Mr Farooq Leghari and Mr Wasim Sajjad are both good, upright men. Despite the considerable personal merits of each, however, Pakistanis would have preferred a “neutral”, consensus candidate in the Presidency. Why is that?
Past experience suggests that if the president and the prime minister don’t see eye to eye, a strong opposition can exploit their differences and bring the government down. This is what happened in 1990. Equally, a power-hungry President can fuel the contradictions between a strong government and a weak opposition in order to try and win longevity for himself. This is what happened in 1993. Past experience might also imply that if there is complete unanimity between the president and the prime minister, a weak opposition can be whipped into total submission and deprived of playing a vital role in holding the government accountable. This is what happened when the country had a rubber-stamp president from 1973-77. Hence a “consensus, neutral” President might have been the ideal way out. He would have built bridges between the two warring parties and provided much needed space for the development of democratic traditions.
If the compulsions for a neutral President are obvious, why then have both parties decided to field their own favourites and slug it out to the bitter end? Surely, one of the two political leaders is bound to be humbled by the contest. When that happens on November 13th, he or she will inevitably plunge into desperation and recklessness. That is a sure recipe for disaster. We cannot afford it.
In all fairness, though, Ms Bhutto cannot be blamed for the present impasse. In discreet negotiations with Mr Sharif through the mutually-agreed aegis of the neutral umpire in Rawalpindi, the PM offered to concede the Presidency to the PML-N. Mr Wasim Sajjad was acceptable, she said, provided Mr Sharif entered into an accord with her to undo some of the president’s discretionary powers. Mr Sharif refused. He wants to discuss each and every clause of the 8th amendment so that he can extract further concessions from her. He also insists that such negotiations can only be held after his candidate is comfortably ensconced in the Presidency. This, despite Mr Sharif’s public commitment to repeal the 8th amendment at the first opportunity! In the end, the neutral umpire has pulled out and left the two political leaders to grapple with their respective fates. They are now poised to go for the kill, barring any last minute change of heart.
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s fears are well grounded. The opposition rules Balochistan and Frontier. Her coalitions in Islamabad and Punjab are weak. She is highly vulnerable to onslaughts by Mian Nawaz Sharif. If Mr Sharif’s man wins, he will immediately insist on the appointment of governors of his choice in the four provinces. That would make life almost unbearable for Ms Bhutto in Punjab and give Mr Sharif an opportunity to capture the province in due course and reduce the central government to nought as in 1988-90. Mr Sharif will then have a strong vested interest in keeping the 8th amendment alive and kicking. Votes of no-confidence and horsetrading will also become the order of the day. In the event, Ms Bhutto will have as much chance of completing her five year tenure as a snowball in hell.
If the government’s candidate wins, however, Ms Bhutto will be in a good position to fend off attacks by the opposition. She will be able to bring Mr Sharif to the negotiating table over the 8th amendment. Maybe the two leaders can also explore ways of eliminating the blackmailing power of independents and small parties so that the two-party system can be strengthened.
Mr Sharif, of course, fears that Ms Bhutto would then become an all-powerful, unaccountable prime minister who will be difficult to dislodge even when her term is up. Is this suspicion justified?
We don’t think so. Comparisons with the situation during Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s regime from 1973-77 are untenable. Mr Bhutto had swept the elections, the PPP was all-in-all in the rump which remained of Pakistan. The Muslim League opposition was weak and fragmented, the press didn’t know the meaning of freedom. The army was a spent political force. There were no institutional or political checks on the prime minister. Mr Bhutto loomed larger than life.
Things are vastly different today. Ms Bhutto’s political experience and responses are very different from her father’s. She has barely scraped through to Islamabad and knows her limitations. The Muslim League is a powerful, united force for the first time in Pakistan’s history under the dynamic leadership of Mian Nawaz Sharif. The press is vibrant and cannot be silenced. The new army leadership watches carefully over the nation’s transition to democracy without taking sides. And the people of Pakistan will not accept authoritarianism of any kind.
For all these reasons, it might be better to give the original 1973 constitution a chance to redeem itself. Maybe it might be better if the prime minister and the president belonged to the same party. The alternative, despite Mr Wasim Sajjad’s integrity, commitment to democracy and due process of law, could conceivably be less workable.