The All Parties Conference under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on how to deal with the Pakistani Taliban concluded last Monday without any surprises. The army leadership, it seems, has been persuaded by the politicians to give “peace negotiations” another chance despite the fact that the last nine attempts to disarm the Taliban failed to achieve any positive results. What is the PMLN government’s mission-strategy? How is it different from the one proposed by the JUI and ANP in consultation with the PPP government earlier this year? When those two APCs didn’t take off, despite PMLN support, what is so special about this one?
It is true that the PMLN at the start of its term is more focused on terrorism than the PPP ever was at the end of its term. Therefore we might fairly expect more headway in rising to the challenge this time round. Certainly, Mr Sharif’s longevity depends on his ability to get the economy moving, which in turn depends on a significant improvement in law and order. It is equally true that the Taliban leaders had earlier expressed a degree of willingness to negotiate with Mr Sharif as opposed to hostility against the leaders of both the PPP and ANP. And, finally, it is a good sign that Imran Khan has lent his shoulder to the strategy chalked out by the PMLN: he says that talks should be initiated via various methods with those who are ready to talk but that a crackdown should be planned against those who insist on their violent anti-state ways. As a sop to the Taliban and to Imran Khan, the APC has agreed to consider moving the UN to pressurize the Americans to stop Drone attacks on Waziristan.
There is some more encouraging news. Senator Pervez Rashid, the information minister, has confirmed that preliminary talks about talks are underway already with a couple of Taliban groups. He has also confirmed that tribal jirgas will be mobilized to persuade the Taliban to stop fighting the Pakistan state. We also know that there are serious rifts within the Taliban about negotiating with the Pakistan state and government, which is a good sign because it weakens the Taliban’s resolve to fight Pakistan. Finally, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the interior minister, has explained that negotiation will be a long drawn out affair, with many ups and downs. This is a measure of his determination to go the whole hog and try everything in the book before admitting failure, shifting the responsibility on to the Taliban and ordering military action against the miscreants. But the proof of the pudding will be in the eating of it.
To be sure, preconditions by either side will not be terribly helpful. We can’t expect the Taliban to lay down their arms before talking. Nor should the Taliban expect the Pakistan government to agree to any of their outrageous demands, like agreeing to install a Shariah regime of their choice in Islamabad or guaranteeing an immediate end to American drone attacks. But at the very least, for the talks to kick off in earnest, there should be a progressive ceasefire by both sides. The army should not carry out any fresh assaults on the Taliban and the Taliban should cease suicide attacks or bomb explosions. This rule should apply to those Taliban groups who want to talk and not to those who want to fight. So talk-talk and fight-fight must be the order of the day. If there is a progressive downslide in the level of Taliban-inspired violence in the next six months, we must continue to support this policy. If there isn’t, we must unveil the iron fist from the velvet glove.
At the end of the day, the PMLN-led initiative must be able to calibrate its anti-terrorism response in such a manner so as to separate unrepentant Al-Qaeda and sectarian elements from the rank and file of disgruntled, misguided or simply criminal elements among the Taliban, and then formulate appropriate tactics and strategy to isolate, target, degrade and eliminate Al-Qaeda while rehabilitating, reforming and reintegrating the others back into society.
The anti-Taliban strategy is bound to be complex, problematic and long-drawn out. There will be hiccups. Both carrots and sticks will have to be applied. Critically, all political parties and military leaders will have to be on the same page at every stage of the game. This is especially true of Imran Khan’s PTI which must adopt a more realistic attitude to the problem of terrorism than the rather naïve and idealist position it has so far adopted.
One fact is of paramount importance. The window of opportunity for the dialogue approach to succeed is limited to the time between now and the US exit from the region next year. If Pakistan doesn’t firm up its approach to both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban quickly, it will suffer from a violent backlash from both in 2014.