Twice in recent times President Asif Zardari has thundered against the “conspirators” and “non-state” actors who are trying to hound him out of office. On both occasions he wore the Sindhi cap and addressed loyal party-political audiences as head of the Pakistan Peoples Party rather than as President of Pakistan. There is an inherent contradiction here. His critics judge his behaviour as unbecoming a Head of State and President of Pakistan even as his political supporters thump his dogged efforts to keep his party, allies and government intact.
If Mr Zardari is rattled, there is cause enough for it. For a variety of reasons, the army doesn’t like him. The opposition doesn’t trust him. The judiciary is hounding him. One section of the media has got the knife out for him. And the fickle Americans are frowning at the diminishing returns from him. This is a result of Mr Zardari’s failed strategy to keep the judges out, the army at arm’s length and the opposition at bay, while bending over backwards to appease the Americans and placate the media. In short, Mr Zardari’s strategy to keep on the right side of his peripheral and foreign allies at the cost of antagonizing the country’s core constituents has left him nowhere.
So a change of tack has been ordered. The army is now being placated at the cost of the Americans viz foreign and domestic security policy. The peripheral allies are being massaged via the NFC award and Balochistan Package. The opposition is being wooed by renewed pledges of appropriate amendments to the constitution. And the media and judiciary (the loudest whisper is that they are the conspirators and non-state actors), which are already wading in muddy waters, are being told where to get off. As one measure of deterrence, Mr Zardari is playing the Sindh card to full effect even as he talks of “Pakistan khappay” by strengthening the federation. Will this work?
Much depends on two critical factors. The first is the Supreme Court. Until now, its activism has been spurred by the wind in its tail generated by the media. But the NRO judgment has divided the media, with a significant section criticizing the application of certain Islamic provisions of the constitution to strike it down. Much the same division is manifest in the appreciation of the SC’s thrusting activism, especially in the established domains of the executive. Should the court now seem as tilted in the specifically anti-Zardari petitions based on morality before it as the NRO earlier, the divisions in the media will become more marked and harm the credibility and cause of the SC. If such considerations weigh in with their Lordships, Mr Zardari may hope to benefit from it. The second factor is the attitude of the opposition led by the PML-Nawaz. Until now, it has played hot and cold in order to nudge Mr Zardari to get rid of the 17th amendment. But the ganging up of the media and judiciary against the executive, with the army looming large in the background, has compelled it to think again. Certainly, the last thing the PMLN wants is the prospect of being confronted by this troika one day in the same manner in which it is hounding the PPP today. That is why the PMLN may still be more amenable to a deal with Mr Zardari (that lets him cling to office while relinquishing power) rather than ganging up with the new troika to get rid of him and set an unholy precedent for itself.
Mr Zardari and Mr Nawaz Sharif should jointly consider a simple and elegant way out of this political, judicial and constitutional quagmire. They should join hands to pass a one line, unanimous, and “principled” constitutional amendment that restores the constitution as it stood before General Zia ul Haq’s coup of 1977. All the mangling of the constitution by two military dictators happened after that date. Such action will please Mr Sharif because it will restore the full powers of the prime minister, including the right to appoint service chiefs and be PM any number of times. It will give a sense of relief to Mr Zardari because it will cut the Chief Justice’s term to three years as originally laid down in the 1973 constitution, at par with the service chiefs and the chief election commissioner. And it will empower the provinces because it will spell the end of the Concurrent List. Above all, it will warm the cockles of every moderate Pakistani’s heart – the overwhelming majority – by ousting the bitterly controversial “Islamic” provisions inserted into the constitution by an opportunist and illegitimate ruler and approved by a battery of LFO and PCO judges. Indeed, there can be no better and more effective way of implementing the Charter of Democracy than by reverting to the pre-martial era between the signing of the constitution in 1973 and its overthrow in 1977. Later, once the current crisis has dissipated, all the players can get together and pass another amendment to incorporate their other concerns.
Mr Zardari has bought breathing space for himself. He should now exploit it to find lasting solutions for the shaky political system no less than for his own discredited party.