Last week we wrote that “both Mr Zardari and Mr Sharif must pull back from the brink”. We also noted that the army “would prefer to operate behind the scenes to effect change rather than be upfront.” The reproach to the two leaders was warranted. And the prediction about the army’s role has been borne out by events
There was a perceptible build-up to high noon all week. At the behest of President Asif Zardari, Maulana Fazal ur Rehman, Asfandyar Wali and Nawab Aslam Raisani offered a constitutional package to Mr Nawaz Sharif to resolve all outstanding issues, including the restoration of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry and repeal of the 17th amendment, on the condition that he abandon the Long March. But Mr Sharif insisted on the restoration of Mr Chaudhry as a pre-condition to any deal and wanted to flex muscle via the Long March. This set the stage for a discreet “intervention” by the ubiquitous Double A – Army and America. Both assessed the developing political conflict as inimical to their interests because it was diverting the attention of the state and government from the core issues facing Pakistan on the economic front and on its eastern and western borders.
Double A’s covert “deal” involved many urgent meetings between General Ashfaq Kayani, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and President Zardari. It involved significant to-ing and fro-ing by the US Ambassador, Anne Patterson, and the UK High Commissioner, Robert Brinkley, and many timely phone calls to the two protagonists by the US Special Envoy to Pakistan-Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, and the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. Secret contact was established by Double A with Iftikhar Chaudhry via Aitzaz Ahsan to clinch solid guarantees of “good conduct” in the event of Mr Chaudhry’s restoration. Imran Khan and Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the two erstwhile revolutionaries, were conspicuously kept out of the loop by all concerned.
The “deal” was set-off by a confidence-building measure before the Long March. President Zardari announced a “review” petition in the Supreme Court (SC) against its judgment disqualifying the Sharif brothers from holding public office. Double A also ensured that the door to the restoration of the PMLN government in Punjab wasn’t closed by leaning on the Chaudhries of the PMLQ to hold off from cementing an alliance with the PPP. In fact, the Chaudhries were advised to float a proposal for a PPP-PMLN-PMLQ “reconciliation government” in Punjab if and when Governor’s Rule was withdrawn.
Everything now hinged on the Long March. If Mr Sharif could put up a forceful show, the pendulum of power would swing to him. But if it failed, President Zardari could renege on his commitments and provoke another round of confrontation. In the event, the Army pulled all the right strings in the federal and provincial administrations and ensured that Mr Sharif was allowed to lead the Long March and galvanise the crowds. This enabled PM Gilani to COAS Kayani to lean on President Zardari to announce the restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry, thereby calling off the Long March.
The army under General Kayani has reaped three dividends. It has reestablished its credibility as a national institution standing above the political fray and defending “democracy” rather than undermining it. It has whittled away at the absolute powers of President Zardari and tried to redistribute them among the prime minister, opposition, Supreme Court and media. By dispersing civilian power amongst countervailing and contending forces it has tilted the historic civil-military imbalance once again in its own favour. And its last minute intervention has removed the slight of its link to the other A for America. This was a smart move in view of rampant anti-Americanism in the country.
But there is many a slip between the cup and lip. Mr Chaudhry has been “restored”, not “reappointed” as a judge. This means that the coup of November 3, 2007, and the PCO, signed by President Pervez Mushaffaf in his capacity as army chief, has to be indemnified by parliament, failing which everything since then would be construed as illegal and plunge the country into a constitutional gridlock.
But the CJ’s de facto “spokesman”, Aitzaz Ahsan, has announced that under the doctrine of “Past and Closed Transactions”, the file will not be reopened on post November 3 decisions “in order to avoid chaos”. This is the “soft” restoration that protects President Zardari from destabilization, enables the army chief to be indemnified and paves the way for Mr Sharif to negotiate an equitable repeal of the 17th amendment.
The next few weeks will be critical. We need a constitutional amendment and a cleansing of the judiciary based on the Charter of Democracy. But this won’t be easy. Mr Sharif will demand everything under the sun while President Zardari will want to retain all his powers and recoup his losses. Meanwhile, there may be a split in the lawyers’ movement between the “idealists” and the pragmatists. No one quite knows how the CJ and the rest of the SC judges will behave in the ultimate analysis. But one thing is for sure. If Mr Sharif and President Zardari start squabbling again, Double A might have to intervene rather more forcefully, this time with more serious consequences for President Asif Zardari.