In the good old days, the media used to love President Pervez Musharraf’s candid, up close and personal utterances. But these are strictly no-no in the current environment of suspicion, hostility and loathing. Unfortunately, however, he hasn’t been deterred in the least, despite his avowed insistence on always recognizing “ground realities”. A case in point is his recent statement that Benazir Bhutto was “unpopular” with the “army”. There cannot be a more damning admission on his part, considering that Ms Bhutto was the charismatic and “popular” leader of the biggest political party in the country and has now been endowed with the halo of martyrdom not just by the PPP or the Sindhis, as in the case of her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but by Pakistanis across the divide of class, ethnicity, and region. Indeed, even President Musharraf is now forced to refer to her as “shaheed Benazir”. In fact, his admission has compelled us to recall how the military and its agencies, under General Zia ul Haq, General Aslam Beg, General Hameed Gul and now General Musharraf, have routinely thwarted the PPP’s popular quest for democratic representation and civilian supremacy. It is as if the military has a political problem with popular parties and a personal problem with their charismatic leaders. Certainly, the treatment meted out to Nawaz Sharif (after he too became a populist) by the military under General Musharraf confirms this prognosis.
Therefore the idea of a “national” government under the tutelage of President Musharraf is a non-starter. Mr Sharif has consistently said as much and there is no reason why he should budge now. Given their acrimonious history, Mr Sharif’s political fortunes will not take off until Mr Musharraf is out of the way. And given Ms Bhutto’s last will and testament about the alleged “role” of the Musharraf establishment in her assassination, Mr Zardari can hardly “welcome” Mr Musharraf to Naudero for condolences, let alone become a junior partner in government with him. So who is spawning all this talk of a national government and what is its significance?
Clearly, President Musharraf is on the horns of a dilemma. He knows that the electoral prospects of the PMLQ have dwindled to such an extent that the PPP and PMLN together will probably get two thirds of the seats in the next parliament after a free and fair election, thereby setting the stage for his ouster through a vote of impeachment. This fear has prompted another “candid” remark from him to the effect that he would prefer to resign rather than face a vote of no-confidence in the next parliament. Under the circumstances, his options are limited: he can rig the elections and face the consequences of his illegitimate act at home and abroad, or he can try and postpone the elections along with his day of reckoning. The idea of a “national government” under him before the elections therefore serves two purposes: if the elections are held under such a national government no one among its participants will be able to claim that the elections were rigged under its own administration even though the rigging would be done by our ubiquitous but unaccountable angels in ghost polling stations; and if such a national government could be persuaded to postpone the elections because of “national security” considerations following “deep briefings” by the brass, then the supreme court could be nudged to stamp its approval, and the PMLQ would get time to regroup while the agencies would find fresh space in which to undermine the PPP and PMLN and sow discord among and between them.
It is this context that Maulana Fazal ur Rehman’s native wisdom seems profound. He wonders how an opposition that has failed to put up a united front in boycotting or participating in the elections can conceivably form a “national” government, and that too under President Musharraf who is universally distrusted. Mr Sharif”s statement is also indicative of his mood. He says he would welcome such a prospect in the interest of free and fair elections only if President Musharraf were to call it quits before it is constituted. And Mr Zardari’s, who says he can’t rule it out only after a round of free and fair elections which gives the PPP a majority in parliament “the two implications being that if the PPP doesn’t get a majority the election results won’t be accepted, and if it does then it may be inclined to join hands with the PMLN and get rid of President Musharraf as a precondition to packing the military off to barracks.
Since President Musharraf is in no mood to call it a day, we are lumped with the prospect of a rigged or delayed election “come hell or high water”. Unfortunately, the air is thick with dark revelations of terrorist “hit lists” and forebodings of bloody assassinations. Therefore most politicians are not venturing too far out and there is no “election campaign” out there. Speculation about a “national government” before the elections sows even more confusion in the mind of the candidates and their voters and dampens the enthusiasm of the crowds. Worse, a big assassination or a spate of bombings could scatter the marchers for democracy.