisely decided to side with the US and rake in financial and military assistance. Consequently, we had to abandon the Taliban and flush out Al-Qaeda terrorists. But this provoked Al-Qaeda and its Islamist jihadis to counter attack Musharraf. When he hit back at them, he discovered the dangerous nexus between Al-Qaeda and the sectarian Sunni organizations and jihadi outfits that were also fueling the militancy in Kashmir. Soon thereafter, he discovered that anti-American sentiment and anti-Musharraf outrage were common to all radical Islamists – Al-Qaeda, jihadis, sectarianists and Jamaatis. So it became impossible for him to support the jihadis in India and the MMA without also undermining the new and profitable alliance with America and jeopardizing his personal security and political longevity. The time had come to liquidate Al-Qaeda, stamp out the sectarianists, rein in the jamaatis and freeze the jihadis. For decades, the tail (foreign policy) had wagged the dog. Now it has to be the other way round.
General Musharraf’s new policy stance is designed to improve Pakistan’s economy, strengthen the army’s corporate interests and prop himself up with the help of liberal parties and the international community. If the world or Pakistan is not compelled to change in unimaginable or unforeseen ways again – as it did after 9/11 – we should take General Musharraf at his word.