The idea of a National Security Council, or something like it, was first mooted by General Zia ul Haq. But it was flatly rejected by prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo for two main reasons: first, the civil bureaucracy’s general hostility towards the idea of any formal role for the military in politics, and second, Mr Junejo’s particular objections to General Zia’s cold war objectives, especially in Afghanistan (Zia was opposed to the Geneva Accords on the Soviet pull-out from Kabul). In the event, there was no mechanism within the 8th amendment framework for conflict-resolution between the prime minister and the president and Mr Junejo lost his job and the political system was orphaned when the two leaders clashed with each other in 1988. Indeed, there is no knowing how the political system would have evolved in time to come if General Zia and his military commanders had not all been assassinated some months later. As a matter of fact, if General Aslam Beg had decided not to open the route to democracy in 1988 by leaning on the supreme court against the wishes of the political remnants of General Zia, there is no knowing where Pakistan might be today.
General Aslam Beg did not formally flog the idea of a National Security Council either during Benazir Bhutto’s rule or Nawaz Sharif’s. But he was decidedly a hands-on army chief, given to making strong public statements on political matters which often seemed to fly against the views of the civilian government in power (he publicly disagreed with Bhutto over policy towards the MQM and he disagreed with Sharif over policy during the Gulf war). Indeed, he made no secret of the fact that he was a key player in politics. He was instrumental in cobbling the IJI in 1988, in propping up the Sharif government in Punjab during 1988-90, in backing the vote of no-confidence against Bhutto in 1989, in affecting the bloody clash between the PPP and MQM in Hyderabad in 1990, in getting rid of Bhutto in 1990, in rigging the 1990 elections and in “ensuring” the appointment of Nawaz Sharif instead of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as prime minister later in the year.
In effect, General Beg did not demand an indirect but formal role in politics for the military because he was able to achieve his objectives directly. He got away with his “interventions” for two main reasons: first, the civilian set-up was still fledgling and both Bhutto and Sharif “owed” him for opening their route to power, and second, the general was successful in creating the perception that he would not be averse to imposing martial law all over again if necessary. That he didn’t do so in 1991 was due to one main factor: General Asif Nawaz was nominated as COAS-designate by President Ishaq Khan six months before General Beg’s retirement and the COAS-designate, in alliance with the civilian government, actively thwarted General Beg’s ambitions to prolong his tenure.
The absence of a National Security Council to mediate conflict-resolution between the army chief and the prime minister was acutely felt once again in 1992 when serious “misunderstandings” arose between Mr Sharif and General Nawaz primarily over the issue of how to deal with MQM terrorism in Karachi. But General Nawaz’ hand was restrained by President Ishaq and US ambassador to Pakistan, Nick Platt, acting behind the scenes. The conflict was only “resolved” when General Nawaz suddenly died of a heart attack in 1993.
General Abdul Waheed came next. His elevation to the rank of COAS six months before his retirement was totally unexpected. President Ishaq was keen on General Farrakh Khan, the CGS and the seniormost general in service, but Mr Sharif put his foot down because General Farrakh Khan was thought to have been “close” to General Nawaz. General Waheed now emerged as a “compromise” candidate. But the system broke down when the president and prime minister fell apart and General Waheed was disinclined to play a mediatory role. The president was therefore compelled to fire the prime minister and the Supreme Court was dragged into the conflict. The chief justice, Nasim Hasan Shah, looked over his shoulder for signs of life in GHQ. But there were none. Indeed, General Waheed was drawn into making a public statement saying that the army supported “democracy”, had faith in the supreme court’s “independence” and was not concerned about the outcome of the supreme court judgment. The route was now clear for Justice Shah. Mr Sharif was restored as prime minister and the unresolved conflict between the prime minister and the president erupted anew. In the end, General Waheed was compelled to act. Faced with a constitutional breakdown, he chose not to take sides. Instead, both the president and the prime minister were nudged to go home. If either one had refused, the constitutional impasse would have acquired crippling proportions and there would have been no option for General Waheed but to impose martial law.
The fairest elections in Pakistani history were subsequently held in 1993 under the tutelage of the Moeen Qureshi administration cobbled by General Waheed with the assent of both Mr Sharif and Ms Bhutto. General Waheed refused an extension in service and retired on due date. President Leghari now followed the seniority principle and promoted the CGS, General Jehangir Karamat, to the COAS slot. It was thought that with the prime minister and the president belonging to the same political party and an avowedly apolitical soldier in the army chief’s chair, there would be no occasion for serious conflict within the political system. There was reason to be confident. Conflict between the prime minister and the COAS arose in 1988 and 1991 because the COAS had definite political ambitions. Conflict between the prime minister and the COAS arose in 1992 because of strong differences of opinion between the prime minister and the COAS over the use of the army to weed out terrorism from Karachi. Conflict between the president and the prime minister arose in 1993 because the prime minister was keen to cut the president down to size. Since neither of these conditions prevailed in the post-1993 Bhutto period, everything was expected to be hunky dory.
But that was not to be. Despite belonging to the PPP, president Leghari and prime minister Bhutto fell foul of each other in 1996 over the question of the independence of the judiciary. In due course, president Leghari ousted Ms Bhutto on the basis of his 8th amendment powers and ordered fresh elections. Mr Sharif became prime minister and swiftly moved to remove the 8th amendment — he did not want to live in a potentially “uncertain” situation where the non-PML president had increasingly shown signs of becoming his own man by instituting a Council for Defense and National Security headed by him. Mr Sharif dug his heels in further by silencing dissent within parliament and burying the CDNS. It was now thought that with the president defanged, a pliable parliament and an apolitical army chief, the political system would become “stable” under a powerful prime minister.
Alas, that was fated to become yet another example of misplaced concreteness when the chief justice decided to stand up for the independence of the judiciary and was compelled to become a political player. For much of 1997, therefore, the conflict between the chief justice and the prime minister raged unabated until it enveloped the powerless president and the apolitical COAS in its fold and brought the system to another constitutional breakdown. The conflict was finally “resolved” after the resignation of the president and the ouster of the chief justice by the “intervention” of the COAS on the side of the prime minister. Despite all the constitutional amendments, the system was still bereft of any institutional mechanism for “conflict resolution” within the more or less powerful organs of the state. But there was no martial law in December 1997 because the personal “temperament” of the COAS revolted against the idea and not because the political system was intrinsically and sufficiently immune from it.
In 1998, the prime minister was fortified by a powerless, hand-picked loyalist as president, a timid chief justice who “owed” his elevation to the prime minister, a weakened judiciary which was still reeling from the aftermath of a bloody assault upon it by goons of the ruling political party and a COAS determined to remain as aloof from politics as possible. Under the circumstances, the system should finally have come to work beautifully. But it didn’t. Instead, it condemned General Jehangir Karamat to finally speak his mind in desperation and brought the country to the brink of another fatal confrontation. In the final analysis — and notwithstanding the so-called “international climate” which is supposed to be hostile to an army take-over — there was no martial law on October 7th because General Karamat was “temperamentally” unfit to impose it and not because the system had become immune to it by allowing for conflict-resolution within its given state and governmental parameters.
The conclusions can now be drawn from this analysis of Pakistan’s convulsive political history under the “decade of democracy”. The 8th amendment was supposed to be a mechanism for conflict resolution within the organs of the state. But it failed to function properly and consistently dragged the COAS into public limelight. It was duly scrapped but the problem of conflict-resolution acquired a new dimension when the chief justice determined to make the judiciary truly independent of the executive. Once again, the COAS was dragged into the fracas and asked to take unsavoury sides. In the most recent crisis, however, fingers could not be pointed at either the president or the chief justice for initiating the conflict. The conflict arose because the COAS felt compelled to set the record straight in an effort to halt the slide into economic and political anarchy under the Sharif government. During all the political and constitutional crises since 1988, martial law was always a real option. But it was averted on each occasion not because of any internal safeguards within the system for conflict mediation, debate and discussion but because of extraneous personal factors particular to each situation.
The problem has progressively been stood on its head since last year by the emergence of an all-powerful prime minister not subject to any checks and balances. It has been transformed from one of potential conflict between the president and prime minister or the prime minister and the judiciary or the prime minister and the COAS into one which emanates from the absolute power of a rampant and reckless prime minister who not only threatens institutional stability but is inherently incapable of addressing the acute and multiple crises of state, society and economy which face the nation. In the absence of an appropriate conflict-resolution apparatus, therefore, the only option to the continuation of this dismal situation is still martial law.
The idea of a National Security Council as proposed by General Jehangir Karamat should be seen in this light. It was offered in good faith by a consistently apolitical soldier who was quick not only to spurn a term as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, but also to cut short his term as COAS. It was not meant to undermine the prerogatives of an elected prime minister at the alter of military power. It’s sole purpose was to provide Mr Sharif with a forum where objective and less sycophantic debate and advice could be aired in order to proffer consistent, stable and credible solutions to the multiple crises facing the country.
If Mr Sharif had accepted the advice, he would have derived immeasurable good from it not only for himself but also for the country. For one, the prime minister would have formally co-opted the armed forces into backing all the tough and unpalatable decisions he must take regarding the economy and quietened discontent in civil society and restiveness in the armed forces. Two, he would have been able to persuade the armed forces to relinquish some of their lingering cold-war legacies and agendas for the common good of post cold-war Pakistan. Third, he would have quietly got the armed forces to back the civilian urge for a new definition of national security which doesn’t rely exclusively on a prohibitively expensive conventional and nuclear arms race in the sub-continent. Finally, he would have put all conspiracy theorists out of business by stabilising politics through the provision of objective advice on good governance. What more could an absolute ruler besieged by personal weakness, whims and fancies have asked for under the circumstances?
That said, all may not yet be lost with the departure of General Karamat. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that the former COAS may have deliberately set the stage for the eventual political acceptance of the idea of some sort of a National Security Council by offering a personal sacrifice in the country’s long term interests. In fact, if General Karamat’s assessment of the problems facing the government and country and the necessity of an appropriate NSC was not a personal view but an institutional one, as is commonly argued, General Pervez Musharraf may be expected to pursue the same objective with reassuring dignity and grace in more conducive and compelling circumstances in time to come. Certainly, there is much support in civil society for what General Karamat said in Lahore the other day. Mr Sharif would therefore be advised, in his own long term interest as well as that of the country in its structural and multi-dimensional crisis, to get rid of his paranoia and reconsider the issue cooly and dispassionately.