In an extraordinary press conference, DG-ISPR Maj-Gen Babar Iftikhar has finally set the record straight.
(1) There was no US conspiracy for regime change in Pakistan. Thus the response of the National Security Committee to the “letter” of the Pakistan Ambassador to Washington purporting a “conspiracy” deserved no more than the usual “demarche”.
(2) The Americans have never demanded military bases in Pakistan, so the response of “Absolutely Not” was misplaced.
(3) Imran Khan, not the military leadership, proposed a discussion on his political options going forward.
(4) General Qamar Javed Bajwa, COAS, does not seek an extension in service and will refuse any if offered.
(5) The army wants to be apolitical, it supports the constitutional process and “there will never be any martial law”.
(6) The social media campaign against the army is unacceptable and there will be consequences.
(7) The attempt to sow division and discord in institutions will not succeed.
This “extraordinary” response follows some extraordinary events in March. Shorn of Miltablishment props, Imran Khan’s government fell because his allies switched sides in anticipation of elections in which the PTI was forecast to lose. But, instead of bowing out gracefully, Khan violated every rule in the book to hang on to office, requiring the Supreme Court to send him packing in the dead of night. Now he is on the election trail, sticking to his “conspiracy” theories and exhorting his supporters to attack the military high command for ditching him.
Naturally, his oppositionists are delighted. The more he attacks the Miltablishment, the less likely it will countenance his “return” at any time in the near future.
Equally significantly, the Miltablishment is licking its wounds from the abject failure of its “hybrid project” and will likely let politics take its rowdy constitutional course until the politicians create another gridlock in it. For sure, Khan wants a military intervention to make sure the PDM government is short lived.
Meanwhile, can we write off Imran Khan?
No. He is still drawing passionate crowds in support of his “narrative” – “I am Mr Clean. The oppositionists are crooks. The US and Western powers are against me because I oppose Islamophobia and want to build a sovereign Pakistan along the lines of the state of Medina in the time of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH)”.
But if this “narrative” is demonstrably false or unproven, why are so many people still buying it?
Most PTI supporters are “children” of General Zia ul Haq. They were nurtured in nurseries of Islamic nationalism that continue to churn out clones. They are relatively young, middle-class, urban, “purra-likha” types, therefore more likely to succumb to conspiracy theories because of access to the internet where such ideas take root and spread like wildfire. Since the military and bureaucracy largely source recruitment from such classes, it is understandable that “civil-military” families (serving and retired) are strong supporters of this narrative. Overseas Pakistanis also highly susceptible, partly because of daily confrontations with Islamophobia and racism and partly because of “dual national” split identities that demand “respect” for their Islamic “practices” in secular societies, craving for “homeland” Pakistan and “honour” and “equality” in resident countries. Proliferating social media groups and twitter spaces of like-minded Khan cultists reinforce common prejudices and beliefs.
But there is another aspect to this development. Many such people are also inclined to “reject” dull dynastic politics that doesn’t deliver the goods. The PPP and PMLN have paraded the same aging faces and tired status-quo policies for thirty years. We see this phenomena across the world where political dynasties are crumbling before rising “populism” and “cultish” leaders preying on youthful, restless, disgruntled populations. In the same vein, alienated, confused, insecure, “proud” Pakistanis at home and abroad have flocked to Imran Khan because he offers hope of “change” – never mind what sort of change — from the stifling socio-political status quo, despite the rising cost of living in “Naya” Pakistan. Does this mean that Imran Khan’s PTI can win the elections if these are held soon?
No. There is another Pakistan that retains a strong vested interest in traditional leaders and parties, especially in the rural areas and small towns where notions of “change” are still weak. The PPP and PMLN are still considered “mainstream” parties because they have dug deep organizational, social and political roots and created vested interests in large swathes of the country during their intermittent bouts in office. This will matter because significant numbers who voted for Imran Khan in 2018 will not vote for him now because his economic mismanagement has imposed unbearable hardships on them or because they may slowly become aware of the dangerous consequences and implications of his narrative. Therefore Khan’s diminished vote bank will not be able to push him past the post.
One can therefore understand his current strategy. He wants to destablise the current hotchpotch regime so that it cannot deliver any pro-people agenda. His rallies are aimed at vitalizing his supporters in the aftermath of his demoralizing exit. His insistence on sticking to his “narrative” despite the evidence against it is based on the simple fact of propaganda that if one repeats a lie a hundred times, it tends to become the “truth”.
But one should not underestimate the relevance and power of competing truths. Soon, there will be a flood of powerful truths about his own corruptions and party’s misdemeanours. The “ToshaKhana” thefts will pale in comparison to the embezzlements of billions from donations when the Foreign Funding Case is concluded against him next month. To follow: Ring Road Pindi, RaviTown, Malam Jabba, Corona 19 funds, BRT Peshawar, First Lady Family-and- Friends kickbacks and commissions in Punjab, etc., etc. His party is also likely to face a crackdown that will test the loyalty and commitment of its leaders, organizers and propagandists, something they have never experienced in their short political life in the safe care of the Miltablishment. Indeed, Imran Khan’s main reason for demanding immediate elections is the fear that his support base will wane when its passion is dissipated by time and countervailing truth.
The current regime led by the PDM is thus in the grip of two opposing tensions. If it opts for early elections, it might face a fair challenge from Imran Khan because his supporters are still kicking dust. If it delays the polls but is unable to deliver and is discredited, it will revive his option. In that case, the Miltablishment will be compelled to go back to the drawing board again to substantiate the circular history of Pakistan.
Fact over Fiction
“Without firing a shot, the Pakistani Awam is abusing the Pakistani Fauj. India could have spent thousands of crores but still it could not have achieved this objective. And the man behind this is Imran Khan. He is our best friend.” Thus spoke Maj (retd) Gaurav Arya, India’s popular strategic analyst, countering the perception that Imran Khan is anti-India. But PTI supporters are not prepared to face reality.
A statement by ISPR last week clarified that the National Security Committee headed by PM Imran Khan a month ago rejected the notion of any conspiracy by the United States for regime change in Pakistan. Now a National Security Committee headed by PM Shehbaz has confirmed this finding. But PTI supporters are not prepared to face reality.
Imran Khan spent nearly one billion rupees helicoptering from Bani Gala to the PM’s House. Yet Fawad Chaudhry insisted the cost of travel was no more than PKR 55 per km. Imran Khan commandeered dozens of precious gifts from the Toshakhana worth nearly PKR200m at a fraction of the market price. So what, retort PTI supporters, he was entitled to keep them, even though he admits he sold some of them. They are not prepared to face reality.
The Foreign Funding Case reveals embezzlement of tens of billions by hand-picked lieutenants of Imran Khan. Even now, after seven long years delaying indictment by the Election Commission of Pakistan, PTI lawyers are not ready to wrap it up and PTI supporters are not ready to face reality.
There is a long list of corrupt, undemocratic and unconstitutional acts and practices during Imran Khan’s rule. Slowly, the sordid truth is beginning to filter out. But PTI supporters insist that such charges apply exclusively to the Sharifs and Zardari-Bhuttos. They are not prepared to face reality.
Now that the PTI is out of office, it is demanding immediate elections. Never mind that Imran Khan spurned the same demand when the opposition cried itself hoarse for three years accusing Imran Khan of being a “selected” PM on the basis of rigged elections. Why, ask PTI supporters, wasn’t Imran Khan allowed to complete his five year term “in the larger interest of democracy and civilian supremacy”, conveniently ignoring the reality that Imran Khan spent the better part of 2008-2018 successfully agitating for the premature ouster of PPP and PMLN Prime Ministers.
PTI propagandists have built a powerful narrative to prop up Imran Khan. This is based on the some carefully crafted perceptions. “He is anti-America”, never mind that after he returned from his embrace of President Donald Trump two years ago he gushed that he felt as elated as when he won the World Cup for Pakistan 1992. “He is anti-imperialist”, never mind that there is a contradiction in terms with being pro-capitalism and anti-imperialist at the same time. “He is a populist”, never mind that this term has nothing to do with being popular and everything to do with being authoritarian and delusional. “He is an Islamic nationalist”, never mind that dictator General Zia ul Haq was one too, even when he was serving the interests of the US in Afghanistan.
The notion that he is so “popular” that he can win any free election hands down is also wrong. If that had been the case, the MNAs and MPAs who have deserted the PTI in droves, despite the certainty of being de-seated, would have stayed put. Most have done so because they know a PTI ticket is a sure shot recipe for defeat in the next elections, so alienated are their supporters from their party. Current public opinion polls suggest that at least in the largest province, Punjab, that accounts for over half the seats in parliament, the PMLN is far ahead of the PTI in electoral prospects.
But if that is the case, argue PTI supporters, why wasn’t Imran Khan allowed to complete his five year term, and be fairly defeated at the polls?
There is one main reason why PDM risked ousting Imran Khan now and inheriting a mauled and stricken economy instead of waiting until next year to defeat him at the polls. If Khan had lasted beyond November 2022, he would have hand-picked the next army chief to help him rig the 2023 elections (the same one who did the needful in 2018 and propped him up subsequently, the very same over whom he picked a fight with the army high command) and together they would have decimated the opposition, strengthened the hybrid regime and consolidated a centrist authoritarian order in the next six years. Therefore, it was a do or die, now or never, bid by the PDM.
That also explains why Imran Khan wants a quick election now. He thinks he has rejuvenated his support base by his “populist narrative” to enable a win today so that he is in the chair come November 2022. His target is the Pakistan army high command whose “neutrality” created an opening for the PDM to marshal its allies and oust him, so fragile and dependent was the coalition that kept him in office. By driving a sharp wedge in the army’s rank and file, he hopes to pressurize the high command to relent and open the route for him to return to office. Alternatively, one can conclude that his whole political strategy now is geared to getting an NOC from the military establishment that he has angered and alienated rather than trying to win an election. What so rejoices Major (retd) Gaurav Arya, the arch enemy, is par for the course for Khan.
Less than 1000 BOTs manipulated by less than 100 PTI supporters out of over 60 m internet users in Pakistan have engineered a terrible, transformative brainwashing of Pakistan’s post-Zia children. Nearly 22 percent or 50m of Pakistan’s population is between the age of 18-30 and 4 million are being added to this category every year. Part of this Youthia bulge is susceptible to the PTI narrative. Thankfully, however, there is still another Pakistan out there whose majority is not fooled. And if one is to go by the relatively modest crowd at Imran Khan’s Lahore jalsa this week and his dull, repetitive speech, it may be argued that the current passion is likely to dissipate over time. Certainly, if Maryam Nawaz Sharif should come out to show PDM muscle and the PDM government is able to exploit the same social media tools to counter Imran Khan’s narrative, the theory of his great popularity may be exploded sooner than later and fact may finally triumph over fiction.
Who will bell the cat?
Mariam Aurangzeb, the information minister of the new PDM government, has admitted that this government intends to stay the full course for general elections late next year. This settles the issue between the two Sharif brothers.
Nawaz Sharif wanted swift elections for two reasons: first, the polls were likely to yield pro-PMLN and anti-PTI results because of the former’s rapprochement with the Miltablishment and PMLN’s track record of being “doers”, compared to the latter’s dismal misgovernance and estrangement from the same power-brokers; second, an economic crisis that was forecast to deepen in the middle term, alienate the new government from the people and possibly revive the PTI.
But Shehbaz Sharif and Asif Zardari had their way because they thought they could use the rehabilitated power-platform to extend their outreach to the voter via patronage to the “electables”, thereby downsizing the PTI. Therefore, their argument went, the longevity of this PDM government was critical to winning the elections next year.
The Shehbaz Sharif government, unfortunately, is still flapping about its strategy. It hasn’t decided how to tackle Imran Khan’s popular narrative of “chor, imported government” that appeals to a section of the nationalist urban middle class, either by counterposing an equally potent narrative of its own or by successfully propagating big convincing holes in his. The PDM hasn’t taken a position on Imran Khan’s tactics either — should it give him a clean hand to organize his destabilizing dharnas and protests or should it take pre-emptive steps to halt him in his tracks? How should it counter his highly effective social media campaign that is heaping passionate hostility against the new government? Indeed, what sort of counter-narrative should it build to capture the imagination and votes of those who don’t buy into Khan’s? Should it focus on short term economic palliatives to deny Imran Khan any popular peg on which to hang peoples’ grievances or should it buckle down to a full-fledged IMF austerity program that is bound to aggravate peoples plight and create unrest? How should it keep its alliance partners in line so that the boat isn’t rocked or the dispensation mocked? What sort of legal and electoral reforms are to be carried out and what is the time frame for this exercise? And so on.
On the other hand, Imran Khan has a definite strategy going forward. He wants to force early elections because he believes his chances have been revived by three factors. First, he has successfully put the Miltablishment on the back foot by whipping up a backlash from its rank and file against the “neutrality” that led to his ouster. An overwhelming majority of middle-class business, bureaucracy and professional classes and Miltablishment “families”, serving and retired, are with him and against the stale dynastic families and leaders of the PDM – the father-son combo is a red rag to these bulls. This means the new government should not expect any positive support from the Miltablishment if and when it gets into serious administrative or financial trouble. Second, he has besieged the Judiciary and Election Commission of Pakistan to ensure that they don’t take any quick decisions against his interests. Continuing delays in concluding the Foreign Funding case and breaking the constitutional logjam created by the PTI President of Pakistan have stalled the formation of the Punjab government and crippled law making by the federal cabinet. Third, he is poised to seriously distract the new government from its main task of stabilizing the economy and providing good governance. His supporters are urban, young, passionate, ready to launch sit-ins, sieges, dharnas and long marches. A politico-constitutional crisis in which a couple of coalition partners pull out – with or without a wink from the Miltablishment under pressure — could topple the government and trigger new elections.
Imran Khan’s strategy goes beyond compelling an early election. If he wins, he will continue on the path of demolishing democratic rules, traditions and laws to entrench himself as a fascist dictator. If he loses, he will challenge the results by the very agitational means and methods he is using today to destabilise and delegitimize the current dispensation. So unless a way is found to counter his narrative and clip his popular base to manageable proportions and put the genie back in the bottle, one should not expect stability and certainty ahead.
The recent happenings in the Masjid i Nabvi should be an eye-opener both for the PDM and Establishment. It shows the extent to which Imran Khan will go to extend his narrative – “imported chor government” – and will reinforce it by continuous propaganda instead of defending it when it is demonstrably false. The stunning silence of his supporters in face of evidence of conspiracy by PTI stalwarts led by Sheikh Rashid suggests that a counter-religious blast could prove effective in these circumstances. But none is forthcoming from the PDM. Instead, the Tehreek in Labiaq Pakistan has condemned Shehbaz Sharif’s attempt to woo the European community and explained this dimension of PDM foreign policy as a peg in the “popular” reaction against the “imported government” in the Masjid i Nabvi.
Suddenly, the PTI and its middle class supporters have latched on to a demand for immediate elections as the only way out of the crisis of state and society. This is ironic considering that only a month ago they were insisting that the PTI government should have been allowed to complete its term in the larger interest of “democracy” while the PDM was insisting on exactly the opposite. Interestingly, however, the PTI was mainly concerned about ensuring Miltablishment support (because it lacked the voter strength needed to win) and the PDM was interested in Miltablishment neutrality whenever the elections were held (because they had the “electables” with them). Demography also favours the PDM.
Here’s the rub. The middle class Miltablishment rank and file continues to romance the cult of the clean hero in Imran Khan even as its decision-making leadership worries about the consequences of his misgovernance for state and society. Come November, a change in its leadership could either reinforce this trend or reverse it, with serious implications either way. That is why the PTI wants a chance to get back into office and the PDM wants to cling to it.
There is one counter-narrative that might yield dividends for the Miltablishment and PDM. This is related to the dire consequences for state and society — especially the middle classes that are critically dependent on the state of the economy for their security and status — of a return to the disastrous paradigm of Imran Khan. Who will bell the cat?
Desperate Khan
Imran Khan is flapping about desperately. He is setting up interviews and podcasts with lackeys who throw him soft balls that he can hit out of the park. Unfortunately, he is often inclined to put his foot in his mouth, the latest example of this being his claim of a “domestic conspiracy” to undo his government. Consider.
Khan now claims that he knew of the PDM’s plans to oust his government as early as July last year. That is why, he argues, he insisted on retaining DG-ISI Lt-Gen Faiz Hameed as his “eyes and ears” for as long as it took to nip this “conspiracy” in the bud. He admits that this decision created a wedge with GHQ which didn’t want any interference in the army’s internal affairs when postings and transfers were ordered.
Imran Khan’s reliance on Lt-Gen Faiz Hameed to bail him out and prop him up goes back to the 2018 general elections when the RT system mysteriously broke down during vote counting and the PTI inexplicably romped home in Islamabad. Subsequently, critical help was similarly needed to drive the Independents, PMLQ, GDA, MQM, BAP etc into the fold of the PTI so that it could make a government. Last year, when the army high command under COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa decided to become “neutral”– it would neither prop him up nor help the opposition drive him out – because it was being roundly discredited for siding with an incompetent and increasingly corrupt government, the die was cast. Since then, Imran khan has grudged General Bajwa’s decision and hinted at the army chief’s role in the demise of the PTI government.
Now the gloves have come off. The PTI’s social media network has gone into high gear to blast General Bajwa for deserting the Great Khan, accusing him of helping the opposition plan its vote of no confidence. In fact, the campaign to build internal military pressure on the COAS via serving and retired army officers is relentless. It aims to change General Bajwa’s neutral stance and help Khan climb back into power. Now Khan’s lackeys in the media have made two new accusations. They claim that GHQ became aware of the “cable” from Ambassador Asad Khan on March 8 (because it was also copied to DG-ISI, DG-MI, DG-MO, COS) but the foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, only read it on 12 March, implying that the matter was deliberately kept under the lid by GHQ so as to enable the vote of no confidence to succeed.
This is ridiculous. If the PDM’s conspiracy with GHQ started in July last year, why did it take nine months to succeed? Surely, all that was required was for GHQ to wink at the PTI’s allies to ditch the government so that a vote of confidence would fall short of the required numbers and there would be overnight regime change. Instead it took the Opposition nine grueling months in which to stitch up the Allies, get the numbers right and launch the vote of no-confidence in March.
Then there’s the question of the alleged US conspiracy to beget regime change. If the earliest manifestation of this is the 8th March cable, why did Imran Khan wait until 27th March to reveal it? If the PDM government has now conceded his demand to investigate the contents of the cable, why is he opposing an independent commission of inquiry? If GHQ and PDM had decided in July to oust Imran Khan, how did the US enter the scene nine months later? Indeed, where was the need for the US to trigger regime change? What drastic anti-US steps had Imran Khan taken to so annoy the White House to order regime change? When Pakistan carried out six nuclear tests in 1998 despite American exhortations to the contrary, did the US order regime change? When Pakistan refused to sign the CTBT in the 1990s, did the US order regime change? When Pakistan played a double game to protect its interests in Afghanistan in the 2000s, did the US order regime change? When Pakistan blocked NATO supply lines to and from Afghanistan, did the US order regime change? And so on. It is ridiculous to argue that Imran Khan’s refusal to grant military bases to the US led to regime change because the US has not asked for any such facility (conditional overflight rights under discussion do not constitute US bases). Nor does a one day trip to Moscow — which didn’t lead to any Russian concessions for Pakistan that undermined the sanctions regime subsequently imposed on it by Western powers – constitute a valid enough reason to order regime change in Pakistan.
Imran Khan’s attempt to pin the conspiracy to oust him in July 2021 on GHQ+PDM has compelled a reference to the long-whispered “L’Affaire General Faiz Hameed” when Khan tried to delay the appointment of a new DG-ISI last year. By naming names and motives, Khan has put the spotlight squarely on General Faiz and severely embarrassed him. It has also revived speculation about what happened in the PM’s House on the fateful night of March 28 when, as reported by BBC, a couple of helicopters disgorged a couple of powerful persons who stopped Imran Khan from making any notification regarding any change in the army high command.
Now Imran Khan is pinning his hopes on a “long march of millions” to Islamabad in the near future to create a volatile situation that compels the army to step into the fray and order fresh elections. Khan thinks that if he can succeed in provoking an army intervention against the PDM, then it should logically follow that the same army will facilitate the PTI’s return to power. He wants this course of action as soon as possible so that he is back in the saddle before end-November when General Bajwa retires and a new COAS is to be appointed.
Imran Khan has plunged the economy into bankruptcy. He has targeted the army high command by playing favourites, sowing divisions and weakening its unity of command (provoking Indian commentators to praise him for doing their job). He has polarized civil society, degraded discourse and eroded the constitution. He has undermined the norms of diplomacy and isolated Pakistan internationally. The sooner the ubiquitous Miltablishment concludes that its latest experiment in hybrid politics is a dismal failure and Imran Khan’s hysterics cannot be tolerated any longer, the better it will be for national security.
Miltablishment “Neutrality”?
For two years, the Opposition cried itself hoarse with demanding elections but Imran Khan refused to heed its call. Indeed, on the eve of the no-confidence move on March 7, he said he welcomed the challenge and would neither resign nor dissolve parliament. But when all seemed lost a few week later, he asked President Arif Alvi to dissolve parliament and order fresh elections. In the event, however, the Opposition succeeded in ousting him and formed a government, not with the intent to hold immediate elections but stay put until the end of next year and put the country back on the rails. Now Imran Khan is demanding elections and threatening to march on to Islamabad and drag the PDM government down.
The PDM deliberated and decided against holding quick elections for four main reasons. It wanted to fill two vacancies in the Election Commission of Pakistan that had rendered it weak so that it could neither hold elections efficiently, nor conclude the Foreign Funding Case against the PTI. It also sought to legislate electoral laws against EVMs and Dual Nationals which are unworkable or put it at a distinct disadvantage. It wanted to defang NAB and make it less hostile towards businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians because it had metamorphosized over time from a credible anti-corruption watchdog into an unaccountable and ruthless institution to victimize opponents of the sitting government or Miltablishment. The PDM also sought time to wrap up the NAB and FIA “cases” — which haven’t yielded any convictions in four years despite dogged efforts by Imran Khan — against its leaders and set them free to take on the PTI. But, one month into government, the PDM is floundering, unsure of its goals, while Imran Khan is making a threatening comeback on a one point agenda of immediate elections. Meanwhile, with every passing day, the economy is tanking and time for very hard and unpopular decisions by the sitting government is already past its expiry date.
Under normal circumstances – political certainty and longevity — the PDM would have lined up with the IMF and pulled the country out of the trough into which Imran Khan had thrown it. But Imran Khan has thrown a spanner in the works. He has successfully divided the Miltablishment and stopped it from supporting the PDM government. Indeed, there is evidence to believe that the Miltablishment has come under pressure from its rank and file to side with Imran Khan’s demand for quick elections. Under the circumstances, the PDM finds itself up the creek without a paddle. Damned if it implements the IMF’s agenda, triggering a popular backlash against it, giving the Miltablishment and PTI an excuse to drag it into an election when its graph is down. Damned if it doesn’t, hastening a financial bankruptcy of the economy and leading to chaos and anarchy with terrible consequences for the country.
The huddle in London with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and half the cabinet called recently by PMLN President Nawaz Sharif deliberated on the way out of this crisis. The arguments for and against quick elections, for and against signing on the dotted line with the IMF, for and against rolling back Imran Khan’s threatening juggernaut, and the consequences of each course of action, were squarely faced. At the end of the day, the ball dropped dead in the Miltablishment’s court. If the PDM and the Miltablishment can be brought on to the same page to salvage the wreck, Imran Khan can be stopped in his tracks, the IMF bail out can be grasped and the country and economy stabilized in the 18 months before elections are due next year. But if the Miltablishment has already succumbed to pressure from Imran Khan and has decided to opt for early elections, then it makes no sense to implement the IMF program, become unpopular and risk being trounced at the elections in the next few months.
Let’s face facts. The Miltablishment’s role in the last six months has been increasingly confused and contradictory. By pulling out of the “same partisan page” with Imran Khan last year, it made him vulnerable, thereby alienating him. But by becoming “neutral” instead of actively helping the Opposition, it forced the Opposition on a long drawn out five month journey to cobble the numbers needed to oust the PTI government and lose time and opportunity to address the economic crisis bequeathed by it. This space enabled Imran Khan to develop a powerful narrative against both the Opposition and the Miltablishment that is paying dividends. In consequence, we are confronted with the spectacle of Imran Khan demanding a Miltablishment intervention against the PDM government and the PDM government seeking assurances of continuing “neutrality” from the Miltablishment if it is expected to clean up the economic mess without adverse consequences for its electoral prospects.
Several questions arise. If the Miltablishment saw wisdom in adopting a “neutral” stance earlier, what is stopping it now from continuing on that path? Why is Imran Khan openly attacking the leaders of the Miltablishment if he is not being egged on to do so by powerful forces within Miltablishment? Have these Miltablishment leaders become so weak that they are ready to capitulate to Imran Khan and risk taking the economy and country down with it? If they want to facilitate his return to power, why did they let him be ousted in the first place? If they had wanted quick elections, why didn’t they pull the plug on Imran Khan in November last year by winking at the MQM and Co to ditch him, fail a vote of confidence and dissolve parliament?
Time and again we find the Miltablishment’s political experiments come a cropper. This time, however, it has been a veritable disaster. The prodigal son has turned not only on the Miltablishment but also on the constitution and economy. Therefore the new PDM government should be allowed to tackle the national crisis and “neutralise” the destabilising threat from Imran Khan without constantly looking over its shoulder for a conspiracy to oust it from office.
What next?
All are agreed. Pakistan is faced with its most serious economic crisis to date. The problem is accentuated by some critical political deadlocks and constitutional subversions. How did we get to this point? Who is responsible? How do we get out of it?
The civil-military ruling gentry – landlords, big businessmen, generals, judges and “civil servants” — have brought us to this pass. Over the decades, this gentry has lived off American and international handouts to establish a largely rent-extraction, imported consumer goods-based economy with low rates of savings and investment, low import substitution, subsisting on low tax revenues, high fiscal and current account deficits, high unproductive “defense” expenditures, resulting in increasing domestic and international debt. In the last three decades, export of manpower rather than high value added manufactured goods and services has enabled us to keep our head barely above water. But the free American lunch has gone and deepening structural imbalances have finally caught up on the gentry’s perks, privileges and subsidies, fueling rising income inequality and inflation, currency devaluation and unsustainable expenditures and debt servicing.
The solution proposed by the gentry’s economists is to borrow more at home and abroad. But the problem is that lenders have got wise to the financial risks involved in bailing out Pakistan without targeted guarantees of long-overdue, painful structural reforms. The fact that such belt-tightening measures are more likely to stress out the have-nots rather than the haves is creating a difficult problem for political stakeholders locked in a battle for office and power via the ballot box.
In the last four years of the PTI regime, the economy has gone from bad to worse, accentuating structural imbalances to breaking point. This was one of the pegs on which the Opposition and Miltablishment decided to order regime change. The other mutual compulsion was Imran Khan’s determination to unconstitutionally consolidate power for another term and wittingly perpetuate the same socio-economic cleavages and imbalances in society that have laid Pakistan low. Now we are faced with fresh dilemmas.
Imran Khan is hitting back. He will not allow the new PDM government to stay long enough in office to fix the economy and reap its electoral benefits before calling fresh polls. The Miltablishment leaders who took the decision to stop propping him up are now under pressure from their own rank and file to give him another chance at office by committing to immediate general elections. But this goes against the demand of the economy that requires urgent fixing and the grain of an “understanding” with the Opposition that it will take the tough and unpopular decisions to do the job provided it is given at least 18 months to do it.
Under the circumstances, the Miltablishment leaders have done a U-Turn and decided to accede to the demands of their pro-Imran constituency. They are now pressurizing the PDM government to take the tough measures in the next two months and then make way for fresh elections that put a new government in office by next October when the critical appointment of a new army chief is to be made. In other words, the Miltablishment wants to have its cake and eat it too. But this is a suicidal option for the PDM. It will be wiped out in a general election after tightening the screws on its voters. It is also an established fact that the PDM is in no position to resist the powerful Miltablishment, nor to stem Imran Khan’s populist surge without administrative backing from the same Miltablishment. It doesn’t help that its insufficient parliamentary numbers in Islamabad and Lahore don’t inspire much hope of constitutional resistance, not least when the “unholy nexus” between the generals and judges is the rage of social media.
The PMLN huddle in London was aimed at finding a way out of this dilemma. It came to the conclusion that it should sign on the dotted line with the IMF – including increasing energy prices – in the national interest, provided only that the Miltablishment wouldn’t pull the rug from under its feet until the scheduled general elections in 2023, thereby leaving it out to dry before an angry populace. Back home, however, the situation had changed overnight. The Miltablishment now wanted the PDM to do the needful vis a vis the IMF and Budget 2022-23 and then obediently dissolve itself in July for a new government to be installed before October. Naturally, this was perceived as yet another example of “betrayal” by the Miltablishment. Why should we clean up the mess left behind by the Selectors’ puppet and then pay the price by losing the elections, they asked themselves, let the hand-picked caretakers of the Miltablishment do the job because they won’t be accountable at the polls.
Critics of the PDM ask why it took office when it couldn’t deliver the goods. Why didn’t it agree to a dissolution of parliament as ordered by Imran Khan on the eve of his ouster if it was eventually going to come to the same thing six weeks later? The answer is simple: it was understood they would deliver the goods by 2023 and a U-Turn by the Miltablishment wasn’t countenanced. Others insist that a better option was to have let Imran Khan rule until 2023 and discredit himself thoroughly instead of hastening his departure and giving him a chance to make a quick comeback. The answer to this too is simple: the PDM feared, and rightly so, that if Imran Khan could last long enough to appoint his own army chief in November 2022, he would use his services to rig the 2023 elections like he did in 2018 and assure himself another five year term which he would use to crush whatever remained of the Opposition by overpowering the constitution and other powerful institutions.
As matters stand, the PDM government may be on its way out and we expect the caretakers will sign up with the IMF. But we certainly can’t say how long the Caretakers will stay, whether the elections will be free and fair, whether these elections will be held on time or postponed on some pretext legitimized by a servile judiciary, and who will appoint the next army chief or extend the tenure of the current one.
As we speak, however, Asif Zardari is making a last ditch attempt to persuade the Miltablishment and PMLN to let this PDM government stay and complete the rest of the parliamentary term. He believes together they can push back Imran Khan and bring political and economic stability to the country.
Whatever the immediate outcome, the political crisis of state and society is far from over. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the next inevitable round of political turmoil, all political stakeholders, including PPP, PMLN and PTI, will be on the same page against the Miltablishment, determined to assert civilian autonomy (if not supremacy).
PDM takes the plunge
The PDM government has finally taken the plunge. After weeks of dithering over various options, it has decided to dig its heels in, resist Imran Khan’s demand for fresh elections, sign the IMF conditionalities, make a tough budget and plough on with or without help from the Miltablishment. Since elections will likely be ordered sooner or later, only time will tell whether this was a wise decision or not.
Option One was to swiftly carry out electoral and NAB laws, announce a caretaker government to hold an election sometime in August or September, and go home without putting any burden on the masses conditioned by the IMF. The logic of this route was obvious enough: let the Miltablishment that condoned Imran Khan’s disastrous mismanagement for four years clean up its puppet’s mess, backed by the narrative that the PDM had voluntarily given up the perks and privileges of power rather than burden the masses with sharp price hikes and deflationary economic policies. The outcome of an election under such conditions would have been favourable to the constituent parties of the PDM.
Option Two was to do the Miltablishment’s bidding: first, take the tough decisions needed to bring the IMF and various donors back to Pakistan and stave off an unprecedented financial crisis; then announce elections in September. Any notion of resisting Miltablishment pressure to hold elections could not be countenanced because of the latter’s unchallenged ability to manipulate the MQM and BAP upon whose critical votes the PDM depends for its survival. This option was rejected in the mid-May London huddle called by the PMLN chief, Nawaz Sharif, because it would alienate the PDM from the voters without ensuring longevity to redeem its economic policies.
In the event, even as the government was planning its exit strategy, the decision was taken out of its hands by Imran Khan’s announcement of Monday 25 May Long March to force an early election. How could any party or government succumb to such blackmailing pressure and hope to persuade the electorate of its political virility? On the contrary, this stiffened its back. It now resolved to resist and fail the Long March. When Imran Khan’s threat petered out – partly because of insufficient popular backing from Punjab and partly because of the government’s hardball resistance – the PDM decided to press home its advantage, endear itself to the Miltablishment by agreeing to take the tough decisions to bail out the economy. Does this mean that the threat from Imran Khan has been repulsed for good, that the PDM government is here to stay until the end of 2023, that the Miltablishment has finally found its long lost political partner and can afford to junk the PTI?
No. Two factors militate against such conclusions. The first is Imran Khan. He simply cannot be written off because of the significant popular support that he enjoys and because such support is both passionate, committed and across the board. He will continue to pose problems for any dispensation before, during and after any general elections. The second is the rift within the Miltablishment: one section believes he is a liability who has discredited the Miltablishment that nurtured him, isolated the country diplomatically and plunged it into economic crisis, therefore he cannot be entrusted with such responsibility again; the second section still supports him because it hates the Sharifs and Bhutto-Zardaris who have dynastically lorded it over the country for three decades without distinction. It is this section that wants Imran Khan to actively remain in the game and is involved in a power struggle within the Miltablishment to achieve its objective. The matter is complicated because both sections want to consolidate the Miltablishment’s hold over national politics by ensuring no single party wins a majority in the next elections.
Under the circumstances, the PTI’s propaganda machine has gone into overdrive to establish that the 25th May Long March was such a huge success that the PDM government has succumbed to the six day reprieve given by Imran Khan and will announce the election schedule in the next few days. The government’s response is exactly the opposite. It claims the Long March was a flop and Khan will think twice before making a second attempt. It has also dug its heels in for a longer haul.
What happens next will depend on two main factors. First, on Imran Khan’s ability to continue to raise small and big storms to destabilise the government and pressure the Miltablishment to compel the government to announce elections sooner than later. Second, on the government’s performance to straighten out the economy and rebuild international relations as soon as possible, thereby earning the grudging support of the Miltablishment and staving off pressure for early elections.
The PDM government has a hard job at hand. It’s alliance partners are not reliable or trustworthy. The President of Pakistan, Arif Alvi, is a PTI thorn in the heart of government determined to wound it at every stage. The judiciary is, by and large, pro-Imran Khan when it is not overtly pro-Miltablishment. The PDM government in the Punjab hangs by a thread in the hands of the judges. The masses are going to groan under the weight of the IMF austerity program and show their displeasure in so many ways. And Imran Khan’s propaganda machine is aiming to relentlessly hunt the leaders of the PDM and give no quarter.
The greater likelihood, therefore, is that the PDM may wilt under such pressure in the in the next two months and be compelled to announce elections. That will bring the Caretakers in and hand over the reins of government directly to the Miltablishment, aided by the judiciary. How long the Caretakers stay and what they do will be the next item on the Miltablishment’s agenda. Much will also depend on the forecast of which party will win a majority or not and which Four Star General will rule the roost in Rawalpindi in December this year. Stay tuned.
Known Unknowns
The PTI is continuously and vigorously making the case for a new round of general elections. This is perfectly understandable. It is out of office and wants another shot at it before its “popularity” fades in the face of Establishment’s “neutrality”. Indeed, the opposition PDM had also agitated for mid-term elections before it launched its no-confidence move last March against the PTI government because it feared Imran Khan would consolidate his grip over power – by manipulating the Establishment high command — if he was able to complete his five-year term.
However, the PDM was confronted with an agonising dilemma after it formed a coalition government in April: should it implement a minimal reform agenda comprising electoral and NAB laws and dissolve parliament within the month in the coalition’s party political interests or dig its heels in for the longer haul until 2023 and implement an unpopular IMF programme in the “national interest”?
The PMLN huddle in London decided to opt for an immediate dissolution because it felt it could not risk alienating the populace by signing on the dotted line with the IMF, better that the Establishment now take responsibility for the mess it had created by propping up a disastrous PTI regime for four years and get an unaccountable Caretaker regime to take and implement hardship decisions. But it was compelled to change its decision after Imran Khan announced a long march to oust the government and gave a six-day ultimatum to dissolve parliament. How could the PDM succumb to this “blackmailing threat”, it was argued, without losing face with the electorate? Under the circumstances, it has now decided to take the hard decisions in the “ national interest” and pray that the electorate forgets and forgives it when the elections are held 15 months hence.
But a new apprehension has now arisen. What if, after the hardship budget is implemented, Imran Khan should succeed in pressurising the Establishment and/or Judiciary to pull the rug from under the PDM government and trigger fresh elections? In such a case, wouldn’t the pursuit of an unpopular “national interest” in the short term amount to a big blow to the PDM parties’ political interests and pave the way for a rejuvenated PTI-Establishment/Judiciary nexus all over again?
Such concerns are not unreasonable. There is speculation that the Establishment may have assured Imran Khan that it would guarantee fresh elections later this year if he extended his ultimatum for a long march until after the PDM government had brought the IMF back to Pakistan. The PDM is already facing the heat over its decision to raise energy prices and this is just the beginning of the long haul back to economic sustainability and political stability. A popular survey has added to the PDM’s anxieties: it claims that over 66% of the sample tested are in favour of elections this year. Inflation is forecast by reputed economists to rise above 23% and economic growth will go down after the IMF reforms are initiated, leading to a backlash against the PDM government.
Curiously enough, though, the case for fresh elections made out by some academics rests on the argument that the harsh economic measures to reset the economy require a fresh mandate from the people. As opposed to this, it can be argued that elections in Pakistan have rarely been about mandated issues and this isn’t about to change now. Indeed, there is no guarantee that a post-election government – whether PDM or PTI — will embark upon a more sustainable economic programme than the one underway currently under the aegis of the IMF.
Further, any disruption in the current reform process for at least three or four months will lead to greater uncertainty and instability which will make the task of economic revival all the more difficult. No, now that the PDM government has undertaken the onerous responsibility of halting the slide into economic anarchy and financial bankruptcy in the “national interest”, it should be allowed to deliver the goods in the next fifteen months without pulling the rug from under its feet. It is a win-win situation for Pakistan even if it leads to an erosion of the PDM’s electoral prospects in due course.
The next month or so is going to test the efficacy of Imran Khan’s pressure tactics on the Establishment and PDM. But some issues are clear. If the Establishment remains steadfastly “neutral” and doesn’t succumb to Khan’s pressure to oust the PDM government, Shehbaz Sharif & Co are not likely to wilt under any popular backlash. It is also certain that the PDM government has the will and ability to take the steam out of Imran Khan’s agitation as the interior minister, Rana Sanaullah, has demonstrated. But another serious known unknown remains.
This is the role of the judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the last decade or so, the SCP under CJPs Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, Saqib Nisar and Asif Khosa has delivered some atrocious judgments biased against the PPP and PMLN and solely in line with core Establishment interests. In the last four years, it has also protected Imran Khan and the PTI from the arm of the law when it was challenged by the opposition parties. Now it appears to be flexing its muscle once again against the PDM government. The protection afforded to Imran Khan by four judges out of five against a blatant violation of a court order on May 25 not to enter D-Chowk in Islamabad has not escaped adverse comment on social media questioning the avowed “neutrality” of the judges.
The encroachment on the rights of the elected executive to make appointments and transfers in government and regulate the Exit Control List is another case in point. Now the SC is threatening to opine on the appointment of a new NAB chief — which is the sole prerogative of the government and opposition in parliament — and itching to become prosecutor and judge at the same time regarding corruption allegations/cases against top government figures. And so on, leading to the suspicion that Imran Khan’s strategy of focusing on and targeting the SCP for “relief” is not without sinister motivation and effect.
We shall see which way the wind is likely to blow in the coming weeks and months and comment accordingly. But one thing is clear. If Pakistan is to survive unprecedented state failure, we must put an end to political instability engineered by Establishment/Judicial interventions outside of their respective constitutional domains.
Dusted and Done?
Agood annual budget should, ideally, aim to rectify any structural imbalances in the economy while incentivizing capital formation, creating jobs, improving living standards (especially for the poor) and reducing inequalities in wealth. But this budget 2022-23 falls short on some counts. It doesn’t sufficiently redress the structural imbalances in the economy like unsustainable current and fiscal account deficits that fuel inflation and exchange rate depreciation and excessive unproductive expenditures on “defense”, administration and subsidies that gobble up a large chunk of tax revenues. Worse, it actually reduces the rate of job creation, increases the cost of living for all and expands the gap between rich and poor.
But, if truth be told, the fault does not lie with Miftah Ismail, the finance minister of the PDM government which has inherited a shipwrecked economy from the ousted PTI regime that will require painful long term overhaul to set things right. In fact, Mr Ismail’s core difficulties stem from two salient facts not of his own making: first, the PTI government had already signed on the dotted line with the harsh conditionalities imposed by the IMF to bail out Pakistan and he could not renege from these without plunging the country into financial default; second, the PDM government has, at best, no more than fifteen months to salvage the mess and, at worst, barely one month before it might be compelled to face the wrath of the electorate. Attempting to make a suitable budget within these fearful parameters was a formidable and unenviable task.
Therefore, kudos are due to Miftah Ismail for braving the challenge and surviving to talk about it. There will be no financial default because the IMF is sufficiently appeased by the budget and the finance minister’s commitments going forward, and will return to Pakistan to help bail it out next month, followed by dollops from sympathetic international financial institutions and friendly Middle Eastern countries.
To be sure, not everyone will agree with Mr Ismail’s matrix of prescriptions. More here and less there can always be argued, depending on one’s perspective of political economy. For instance, he has tried to offset the blow to the poor from significantly higher energy rates by providing direct relief via the Benazir income Support Program to the tune of PKR 364B to 14m households, an increase of nearly 33 percent over last year’s outlay. He could have put more money into poverty alleviation and project development at the expense of the “defence” budget, but that would have provoked the ire of the ubiquitous and all-powerful Miltablishment. He has increased taxes on luxury imports but reduced them on core medicines, agricultural machinery, solar cells, etc. He has increased the minimum taxable income of the lower middle class person from PKR 50k to PKR 100k per month but offset it by increasing the tax rate on the income, dividend and property of wealthy individuals and institutions like commercial banks. He has brought the small retailer into the tax net by indirectly levying PKR 3000-10,000 per month without triggering any significant backlash. And so on.
Still, some omissions are inexplicable. He should have done away with the 5000 rupee bank note which is the single most important transmission source of “black” money in the economy. This would have compelled increased banking transactions and verifiable money trails, thereby facilitating the tax collector and expanding the tax base. He should have slapped a progressive tax on inherited wealth and death duties which mostly relate to the very rich. He should have scrutinised the pros and cons of economic growth based on the speculative parking of black money in the construction sector and made policy accordingly. He should have abolished subsidies on the domestic sugar industry and various export industries since devaluation has now given them a distinct competitive advantage. And now that the Miltablishment is no longer opposed to it for strategic “geo-economic” reasons, he should have made bold to open up trade with India on core items at least to alleviate the inflationary impact of speculative hoarding and unexpected shortages of everyday stuff. And so on.
But we are not yet dusted and done. Miftah Ismail has been candid enough to warn that the IMF Board will meet mid-July to consider these budgetary offerings and is forecast to insist on some additional “hardship” measures. These will necessitate a mini budget a few months down the line.
Meanwhile, politics is gearing up to take a further toll of state and society that could jeopardize a revival of the economy. Imran Khan is threatening to exploit the popular discontent from inflation and joblessness to oust the PDM government next month and plunge the country into general elections in October. Such a course of action would halt the IMF program in its tracks, with disastrous consequences. It would cost about PKR 200B which would send the budget reeling. And, in all probability, it would exacerbate the political crisis if Imran Khan refuses to accept the result or if its leads to a weak coalition government that is unable to stick to the hard IMF program.
This PDM government has clearly put national interest over party political interest. Its political interest lay in dissolving parliament and going for a quick election when Imran Khan was down and out without soiling its hands trying to clean up the stink left behind by the PTI. In fact, by doing the Miltablishment’s unequivocal bidding in the “national interest” (it’s the economy, stupid) at this stage, it has hurt its own narrative of “vote ko izzat do”. But if the Miltablishment should now succumb to Imran Khan’s pressure to hold elections rather than enable this PDM government to try and deliver the goods by October 2023, it will have only itself to blame for the disastrous consequences that are bound to follow.
Kudos to GHQ?
Everyone and Charlie’s aunt is congratulating himself for getting Pakistan off the FATF “grey list”. Hina Rabbani Khar, the state minister for foreign affairs representing the PPP in the PDM government, who led the lobbying team that went to Brussels, has given a pat on the back to “joint efforts” that led to success. Not to be left behind, the PTI has reminded everyone that the legal and organizational hurdles in satisfying the remaining stiff criteria were overcome during the last three years of its regime after Pakistan was bunged back into the grey list in 2018 after the departure of the PMLN government. Now we have the PTI’s Ali Zaidi sharing kudos with Sultan Ali Allana, President of Habib Bank Ltd (an Aga Khan enterprise), who funded a team of experts in finance, law and anti-terrorism operations to do the research and prepare a solid brief for the EU.
Not to be outdone, however, the ISPR has stepped up to praise the untiring efforts of the army chief, Qamar Javed Bajwa, in putting a khaki team to work at GHQ whose job was to coordinate and stitch up the various efforts undertaken by different groups to clinch the matter.
Thus congratulations are in order all round. This was a scary noose dangling over the Pakistani state since 2008 for acts of omission and commission. The consequences of being shunted back to the “black” zone and slapped with a bagful of sanctions would have been disastrous for a country struggling to end international isolation and financial bankruptcy. But a review of the timeline on FATF interventions over the years makes for a revealing perspective.
Pakistan was put into the grey “monitoring” zone in 2008 after the elections put the PPP into office, and off it in 2010 when the Zardari regime passed an anti-money laundering law demonstrating progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. It went back into the grey zone in 2012 for not being fully compliant with FATF requirements. Progress was made in 2015 and Pakistan slipped out of the grey zone during the Nawaz Sharif period when the FATF acknowledged that “the country had established the legal and regulatory framework to meet the commitments in its action plan.”
But in June 2018 when the country was transitioning to a new government after elections in May , the FATF sent Pakistan reeling back into the grey list for failing to act on the export of terrorism from its soil. The FATF’s Asia Pacific Group led by India under Narendra Modi now began to tighten the screws on Pakistan. The “banned outfits”, mainly anti-India, pro Kashmir jihad groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jamaat ul Dawa, Lashkar-e-Taiba, etc., were labelled as “high risk”.
During the PTI regime, the FATF insisted on the implementation of 29 conditions and by October 2020 Pakistan had complied with 21 out of these by a flurry of laws and ordinances involving the FBR, SECP, Customs, etc., and both houses of parliament. Then, in December 2020, Pakistan finally arrested Hafiz Saeed, chief of the Jamaat ul Dawa and self-confessed mastermind of the Mumbai attack in 2008, and put him on trial. This was one of the core outstanding demands of the FATF. Still, there was no reprieve. Two months later, it arrested Zia ur Rahman Lakhvi, a Lashkar-e-Taiba leader involved in the Mumbai attack. In January 2021, the State Bank of Pakistan also amended its rules and regulations to cater to FATF requirements.
It has taken another year to fulfil the last three remaining conditions. The FIA and NAB have got into stride and the banks have started to monitor and restrict transactions by Politically Exposed Persons. After Hafiz Saeed was sentenced to 33 years in jail in August 2022, the FATF finally relented. On June 14th, following a four day plenary session in Berlin, Germany, the FATF acknowledged that Pakistan had complied with all 34 items on its action plan. Now it is sending a team to Islamabad to pat Pakistan on the back, curiously when there is a new government in office towards which the EU and USA are less unfavourably inclined than the outgoing PTI regime despite the fact that the most progress was made in the last two years.
This turn of events would suggest that there is truth in the ISPR claim that the impetus behind pushing the PTI regime to “do more” came from GHQ rather than Imran Khan who is generally anti-India, anti-EU and anti-US. But then, by the same logic, it might reasonably be asked why the same approach to terrorism related issues was not dictated by GHQ from 2008 onwards when there has never been any doubt about who was training and funding the anti-India jihadi organisations helping the Kashmiris resist Indian occupation and repression. Indeed, the Miltablishment’s inflexible approach to India after the exit of General Pervez Mushharf in 2008 – he staked his all on “resolving” Kashmir by means of a historic compromise — to mediating conflict with India was part of the problem for many years until COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa signalled a shift from “geo-strategy” to “geo-economics” in 2020 and succeeded in paving the way for a calibrated rapprochement with India by cementing a ceasefire along the LoC.
In this context one seminal development may be recalled that has had a profound impact on this narrative. When PM Nawaz Sharif wanted to open channels of rapprochement with Narendra Modi in 2014-2016, he was actively thwarted by the Miltablishment led by COAS Raheel Sharif, DGISI Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar and PTI leader Imran Khan. Nawaz Sharif paid the price for this. The irony is that when COAS General Bajwa later wanted to focus on geo-economics, Imran Khan was fixated on outdated geo-strategy.
The Miltablishment has just started to fix the seventy year old problem because the free American lunch has gone and we are drowning in debt. it is time to take the painful Mother of all U-Turns. Thankfully, too, the new civilian PDM regime is favourably disposed to focussing on geo-economics as its top priority. But without long term civil-military complementarities to become a constitutional, non-aligned, normal trading state, the project won’t succeed.
Place your bets
The Information Minister, Maryam Auranzeb, has investigated a multimillion dollar contract between Pakistan Television Corp and a GroupM-ARY TV consortium during the PTI regime and initiated a case of corrupt practices in FIA against all those who signed off on the “deal”. In a brilliantly articulated press conference, Ms Auranzeb diligently explained, step by step with the help of documents, how the deal was riddled with non-transparent and corrupt procedures aimed at giving a highly lucrative three-year contract for international and PSL cricket broadcasting rights to the ARY consortium that was the PTI government’s biggest media supporter before and after the 2018 general elections. She accused ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan of being the moving force behind this sordid “quid pro quo” that has brought PTV to the brink of bankruptcy.
By all accounts, this is an open and shut case. Indeed, when the deal was first inked during the PTI regime, the most competitive bidder who was unfairly ousted, Blitz, was obliged to petition the Islamabad High Court where the case lay pending for months, despite adverse media comment on the dubious contract. The PDM government has now changed lawyers and started the process of prosecuting the contract instead of defending it as strategized by the PTI government. The most blatant transgressions have been laid at the door of PTV Sports but the PTV Chairman, Managing Director and Board of Directors cannot be condoned for conscious omissions and commissions. Hopefully, no one will be spared the rigour of accountability and punishments will not be confined to a rap on the wrist like transfers and suspensions.
This is not the only piece of good news in the two months since the PDM took office. The IMF deal is all but signed and sealed, on the basis of which the Rupee is climbing back to respectable parity with the US Dollar. Various donors are also lining up to shore the reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan. On popular demand, Miftah Ismail, the finance minister, has adjusted his gunsights to zap a one-time super-tax of 10% on the super-rich corporate sector for “poverty alleviation”. Having coaxed the retail and trade sector – which has historically supported the PMLN – to a small fixed tax rate, he is now aiming at the high earning “professional classes” of doctors, lawyers, architects, consultants, etc., who have hitherto been allowed to assess their own incomes and expenditures without any questions being asked. As an unexpected bonus, the price of oil in the international markets is going down significantly and will bring some desperately needed relief to the government.
But the way ahead is bumpy. Pakistan is compelled to pay exorbitant prices for LNG because the PTI government messed up the situation. Double-digit Inflation is forecast to remain a source of popular discontent that could create upheaval if it is transformed into organized protest. Imran Khan is bent on undermining the PDM government and is instigating rebellion within the Miltablishment. Violent clashes are predicted in the forthcoming by-elections on 20 PA Punjab seats which will make or break the PDM Punjab government. Khan has already trained his guns on the Election Commission of Pakistan which is about to deliver an adverse judgment in the “prohibited funding” case against the PTI. He has also rejected the amendments in electoral laws made by the PDM government, which is to say that he is bound to reject the results of these by-elections if these are not to his liking. Now he has announced a protest rally on Parade Ground in Islamabad early July after the “hardship” budget is passed on 30 June and Islamabad is already tense and uncertain.
The biggest PTI battering is reserved for the army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. A flood of hostile memes and social media commentary has daily tended on twitter against him. This is unprecedented. Never has the Pakistan military been so publicly criticized, let alone an army chief by name. What is equally unprecedented is that no punitive action has been contemplated against the PTI aiders and abettors even though an express law against exactly such comments against the national security establishment was passed by the PTI regime not so long ago. Indeed, Ali Wazir, an elected MNA from Waziristan is being unfairly persecuted for much less offence against the deep state and the terrorist Tehreek I Taliban Pakistan that has carried out 3,280 terrorist attacks in Pakistan since its establishment in 2007, which include 301 suicide bombings and 7,488 lives lost is being treated as a legitimate partner in negotiating peace. Instead, General Bajwa has countered with a picture that shows him receiving a high award from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman who is said to have agreed to help out Pakistan financially at General Bajwa’s persuasion.
Pundits had predicted that July could be the cruelest month for the PDM if, after the tough budget is passed, the Miltablishment should succumb to Khan’s pressure and lean on the PDM government to dissolve parliament and order fresh elections. But now a more persuasive argument is tending to tilt the balance against the PTI. Why opt for fresh elections if Imran Khan wins and exacts revenge from the leadership of the Miltablishment that connived with the PDM to oust him from office or, if he loses, refuses to accept the results and continues on the path of mass mobilization and destabilization. Better, it is argued, to let this obedient government continue in office until next year, meanwhile allowing Khan’s protests to lose steam and peter out.
We will know which way the wind is blowing on 17 July when the 20 by-elections are held in Punjab. If the PMLN wins a majority fair and square, the PDM government will be home high and dry. But if the PTI trumps the hustings, Imran Khan will become an even more potent adversary than he is now, and all bets will be off.
Generals and Judges
Last Friday, Ayaz Amir, a respected columnist/tv commentator, was waylaid by masked men in broad daylight outside the premises of Dunya TV, and roughed up. Apparently, their motive was to teach him a lesson for publicly dilating on the past and present sins of the Miltablishment. One way of looking at the incident is to count him lucky because lesser mortals have been “disappeared”, temporarily or permanently as the case may be, for the same sort of “crime”. The other way is to stand up and be counted in condemning such state-sponsored thuggery. This is, of course, what every journalist worth his/her salt, media organization and political party has done. The bad news is that, despite such condemnation, this despicable practice continues with impunity because no civilian government has the courage or wherewithal to put an end to it (least of all the Miltablishment-supported PDM government in office, notwithstanding the tweet, for the sake of form, by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, pledging to get to the bottom of it). The good news is that, despite the overhanging threats, more and more people are being so bold as to speak their mind on the subject. The elephant in the room decidedly looms ever so darkly but is neither sacred nor invisible any longer. This is unprecedented.
Equally unprecedented is the creeping politicization of judiciary and judicialization of politics since the Lawyers Movement in 2009 restored the writ of rebellious judges led by Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. Until then, no judge had stood his ground when confronted with the brute power of the Miltablishment or a vindictive “popular” civilian leader. Most happily became handmaidens to terrible miscarriages of law and constitution or salved their conscience by delivering judgments after the event or dictator had passed. Still, it required a “mad man” like Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry to defy the odds and light a prairie fire that that eventually ousted a military dictator.
But that “freedom” has been sacrificed subsequently at the altar of personal ambition, cowardice or corruption. Chief Justices of Pakistan like Saqib Nisar and Asif Khosa were like putty in the hands of the Miltablishment, emboldening it to stretch its crush over the institution like an octopus. Others tried to walk the balancing act on a wink and nod. The politicization of the judiciary in the last four years was abetted by the fact that the judiciary as an urban, middle class institution, like the military, was inclined to support the popular narrative of Imran Khan against the two-party status quo and therefore did not give much respite to the opposition when Khan and Miltablishment were both on the warpath against it. The social media is replete with instances of naked bias — whether in writing the constitution to grant another term to an army chief, or in regularizing Imran Khan’s Bani Gala property, or in giving relief to Khan for seven years in the PTI prohibited funding case, or in refusing to hold Khan guilty for violating his “Sadiq and Ameen oath, etc., — but the culpable judges have brushed it away self-righteously.
Now we have entered into another unprecedented stage in our political evolution, namely the judicialization of politics. This began when Khan’s routine trampling of law and constitution was no longer supported by the Miltablishment in late 2021 and the judiciary was quick to accept that power flows from the barrel of a gun backed by intelligence of high and low misdemeanors by judges that could be used to blackmail them effectively (as in the case of the ex-Chairman of NAB). Thus, in an unprecedented manner, the Supreme Court and Islamabad High Court were “opened up” to thwart Khan as he sought to defy the Miltablishment. Subsequently, this opened the route for the opposition to successfully challenge Khan’s political decisions (long march, etc), compelling him to plead with the judges to shun “neutrality” and side with him. We have now arrived at a stage when both sides are petitioning the judges to take political sides or adjudge matters based on “ground realities” rather than law and constitution. The retrospective cancellation of the votes of the 25 dissenting members of the PTI is a prime example of such unconstitutional intervention on the basis of “morality” no less than the “compromise” solution afforded by the judges to allow Hamza Sharif to remain CM Punjab while giving time to the absenting PTI members to be present until a fresh election for CM Punjab can be held after July 17. The extraordinary fact is that the judges have now ordered Hamza Sharif, Imran Khan and Pervez Elahi to huddle and arrive at this “out of court” solution.
Under the developing circumstances, we should not be surprised to see the developing nexus between the Judiciary and Miltablishment forcefully extended into the future. This will be a true measure of the hybrid nature of future civilian regimes rather than just the relationship between the civilian rulers and the Miltablishment. In the old sociological formulations of class and state in Pakistan, the judiciary was billed as a handmaiden of the executive where the executive authority lay with post-colonial elected civilian regimes. Now that executive authority has shifted rather brutally and openly to the Miltablishment, the judiciary is fast becoming a handmaiden to it. Power will no longer be exercised by a Miltablishment threatening martial law if the elected civilian rulers do not bend but by the unaccountable judiciary threatening to undo their decisions at the behest of the Miltablishment.
Welcome to the New Pakistan in which the term Miltablishment will not refer to the old military establishment but to the new judicial-military nexus in “deep” state and “open” society in which the Generals will rule indirectly with the direct assistance of Judges.
Dejection and Despair
The July 17 by-elections on 20 seats in Punjab could be a watershed moment. They will test the PMLN’s decision to boldly steer the country out of treacherous waters and the PTI’s relentless bid to take advantage of its unpopular measures and overthrow it. Should the PMLN win big, it will be able to retain and stabilize its government in Punjab and dig its heels in comfortably in Islamabad. Should the PTI upset the boat, its campaign to demonstrate its popularity and sow discord within the Miltablishment will get a fillip and its demand for fresh general elections will become shrill and violent. In short, a win for the PMLN will usher a desperate dose of political stability and economic certainty while a win for the PTI will push the country and political system in the opposite direction, at least in the immediate future.
However, pundits are wary of forecasting a sweep for any party. The PMLN’s popularity has declined since it took tough economic decisions that have hurt its voters. Also, its traditional supporters don’t like some of the candidates it is fielding out of necessity because they won their seats earlier on a PTI ticket.
The PTI, on the other hand, is on a do-or-die mission. Imran Khan is successfully spinning his narrative of “imported government of chors” and, like him, his supporters have acquired a Teflon hide on which adverse facts about their leader and his earlier government’s dismal performance simply don’t stick. He is also unabashedly calling upon them to resort to violence and vote stuffing if necessary, even as he continues to mount pressure on the high courts and election commission or Pakistan and seeks to instigate rebellion in the Miltablishment. He has also opportunistically decided to field strong traditional candidates instead of ideological ones. The race is therefore perceived to be so rough and tough in some constituencies that two PMLN federal ministers have resigned their posts to rush home and canvass for their party’s candidates.
The Miltablishment, that was in favour of immediate elections after PTI’s ouster last April because Imran Khan’s popularity was fading, decided to let the PMLN defer the option when it agreed to shoulder the burden of imposing economic hardship measures, courtesy the IMF, but may be forced into second thoughts if Imran Khan has his way. A conspiracy theory is already doing the rounds that says the Miltablishment might consider dispensing with the PDM government after the IMF deal is signed and sealed and order fresh elections by October that will likely fulfil its core requirements: deflect Imran Khan’s pressure for new elections and yield a hung parliament whereby the Miltablishment can once again cobble a coalition government that will do its bidding like the current PDM under Shehbaz Sharif and Asif Zardari (what better way to keep both troublemakers Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif out of the reckoning?). This way, says this conspiracy theory, come November, COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa can manipulate the nomination of the next army chief who suits his retirement plans or get another extension for himself.
Meanwhile, an interesting twist has been added to the unfolding drama. It has been leaked that the Miltablishment wants to bring back General (retd) Pervez Musharraf to Pakistan for two reasons. First, to delegitimize the Article 6 sword hanging over the head of a former army chief as an institutional security guarantee for the future – it has already manipulated the overturn of the harsh death sentence awarded to General (retd) Musharraf by the Peshawar high Court. Second, to pave the way for the return of Ishaq Dar and Nawaz Sharif. Indeed, when talk was rife of this possibility, Mr Dar announced his intention to return to Pakistan by end July. Now General (retd) Musharraf’s family sources are reported as saying that he has no intention of returning until his doctors give the green light. This has prompted a flurry of news reports, some quoting PMLN bigwigs in Islamabad like Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and Khwaja Asif, that Mr Dar is not returning home as originally announced, and some referencing Mr Dar himself as saying that his return plan hasn’t changed. At the end of the day, however, it all depends on whether or not the Supreme Court will finally hear his three year-old petition against his nomination as a “Proclaimed Absconder”. If the court holds in his favour, he may return to fight the NAB case against him. If it doesn’t, it should be taken to mean that justice is still hostage to Miltablishment politics. Whether this was all part of an elaborate plan to pretend that the Miltablishment wants to facilitate his return but doesn’t in reality, only time will tell by the way in which the decisions of the superior courts and General Bajwa unfold in the coming months and whether the PDM leadership offers any resistance or not.
The political and economic forecast is gloomy. At best, the IMF program will impose hardships on all sectors of society but especially on the relatively poor. It will clip investment and growth and lead to a rise in unemployment without significantly clamping down on double-digit inflation. If the PDM government doesn’t radically tax the wealth and incomes of the rich, swiftly privatise the bleeding state enterprises and stop subsidizing privileged sectors of state and economy, to set a platform for sustainable development without internal and external conflict, we shall continue to stumble in the dark woods of dejection and despair.
Caretakers To The Rescue
Shortly after Umar Ata Bandial was elevated to the post of the Chief Justice of Pakistan early this year, I wrote that under the prevailing circumstances, “his stint was likely to assume historic proportions, for better or worse” (https://www.najamsethi.com/for-better-or-worse/). A recent twitter thread by @reema_omer, a respected commentator on law and jurisprudence, signposts Justice Bandial’s constitutional and jurisprudential positions since 2015 in a majority of critical cases that have tilted the political landscape of Pakistan against Parliament, Mainstream Media and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. In one recent case, Justice Bandial headed a bench to write a new law into the constitution to deny the right to vote according to a parliamentarian’s conscience; in another he deemed a parliamentary party’s directive to parliamentarians to carry more weight than that of the party head to whom the parliamentary party is subservient, and now in a third case he has tried to pack the Supreme Court with junior judges against the principles of seniority, merit and competence enunciated time and again by the bar and bench. In short, is Justice Bandial fated to receive the same sorry denunciations like his recent predecessors Saqib Nisar and Asif Khosa?
Pakistan’s judiciary has been a “handmaiden of the executive”, a hangover from colonial times. Since the executive has been, by turns, in civilian and military hands, the judiciary has done “justice” to both, but always bowing to the powerful military before the civilians when they were in hybrid contention. The military has recognized the wisdom of discreetly stitching up the judiciary via its Intel agencies to legitimize its political objectives, especially since direct seizures of power via the barrel of the gun are no longer appetizing or feasible and the traditional print media that was once amenable to control and management has been overtaken by independent free-wheeling social media in the era of algorithms. The judges, in turn, have snatched better personal and constitutional terms for themselves following the successful Lawyers Movement in 2008-09 and none so much as the office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan since the time of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry.
Unfortunately, over the years, bitter fighting among the civilian contenders for office has strengthened both the military and judiciary at parliament’s expense. During the PPP regime from 2008-2013, the ruling party made an attempt to legislate bi-partisan parliamentary review of postings and elevations of judges but the PMLN opposition sided with CJP Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudry and torpedoed the move. As a result, the CJP can now handpick a bench or clutch at indiscriminate suo motu power to ride roughshod over both parliament and constitutional precedence in pursuit of either political bias or personal peeve. The recent attempt by CJP Bandial to “pack” the supreme court with five handpicked junior judges, according to respected bar and bench practitioners, was aimed at thwarting the small “independent” judges group led by Justice Qazi Faez Isa who is scheduled to become CJP late next year. In a courageous outburst against the corpus of pro-Miltablishment judges recently, the little-big man from Baluchistan, a former President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, Ali Ahmed Kurd, thundered that only four judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan led by Justice Qazi Faez Isa could be called “independent”.
The unholy nexus between the Miltablishment and Judiciary that underpinned the hybrid regime of Imran Khan has brought Pakistan to this constitutional and economic impasse. The stage is now set for a new round of innovative engineering of the state system.
Late last year, the Miltablishment came to the conclusion that its hybrid experiment with Imran Khan had come a cropper. It had discredited the military, wrecked the economy and isolated Pakistan internationally. When Khan resisted, the judges were pulled out at midnight to brandish the sword. The PDM was reluctantly eased into office on the understanding that it would call an immediate general election so that a caretaker regime handpicked by the Miltablishment could take control in the interim, giving time and space to the Miltablishment to sign on the dotted line with the IMF and appoint the next army chief, giving safe passage to the current one and sanctioning a new job for him overseas. Unfortunately, however, when the PDM regime decided to cling to office until next year and made a bid to seize Punjab in order to consolidate iyself, the Miltablishment’s plans were threatened. The more unpopular the PDM government became because of the hardship IMF program, the greater the revival of Imran Khan’s prospects of returning to office within the year and exacting his revenge against the current crop of Miltablishment leaders. So the judges rose to deny Punjab to the PDM and encourage Imran Khan to push for new elections.
If the PDM had opted for fresh elections at the height of Imran Khan’s debacle in April, the result would have yielded a PMLN win or hung parliament that would have enabled the Miltablishment to cobble a hybrid regime once again. But that moment has passed. Khan is rampaging. The PMLN is in disarray without a winning narrative. It is only a matter of time before the PDM regime packs up with a wink and nod.
But the old calculations have also been overturned. So the Caretakers are poised to rescue the Miltablishment. Facilitation by the judiciary is critical to the next stage of this enterprise. A level playing field for the PMLN – enabling Nawaz Sharif and Maryam Nawaz Sharif to lead their party in the elections –will allow it to put up a good fight and thwart Khan from storming into Islamabad. But if that isn’t possible for one reason or another, the Caretakers may be blessed with a charmed life beyond their expectations!
Original Sin
It has taken over eight years, 150 hearings, 100 adjournments and three chief election commissioners to dig out the facts behind the sources of funding of the Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf. It is an apt comment not just on the roadblocks in the path of justice erected by the PTI, including a handpicked Scrutiny Committee, but also by the Miltablishment and Judiciary who propped up and protected Imran Khan all these years. Now the political environment has changed and the original sin has come back to haunt its perpetrators.
The report of the Election Commission of Pakistan, headed by the brave and upright CEC Sikandar Sultan Raja, on the Foreign Funding Case is a damning indictment of Imran Khan. It accuses the PTI, its leading stalwarts, including Imran Khan, of “willfully and knowingly” receiving prohibited foreign funds, fudging accounts, hiding and siphoning off large sums of money, submitting false affidavits, etc. This is just the tip of the iceberg from 2008-2013. Slowly, more grubby facts are coming to light, thanks to some PTI insider-founders who left the party in disillusionment and disgust after they saw the light. Amongst these, Akbar Sher Babar, who singlehandedly pursued the case against Imran Khan when the latter was all powerful and every state institution was bending over backwards to appease him, deserves unqualified praise for his untiring and heroic efforts.
Undoubtedly, the ECP’s indictment of Imran Khan and PTI is a political boon for the struggling PDM government. It opens the door to disqualifying Imran Khan from being a member of parliament and heading the PTI for lying under oath and convicting several PTI stalwarts for money laundering and embezzlement. It also serves to focus attention on the case of PMLM leader Nawaz Sharif who was disqualified for life from contesting elections by the Supreme Court in 2017 on the ground that he had not disclosed a small, unreceived income from his own son in his sworn statement to the ECP before contesting the 2013 elections. By that yardstick of justice, on the basis of the mountain of evidence of wrong doing marshalled against him, Imran Khan is liable to be disqualified for this life and a hundred lives hereafter!
The PDM government has decided to go all out seeking Imran Khan’s conviction for not being “Sadiq and Ameen”. It will also seek convictions for embezzlement and money laundering by eleven of Khan’s lieutenants, including the ex-Speaker of the National Assembly, Asad Qaisar, and ex-Governor of Sindh, Imran Ismail. But it is mulling the pros and cons of applying to the Supreme Court to ban the PTI. The case for banning the party is weak. Also, it is never a good idea to ban a popular mainstream party that can easily be reincarnated under a different name and enjoy the perks of victimhood. Equally, a rebuff by the SC can revive a party’s flagging fortunes.
The case has highlighted the injustice meted out to Nawaz Sharif in 2017. How will the current CJP, Omar Ata Bandial, fare in the cast-iron case against Imran Khan? If he is perceived to be partisan and biased, he may be fated to serve term in the dog house of history like his predecessors Saqib Nisar and Asif Khosa.
Imran Khan has always known the magnitude of his deception. That is why he has stalled the ECP for eight years. But when he realized that Sikandar Sultan Raja was determined to expose his lies, he launched a relentless attack on the CEC. But, shorn of Miltablishment support and protection, he is flailing about quite helplessly.
If Imran Khan is convicted as ordained by law and constitution, the debate will turn on the political consequences of his formal lifetime ouster. Unlike Nawaz Sharif whose party fell back on its dynastic moorings for survival, the PTI may find it hard to struggle without the prospect of Imran Khan in power.
Understandably, there is chatter of a new Charter of Democracy between Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif that amends the constitution to enable both leaders and parties to live and let live. But that will require the Mother of all U-Turns by Imran Khan because his popular narrative has been built on the forceful annihilation of the “thieving” PPP and PMLN.
The Miltablishment and Judiciary that jointly committed the original sin of destabilizing a 2/3rd mandated elected PMLN government and deposing a thrice elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, from 2013-2018 in order to install a hybrid Imran Khan regime have much to atone for. The national economic crash that has followed recent political upheaval is entirely to their account.
A common popular prescription is for free and fair elections in an environment of state neutrality and fair play. The Miltablishment-Judiciary can either level the playing field by convicting Imran Khan and consigning him to exile like Nawaz Sharif. But that would politically compound the original sin. Or they can facilitate the return of Nawaz Sharif to lead his party as a free man after overturning his various kangaroo convictions while condoning those of Imran Khan. A stroke of the pen by parliament or Supreme Court can kill the notorious law that has become the bane of parliamentary lives. That would amount to redeeming the “original sin” if both state institutions were also to acknowledge the limits of their constitutional roles, going forward.
Pakistan Zindabad!
Imran Khan’s Chief of Staff, Shahbaz Gill, recently went on ARY TV to provoke, knowingly and willfully (as he has admitted) officers of the armed forces not to obey “illegal” orders of the high command in support of “evil”. Why did he do so, knowing well that the Miltablishment would consider it tantamount to provoking mutiny and rebellion in the armed forces, whose consequences could potentially lead to a court martial and severe punishment? Why did the Miltablishment opt to arrest him instead of rapping him on the knuckles through a strong warning statement from ISPR. But then how come there was no strong objection from the same quarters when a lower court judge quickly remanded him to judicial custody after only two days in police custody for investigation and interrogation? The questions keep coming.
Why did Imran Khan shift the venue of his August 13th Jalsa from Islamabad to Lahore? Why didn’t he blast the “neutrals” or target the Americans for “changing his regime” as he has done so thunderously in the recent past? Indeed, why didn’t he back up Shahbaz Gill’s statement, confining himself only to the “unfair” arrest and “brutal” treatment meted out to him? Instead, considering how popular he thinks he is, why is he so worried about what liesof in store for him? Why has he come to terms with the fact that a quick election is not in the cards? Why is he so worried that he may be disqualified from contesting elections for not being “Sadiq and Ameen” in consequence the screaming revelations in the Prohibited Funding Report released by the Election Commission of Pakistan?
The answers are blowing in the wind. The Miltablishment has sent Imran Khan its assessment and advice going forward.
‘We didn’t want to oust you and embrace the PDM. But you didn’t leave us with any choice. You brought the economy to the brink of default. You alienated and antagonized our foreign friends and benefactors, especially USA, EU, China and Saudi Arabia. You refused to help us “normalize” with India and cover our flanks. Then you started to interfere in our internal affairs. When we discreetly resisted, you publicly accused us of being “evil” and provoked discontent in our rank and file. After your exit, instead of learning your lessons, you persisted with your damning narrative which destablised the polity and bled the economy. This has compelled us to take a step back and rethink policy going forward, especially in relation to the role that you may or may not be allowed to play. We cannot afford to be discredited in the public imagination any longer for blindly siding with you. But we also have no intention of curbing your populist base.
‘In the national interest, we will not allow the economy to be derailed by political instability. The PDM is cooperating and taking the hard economic decisions at considerable cost to their party interest. That has redeemed it in our eyes. We have determined that the IMF program must not be derailed or interrupted by general elections until next year at least. If you try to sabotage this process, you may expect to face the full wrath of the law. That is why we have given the green light to the Election Commission of Pakistan to release its Report related to the PTI’s prohibited funding case. As you know very well, you have committed various crimes that are many times more serious and incriminating than the unreceived income from his son that led to Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification. If you don’t see the writing on the wall and adjust your sights accordingly, you will be knocked out swiftly.
‘We would like free and fair elections next year. We want to atone for our disastrous hybrid experiment by creating a level playing field for all players. This means allowing Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan and lead his party. It also means giving you a free hand to contest. Unfortunately, that cannot happen as long as Nawaz is crippled by kangaroo court convictions (which, admittedly, we manipulated out of a sense of misplaced concreteness) and disqualifications and the sword of Damocles is hanging over your head. That means that PTI and PDM must join hands in parliament to undo these threats without threatening our long term institutional power and interests. Or we will be compelled to find other ways of achieving the same end.
‘As a sign of your acquiescence to “Operation Fair Play”, you should discard the “regime change” narrative and reach out to our foreign friends and allies and dispel the apprehensions that have arisen as a consequence of your opportunism or foolishness or both so that the prospect of PTI in office again is not a strict no-no.
‘Should you resist or create more problems, you will be fairly disqualified, detained and convicted. That is another way of creating a level playing field. But it should not come to that if you see the wisdom of what we are saying. Our response to Shahbaz Gill is a warning shot across your bow. We can go easy on him or screw him, depending on what lessons you and your party are prepared to learn. We have left Punjab in your hands so that you are not at a disadvantage. But that can change in the twinkling of an eye if you try to exploit it to destablise the PDM government in Islamabad.
‘One last matter. Come November, there will be no discontinuity or disruption in our institutional response. Do not think otherwise and create controversy to thwart us. The fact that we have not cut short the command tenure of your favourite general should give you some comfort. We have several aces up our sleeves, as we have also informed the PDM.
‘Pakistan Zindabad’.
Watch This Space
Thanks to Imran Khan, the case of his Chief of Staff (COS), Shahbaz Gill continues to hog the headlines, with inconvenient truths and convenient falsehoods sprouting by the hour. People say Imran is worried that Mr Gill might spill the beans about his (Imran’s) hand in the anti-army campaign that has outraged its rank and file and led to the crackdown on him. Indeed, there is even fear in PTI circles that if Mr Gill is threatened with Court Martial, he might succumb and become an Approver against Imran, a throwback to the murder case against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1978 based on the testimony of an Approver, Masood Mahmood, the then head of the Federal Security Force.
On his part, Imran has launched a propaganda blitzkrieg to secure Mr Gill’s freedom. He has alleged “brutal torture” and “sexual abuse” of his COS, never mind that his own Punjab Government’s Home Minister has said the prisoner wasn’t harmed, never mind too that a panel of top doctors at the Pakistan Institute of Medicine in Islamabad has examined Mr Gill and vouched that there is no evidence of torture and he is as fine as can be under the stressful circumstances. Imran has also “ordered” the Punjab government to stop the transfer of Mr Gill from Adiala jail in Punjab to Islamabad Police, never mind that such instructions were in defiance of court orders and could have led to the framing of contempt of court charges against the Punjab Chief Minister, IGP, IGP Prisons, DIG and Superintendent Adiala Jail. But he was quick to relent when the federal government threatened to send the Rangers to secure Mr Gill from Adiala Jail. When all else failed, he jumped into an armoured car and raced to PIMs, with PTI stalwarts screeching behind, and tried to storm his way into the hospital, only to be foiled once again by the police security on detail.
The PTI has also launched an ingenious campaign to target PDM leaders of equivalence in guilt but discrimination in punitive action. Why, they ask, are PDM leaders like Nawaz Sharif, Asif Zardari, Maulana Fazal ur Rahman, Khwaja Asif, Mariam Nawaz Sharif, etc., not charged with the same crime as Shahbaz Gill when they have also criticized the Miltablishment in the past? Indeed, Imran Khan made a big song and dance of this charge in his Lahore rally on August 13 and the youthful crowd lapped it up deliriously, as usual. But, never mind, there is no equivalence. The PDM leaders have certainly criticized the partisan and unconstitutional political intervention of the Miltablishment that has brought the country to this pass but never ever tried to foment rebellion and revolt in military ranks, as Imran Khan, Shahbaz Gill and PTI social media activists have all been trying to do for months by exhorting officers to disobey the “evil” orders of the high command and stand on the side of the ‘righteous” (PTI). In fact, Imran’s grouse against the Miltablishment is not that it has usurped civilian space but that it has not done so to support him. “Neutrality” is an “evil animal”, he has thundered time and again, “it’s never too late to review your stance and come back to my side”, says the gentleman who has made the vice of U-Turns a virtue in politics.
Now Imran Khan has absolved the PDM civilian government of instigating the case against Mr Gill by pointing the finger at the Miltablishment and revealed that the “disappearances” of journalists and social media activists during his time in office were also the handiwork of the ubiquitous and unaccountable security agencies. This is a damning indictment of the very Miltablishment that helped bring him into office and propped him up for four years (“changed his nappies”, according to Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, his very own Chief Minister of Punjab). The threat to reveal more dirt has been hurled in a last ditch act of defiance.
Imran Khan has also upped his personal attacks on the integrity and neutrality of the Chief Election Commissioner, Sikandar Sultan Raja, attributing his appointment by his own government to the advice of the Miltablishment. Understandably, he has been summoned to answer charges of contempt, along with a clutch of his “ more-loyal-than-the-King” ex advisors and ministers. In the past groveling apologies have got some of these same gents off the hook. But now Imran Khan is making a habit of ignoring or rejecting summons of various government agencies and departments for investigation or inquiries into various illegal acts of omission and commission. It is argued that the disqualification case against Imran Khan pending in the election commission of Pakistan scheduled to conclude in one month could spark the ultimate showdown if he is convicted. He seems aware of this probability and that is why he is getting more desperate by the day.
People who know Imran Khan intimately say that his popularity has gone to his head and he will not back down. Similarly, Miltablishment-watchers say there is too much at institutional and personal stake for kid-glove treatment any more. The stage is therefore set for escalation of conflict between Imran Khan and the Miltablishment.
Imran Khan’s popularity was at its lowest ebb on the eve of his ouster. If the PDM government had opted for quick elections without signing the IMF programme and imposing hardship on Pakistanis, the PMLN would conceivably have romped home comfortably. But it has become progressively unpopular because of a string of bad or unpalatable decisions. By contrast, the PTI’s resistance has given it a fillip. But the balance could just as easily tilt in the other direction over time as the economy limps back into shape and passion dissipates in Khan’s supporters out of frustration or failure.
Watch this space for further action and reaction.
Come November
Imran Khan’s popularity graph in opposition is up and that of the PMLN in government is down. Since Khan hasn’t done anything extraordinary to merit greater support – if anything the PTI’s media campaign against the army and judiciary has provoked a backlash even from his own supporters — it is the PMLN government that is in the dog house with the “awam” because of the economic hardships imposed by the IMF program. Indeed, even Nawaz and Maryam Sharif have been compelled to publicly distance themselves from the economic policies of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government. Imran Khan has also benefited from the PDM government’s decision to slap “terrorism” charges on him. Forget the small print of the anti-terrorism law that legally applies even in such situations. In the public imagination, the charges smack of victimization because a populist ex-prime minister’s “threats” at a charged public rally to take “action” against “miscreant” police officials and a “biased” judge are profoundly different from masked men blowing up innocent people or holding them hostage at gun point for avowed ideological or political reasons.
Still, Imran Khan now faces a formidable challenge to his political ambitions. There are at least five significant cases against him and he could be knocked out in any one or more of them, notwithstanding the fact that the judiciary, high and low, is tilted in his favour for much the same sort of reasons that make him popular or make the PDM’s leading components unpopular by default.
In three cases, he is charged with contempt of court. The evidence against him is substantial by comparison with the recent cases of Nihal Hashmi, Talal Chaudhry and Danial Aziz who were all convicted and disqualified by the Supreme Court from contesting elections for five years, despite the fact that all offered unqualified apologies. In Khan’s case, Fawad Chaudhry says Imran is not going to apologise, which will make the task of the SC bench and ECP hard because comparisons will be made and tilts noted and debated.
The other cases pertain to the Toshakhana purchases that were not disclosed in Khan’s tax returns or relate to the findings of the ECP’s report on Prohibited Funding in which several bank accounts referenced by Imran Khan have been discovered and no explanations have been given regarding monies received and disbursed. The incriminating yardstick here will be Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification for life based on non-disclosure in his tax returns of a “due-income” which he did not eventually receive from his son!
Khan’s problem derives from his erstwhile Miltablishment supporters. He is still targeting them for manipulating his ouster, which makes the two-way alienation bitter and irrevocable and compels the Generals to seek newer “options”. The PPP and PMLN, on the other hand, have abandoned their hostility towards the same Generals for manipulating their misfortunes earlier and have embraced them with unabashed abandon.
The situation is headed for some climactic developments. Khan is demanding quick general elections to exploit his popularity while he runs from pillar to post fending off disqualification charges. But the PDM government is digging its heels in with the help of the Miltablishment. One wild card is the mood of the people who are agitating angrily against severe inflation which has impoverished them significantly and unprecedented floods that have rendered them hungry and homeless. The other wild card is the judiciary that can flay or revive Khan’s chances of a come-back. The situation is compounded by the possibility of both a continuation of the status quo or a change in the army high command in November that could spell problems for one or the other political protagonist.
In the coming months, Imran Khan could be arrested on some count or the other. But the judiciary is likely to set him free quickly. He may be disqualified from contesting elections for contempt of court or corruption but can reasonably expect to be reprieved in the short term by “stay orders” pending appeals. But if the people don’t rise up to storm the citadels of power autonomously, his long marches will not amount to much as long as the Miltablishment continues to lend support to the PDM government. So what should we look out for?
Once the IMF, multilateral and bilateral money amounting to several billion dollars pours into the coffers of the State Bank of Pakistan in the next month or so, the Miltablishment’s compulsion to hang on to the PDM government is likely to be diminished. Should the Sharifs balk at conceding its covert requirement in November, chances are that the government will be kicked out and caretakers summoned to do the needful. The debate will then turn on whether and when the next elections will be held and what sort of concessions will be made to the democratic yearning for a level playing field by Nawaz Sharif and a pro-PTI pitch by Imran Khan. In fact, the situation is so murky that few would hazard predicting the outcome for any party or leader in the event of continuity in the army high command or change in it. Continuity could lead to consolidation of the current anti-PTI situation and a change could usher in sincere neutrality. Or vice versa, depending on who’s the man on horseback at that time.
In the run-up to November, Imran Khan can conceivably be disqualified and the Punjab government can change hands while the federal government continues to hang on by the skin of its teeth. Alternatively, fresh general elections may be called sooner than later next year by levelling the electoral field for both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan.
Pindi Plan
Last week Imran Khan threatened to become “dangerous if pushed to the wall”. In his latest broadside against the high command of the Pakistan Army for being “neutral” — another word for “animals” in his book — he has been true to his word.
“Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif want to appoint a new army chief in November”, he thundered a few days ago, “one who will be their ‘favourite’, because they have stolen money, they are afraid that if a strong and merited army chief, a patriotic army chief, arrives on the scene, he will hold them accountable, and it is this fear that is compelling them to hang on till November and appoint their ‘favourite’ as the next army chief”.
Imran Khan wants immediate elections that he thinks he will win so that he can appoint his own ‘favourite’ as army chief next November and then join forces with him and eliminate the Zardaris and Sharifs from the face of Pakistan. In fact, this has always been his agenda and this is what got him into trouble last year with the army high command when he insisted on retaining his ‘favourite’ general as head of the ISI so that the agency could be used to fulfil his ambitions.
Mr Khan’s latest assault on the high command of the Pakistan army has shattered a red barrier. Earlier, he was focused on attacking the person of COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa for becoming “neutral” and not saving him from a vote of no confidence by the opposition parties that removed him from office last April. Now he is saying that whosoever is appointed as army chief by the PDM government in November is bound to be unmerited and unpatriotic. Thus, in one fell swoop, he has condemned the top generals of the Pakistan army eligible to become army chief as potentially unpatriotic and unmerited since any one of them will be appointed to the coveted post and will automatically be the object of Mr Khan’s wrath.
There is, of course, a method in Mr Khan’s madness. His current nemesis, General Bajwa, has been warned not to seek another extension if he wants to escape the PTI’s wrath. In the same bad breath, the next man – whosoever he may – has already been brought under pressure to prove his “patriotic and merited” credentials by siding with Mr Khan in his battle royale against the Sharifs and Zardaris.
The ISPR spokesman of the Pakistan Army is “aghast” at Mr Khan’s “defamatory” and “uncalled for” remarks. It “regrets” the attempt to undermine the army leadership by “stirring controversy” by an “unfortunate” and “disappointing” statement.
A softer critique could not have been crafted. In a different time and context, the offending politician would have been hauled up under the Army Act, 1952, and court martialed under a clutch of criminal charges, and the keys to the locker thrown away. But in this case, there was disagreement among Miltablishment generals about whether and how to respond to the provocation. Some wanted a hard statement while some wanted to shunt the response to the government. In the end, a whimper shushed out from the ISPR late in the night.
“Who me?”, asked Imran Khan mockingly, “what did I say wrong?” He knows he has successfully breached the unity of the Miltablishment and will pile pressure on any institution that doesn’t bend before him, especially the judiciary and Election Commission of Pakistan. But his lieutenants like Arif Alvi, Asad Omar, Shah Mahmud Qureshi, etc, have all distanced themselves from his diatribe, even going so far as to say with a straight face that they haven’t heard or read his statement.
Now Imran Khan has demanded immediate general elections and thrown the gauntlet to Nawaz Sharif. “I am waiting for you”, he roared at a rally recently, “come and fight me”. This suggests that something significant is afoot.
Why are the Miltablishment and courts still soft on Imran Khan when he has crossed so many red barriers? Why aren’t the Toshakhana, Foreign Funding and terrorism cases against Khan on a go-slow track? Why is he demanding immediate elections and insisting the PDM government go home before November? Why are Ishaq Dar and Nawaz Sharif reported to be readying to return to Pakistan? Why , after four years, is Maryam Nawaz applying to get her passport back from the Islamabad High Court so that she can travel to London? Why is Khan warning of a conspiracy by “Mr X and Mr Y” to oust the PTI government in Punjab?
Despite loud denials by Imran Khan, President Arif Alvi has confirmed that secret efforts are afoot to bring the PDM and PTI to the negotiating table in order to pull the country out of conflict mode and restore political and economic stability. Obviously, this can only be at the behest of the Miltablishment. What sort of Pindi Plan is on offer that provides rough answers to the questions raised above?
If the PDM government is persuaded to dissolve parliament in October and order general elections in January 2023, the caretakers appointed by agreement between Khan and Sharif can appoint the next army chief in November by mutual consent. That would fulfil Khan’s two demands. In exchange, the playing field would be levelled by allowing Nawaz Sharif to return and lead the PMLN, the Punjab government would be handed over to the PDM by a swift shift of the PMLQ from the PTI to the PMLN and a condition imposed on Khan, Sharif and Zardari to dissolve their respective provincial governments in KP, Sindh and Punjab when the federal government is dissolved. Before the PDM dissolves the federal PDM government would be entitled to disburse a significant economic relief package for voters disgruntled by IMF-dictated hardship policies that have made it unpopular. Thus a level playing field could be created that would enable a fair election to be held next year, notwithstanding any delays necessitated by circumstances.
Of course, it’s a tall order. The protagonists hate and distrust one another. But the Miltablishment has a political noose around the neck of each. The PDM is ready to play ball. If Khan defies the logic, the noose will get tighter. Resolutions must be effected before November 29. Otherwise the default setting of the Pindi Plan will be triggered and Khan could be the biggest loser.
Regime change?
President Arif Alvi has admitted that secret reconciliation talks are underway between various “stakeholders” in order to resolve the political logjam that is hurting the country. Mr Alvi, who has discreetly distanced himself from Imran Khan’s outburst against the Miltablishment and Judiciary, says he is “hopeful” that these efforts will bear fruit. Indeed, Imran Khan’s statements and practice suggest that he is in the loop even though he pretends otherwise in his charged rallies.
Two issues hog the waves. Who will appoint the new army chief in November and when general elections will be held.
The PDM government insists, rightly, that it is the constitutional prerogative of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to appoint the next army chief, or extend the tenure of the the incumbent, in November 2022. It also expects to complete its tenure until August next year. But Imran Khan says that elections must be held immediately, in any case no later than March 2023, and the army chief should be appointed by the prime minister of the next government – which he assumes will be his — after the elections because any army chief appointed by “imported crooks” will be detrimental to the interests of the country. This means that the National Assembly must be dissolved in the next two months before November so that a caretaker regime can be installed. But, he says, the caretakers must “defer” the decision to appoint the army chief to the next elected prime minister which in effect means an extension of the tenure of General Qamar Javed Bajwa, even though he is against the idea of giving a second extension to him.
This is an interesting development. Until recently Imran Khan was targeting General Bajwa as an “evil neutral”. Now he is proposing to extend his tenure until after the next elections, suggesting a revival of some degree of tactical reconciliation.
On the other side, the PDM is bracing for political climate change. The PMLN’s Khwaja Saad Rafique has bemoaned the “pressure” on the government to call early general elections and is demanding a “level playing field”. How is that possible, one may wonder, when the PDM assumed office on the “understanding” with the Miltablishment that it would sign off on the harsh IMF program in the “national interest” and would not have to face the angry electorate until late next year by when it would have had time to turn the economy around and win back support of the voter? Indeed, given the angry voter blowback against the PDM, an early election would enable the PTI to sweep into government and bury the PDM.
In one critical way we have turned full circle. The PDM launched its bid to dethrone Imran Khan early this year because it didn’t want him to appoint his “favourite” general as army chief in November. The fear was that together they would rig the next elections and cling to power for another five years at least. The irony is that, once again, the debate now hinges on who will appoint the next chief and whose “favourite” he will be, even though the historical record proves that any army chief is ultimately “his own man”, or his institution’s man, regardless of who “favoured” him to the powerful coveted post in the first place.
Imran Khan is threatening to call another long march next month to push the PDM government out. But he knows that without Miltablishment backing it won’t succeed. Meanwhile, the PDM government has dug its heels in because a “level playing field” is nowhere in sight. Its leader, Nawaz Sharif, is in exile, his trumped-up convictions show no sign of being swiftly overturned even as there is a palpable go-slow on the several “disqualification” cases against Imran Khan. Meanwhile, by naming names on social media, Khan’s supporters have made several three star generals “controversial” because they are not among Khan’s presumed “favourites”, by way of eliminating from the line-up to be the next army chief.
The constitutional route is for the constitutionally empowered Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to appoint the next army chief in November and continue to rule until next August when scheduled elections are held. If Khan tries to use popular force to prematurely oust Shehbaz Sharif, the latter has the constitutional right to call the army to assist civil power to stop this from happening. But the constitution has been torn to shreds over the years by generals, judges and politicians. Brute power rules the day. The Miltablishment calls the shots. Thus, in one form or another, it will thrust another hybrid “solution” on us and we will lurch to another crisis sooner or later.
It is extraordinary that the personal ambitions, passions and feuds of two men, one of whom is a past benefactor of the other, control the fate of this hapless nation of 240 million that is drowning in debt and despair. For how long will we, the people, also stand and serve? Is the natural calamity that has struck the nation low a harbinger of “regime change” that will sow chaos and disorder in the land?
Desperate Maverick
Imran Khan is so blinded by his “popularity” that he has lost his way. Consider.
His obsession with the Miltablishment is a key factor in both his success and failure. He blows hot and cold with its leaders. He is so fixated on being on the “same page” with them that he can’t bear it when they slip out of it. They were great “patriots” when they supported him, now that they are “neutral”, they are “animals” who can’t distinguish between good (Imran) and evil (Everybody else). Last week he thundered that the “lions” of the Pakistan Army were led by a “jackal” (no prizes for guessing who) and would be routed by an army of jackals led by a lion (no prizes for guessing who).
He used to say that when he became prime minister he would never give an “extension” to any army chief. Yet he became the first prime minister in history to change the law and extend the term of General Qamar Javed Bajwa. He used to say that it is the sole prerogative of the Prime Minister to appoint the army chief. Now he says that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif should not appoint the next Chief in November, instead he should extend the term of General Bajwa until after fresh elections are held so that he (Imran) can appoint his successor after he wins them. Indeed, he says that any Chief appointed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif will not be a “patriot”, thereby ensuring that all Lt Generals in line to succeed to the post are made controversial on Day-One. He used to praise General Bajwa as a great democrat and patriot, now he calls him names and exhorts his commanders to revolt against him.
He used to say that he should have been allowed to complete his term instead of being kicked out via the democratic Vote of No Confidence. Now he says that he won’t allow the present PDM regime to complete its term and will launch a long march of tens of thousands on Islamabad to (undemocratically) oust the government.
He used to say that when he became prime minister he would never go begging to the IMF for an economic bailout. But when he was in power he signed on a USD 6 billon loan package with the IMF. Now that he is out of power he is blackballing the government for embracing the very program that he signed with the IMF, even going so far as to try and sabotage it through his henchmen.
He used to say that the United States engineered his “regime change” last March and paved the way for an “imported” government to seize power. Now he is busy hiring ex-CIA lobbyists in Washington to build fences with the US government while laying out the red carpet for American dignitaries in Islamabad and scraping the barrel for crumbs handed out by them to his government in KP.
He used to heap laurels on NAB, FIA and their Heads when they victimized his political opponents. Now he heaps scorn on them for returning to the straight path. For years he praised the Election Commission of Pakistan and its Commissioners when they put the Foreign Funding Case against the PTI into cold storage. Now he is abusing the Chief Election Commissioner (that he appointed) for hauling him up.
He used to praise the judiciary when it was a handmaiden to his executive. Now he is daily contemning it when it refuses to bow under pressure. He said he would never apologize for his remarks against judges. Now he is inching toward an unqualified apology to the Islamabad High Court.
He said he would never talk to the PDM. Now he has nudged PTI loyalist Arif Alvi to “secretly” start the process. He used to send party leaders to “negotiate” with the Miltablishment, now he warns them to desist from opening channels of communication with them.
There was a time when many serving and retired serviceman openly lent support to him. Now they are having second thoughts about his erratic and dangerous behaviour. There was a time when enthusiastic young men and women used to throng his jalsas and clutch at his every word. Now they are tiring of his repetitive rhetoric and thinning his rallies.
Last week he told his loyalists that it’s “now or never”. He fears that if the PDM government isn’t dislodged immediately, it will appoint the next army chief, put the economy on the rails again and consolidate power, thus diminishing his support base and chances of sweeping the next elections when these are held late next year.
He has announced a Long March on Islamabad soon but stopped short of giving a date. He fears it won’t succeed if, as is likely, the Miltablishment stands with the PDM government. Under the circumstances, he can then expect to be dealt with an iron hand, starting with his “disqualification” from contesting elections on any one of a number of solid counts.
Imran Khan’s apologists claim that the longer the PDM government stays in office, the more discredited it will become in the face of the rising popularity of their leader. But in the same breath they are demanding its immediate ouster because they fear their own leader is losing his lustre with the masses and clout with the Miltablishment.
The Chief Justice of Pakistan, Umar Ata Bandial, has offered some gratuitous but valuable advice to Imran Khan. Return to parliament and resolve your political problems there, he instructs, instead of constantly trying to drag the judiciary into political controversy.
The Miltablishment and Judiciary have slowly but unmistakably distanced themselves from Imran Khan. His youthful supporters are fatigued and frustrated. His senior colleagues in the PTI are bewildered and confused by his histrionics. He is looking increasingly like a desperate Maverick out of touch with reality. If he continues on his reckless path he will do himself and Pakistan incalculable harm.
Come November
Some things are now reasonably clear.
The audio recordings were probably done by a domestic Intel Agency which targeted important political people and used a software like Pegasus to infiltrate their smart phones and transmit conversations like a standard electronic bug.
Somewhere along the line a chunk of this data was probably stolen by an Intel insider or hacker sympathetic to, or allied with, Imran Khan and the PTI.
Imran Khan selected and approved use of this data against his “enemies” and “opponents” to fortify his anti-“chors”/anti-America narrative to recapture political power.
Then the Neutral Umpire stepped in to balance the debate by furnishing an audio of Imran Khan and his principal secretary, Azam Khan, deliberating on how to analyse and “play” the cable.
Obviously, we have heard only a fraction of what is available to both sides. But we can be sure that Imran Khan is no match for the Agency. The audios are probably not a patch on the damaging audio-videos of Khan that are reportedly in the possession of the Agency. But now that the Agency has been compelled to break the ice because Khan is fast losing his exalted status as a “ladla”, we can expect the war of the leaks to heat up or, alternatively, to cool down because of the fear of “mutual assured destruction.”
We can also be reasonably sure that a domestic Intel Agency was involved if the JIT tasked by the National Security Committee (to identify the source of the audios and the method whereby the conversations were recorded) doesn’t soon come up with a credible explanation. Indeed, if the audios from Imran Khan’s side should suddenly stop titillating the faithful because the Dark Web sleuth has disappeared without a trace, we can assume that the Agency has successfully “restrained” Khan from crossing another red line.
But Imran Khan is getting desperate with each passing week as the Sharifs and Zardaris dig in for the long haul. The NAB cases against leading PMLN stalwarts have been withdrawn or dropped after the promulgation of the amended NAB law. The ex-Finance Minister of Pakistan, Ishaq Dar, has returned from exile to be sworn in as a senator and reoccupy the finance ministry. The conviction against Maryam Nawaz Sharif and husband in the Avenfield case by an accountability court has been overturned by the Lahore High Court after lying in cold storage for four long years. She has got her passport back to travel to London to be with her father. And the PDM is readying to recapture Punjab and consolidate power.
Imran Khan has two options. He can either go ahead with the Long March and try to besiege and dislodge the government. If he opts for this aggressive path, he will find it blocked by Rana Sanaullah’s 50,000 strong force of Police and Rangers. The situation will be precipitous. Only a Third Force can benefit from the chaos and violence that will inevitably ensue, to the detriment of both the government and opposition. Or he can use its threat to renegotiate the terms of getting back into the constitutional game of power. His statement that he is ready to go back to parliament to negotiate the schedule of the next elections if the government sets up a commission to investigate the “regime change cable” suggests he is seeking a fig-leaf behind which to retreat.
The fluidity in the developing situation is deepened by the rumours surrounding the scheduled retirement of the COAS, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, on 29th November 2022. Will he seek and get an extension in service? The ISPR has categorically said he won’t. But by all accounts, the busy-body schedule of General Bajwa – negotiating military supplies with the Americans, cajoling the Saudis and Qataris to bail out Pakistan, asking the US State Dept to put in a good word with the IMF, etc — that makes it to the front page of newspapers almost daily suggests that the Big Man is not exactly readying to put on his spurs and ride off into the sunset.
This issue is critical to the assumed tactics and strategy of the Sharifs/Zardaris to stay in office and get a level playing field for the elections next year, which is a commitment that the incumbent appears to have made to them. But by the same criterion, Imran Khan wants him out so that he can appoint his own man to the coveted slot after a quick round of elections this year.
The confusion is compounded by the fact that Imran Khan is publicly targeting both the COAS and DGISI (Mr X and Mr Y) because he holds them jointly responsible for insisting on “neutrality” when he has constantly demanded that they should back him positively against the “chors”. The dark web sleuth has identified “#13” as the next target. This is the DGISI because he currently ranks 13th in line to the coveted throne.
The months of October and November promise to yield an overdose of fodder for the hungry media. But if we are going to make bold and predict the outcomes of these ruthless struggles, we think that Imran Khan will blow hot and cold but not succeed in bringing down the house. Indeed, the likelihood is that some “settlement” may take place behind the scenes that enables Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to appoint the COAS or extend General Bajwa’s term, as required by the Constitution, when the PTI will return to the National Assembly and when the general elections will be held as per the Constitution next year.
Looming Disaster
Is Imran Khan a rank opportunist who believes that U-turns, lies, propaganda and fabrications are necessary and desirable in politics because the end justifies the means? Is he the Pied Piper of Pakistan?
Imran Khan says he won’t return to parliament under any circumstances. But he has nudged 11 PTI MNAs who tendered their resignations along with 140+ other PTI parliamentarians some months ago to petition the Islamabad High Court to order the National Assembly Speaker not to accept their resignations tendered upon his (Khan’s) directions. But the Chief Justice of the IHC, J Athar Minallah, has rejected their case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the decision of the NA Speaker. He has, however, advised them to return to Parliament if they wish to resolve such grievances. Much the same sort of advice has been given by a couple of supreme court judges, including the chief justice of Pakistan, J Umar Ata Bandial, hearing Khan’s petition against the amended NAB law. Why didn’t you challenge it in parliament when it was being passed, they ask, why are you boycotting parliament?
Imran Khan has refused to attend contempt proceedings against himself in the Election Commission of Pakistan. In fact, he is constantly attacking the Chief Election Commissioner, Sikander Sultan Raja, as being a PMLN stooge who should resign, despite the fact that the CEC was appointed by Khan himself and was showered with praise at the time. At the same time, Khan is exhorting the CEC to investigate and swiftly conclude the scrutiny of the funding sources of the PMLN and PPP.
Khan refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the PDM government and its leaders, let alone talk to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the constitutional way forward. But he has given the green light to his PTI-nominee, President Arif Alvi, to open a dialogue with the government for an early election.
Khan and his troll army have been abusing COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa for months and insisting he would not support any extension for him. But after the two secretly met recently, he conceded in an interview that General Bajwa could stay on after November 2022 if he ordered elections in early 2023 that enabled him (Khan) to win and choose the next army chief himself!
Now Khan has sworn the faithful to get ready in the millions to march to Islamabad and overthrow the PDM government. He has been threatening this course of action for months but refrained from giving a date. Any day now, say his lieutenants, this is a make or break month for the PTI. As a warm up measure, Khan has applied to the court to allow him to hold a Rehmatul-il-Alameen Conference in the Convention Centre in Islamabad on October 12. The idea is to use this as a launching pad for the proposed Long March later.
Understandably, the PDM government has refused to concede his demands. Instead it has commandeered hundreds of containers to block and seal roads, thousands of tear gas shells and rubber bullets and tens of thousands of police, Rangers and soldiers to protect Islamabad. The police is on standby to house-arrest Khan if necessary.
Clearly, the PDM government is digging its heels in for a longer haul. Ishaq Dar has returned to occupy the finance ministry and try to ease the economic burden on the masses imposed by the IMF programme. Maryam Nawaz has obtained acquittal from trumped-up corruption cases, got her passport back and shipped to London. Other PMLN and PPP leaders have benefited from the new NAB laws to escape persecution. Now the government has unleashed the FIA to arrest Khan’s chosen finance handlers named in the Foreign Funding Case by the ECP who were allegedly operating secret bank accounts on behalf of Khan. The net is getting wider and tighter with Khan’s audio tapes condemning him unequivocally.
Things are coming to a head. Unless there is a last ditch deal with the PDM government through the good offices of the Miltablishment, which Khan desperately craves, to abandon the Long March and return to Parliament, the stage is set for a precipitous confrontation.
In the midst of this, COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa is “negotiating” mutual long term security issues with American bigwigs in Washington and Langley as if there’s no tomorrow, when he should logically be dining out farewells with senior colleagues at home. This, despite the fact that he publicly insists he is retiring next month and Khwaja Asif says Shehbaz Sharif will duly pick one general out of a list of five to be the next army chief.
Naturally, then, tongues will wag. What if the confrontation in Islamabad leads to blood on the streets? What if PTI-triggered civil strife spreads to other parts of the country? Given the dismal state of the economy and the devastation caused by the floods, will General Bajwa stand by and allow the country to plunge into chaos and anarchy?
This is a question that Imran Khan should answer. He is solely responsible for continuing to undermine parliamentary and constitutional avenues for political participation and reconciliation.
At 75
Russia and the Western powers are embroiled in a conflict that could trigger nuclear war. The Western economies are in the throes of an unprecedented recession and inflation that is hurting people. Saudi Arabia and OPEC are refusing to succumb to American pressure to increase oil output and reduce energy prices. And yet US President Joe Biden finds it opportune to make a devastating remark about Pakistan, seemingly without provocation, describing it as “one of the most dangerous places in the world, nuclear weapons without cohesion”.
President Biden was talking in the context of a changing global situation that warranted dynamic American responses. And Pakistan, as everybody knows, has been in international headlines recently, and not at all for the right reasons. It has gone begging for Western aid to help over 30 million destitute people rendered homeless by unprecedented floods due to climate change. It has been hovering on the brink of financial default for months owing to inexcusable economic mismanagement and pleading with the IMF and the Paris Club to bail it out. But it has also refused to support the Western powers led by the US in censuring Russia at the forum of the United Nations, provoking resentment and anger. And it is still dragging its feet over a key American demand: overflight rights to CIA drones targeting IS and allied terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
If there may have been reasons for Washington’s estrangement, the prickly reaction in Islamabad – pulling out the US Ambassador and slapping a “demarche” on him — is also understandable. President Biden’s “negative” remark came in the wake of “successful” meetings between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa and Finance Minister Ishaq Dar with their top American counterparts in Washington, and wiped the gloss off them. It also gave a fillip to rampant anti-Americanism in the country when the PDM government and Miltablishment are desperately trying to repair relations with the US soured by Imran Khan and his “regime change” conspiracy theory.
It is, of course, not uncommon for top American leaders to burst out indignantly against Pakistan from time to time. President Donald Trump was inclined to use harsh words about Pakistani “betrayal” and “double-crossing” in Afghanistan as was Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman JCOSC. President Biden refused to say hello to Imran Khan after the latter lauded the Taliban for overthrowing the “yoke of American slavery” and called Osama bin Laden a “martyr”.
At the root of this bickering US-Pakistan relationship lies history. For four decades – 1947-87 – US and Pakistani interests coincided during the Cold War. Pakistan was a member of various US sponsored pacts and alliances against the Soviet Union and received military and economic grants and aid from the US, culminating in US-Pakistan backed Islamic jihad that drove Soviet forces out of Afghanistan in 1987. Then the USSR broke up, the Cold War ended and the Americans did a U-Turn in the 1990s on Pakistan by sanctioning it when it refused to “freeze, cap and roll back its nuclear program”. The ensuing bitterness in Pakistan was reflected in growing anti-Americanism in state and society. But 9/11 provided Pakistan with an opening to transform an American threat (“You are either with us or against us”) into an opportunity to renew relations. In exchange for over USD20b over the next decade or so, Pakistan provided logistical support to NATO against the Taliban in Afghanistan. But this time, unlike in the past, such support wasn’t unequivocal – Pakistan never abandoned its own long term strategic interests with the Taliban in Afghanistan which were sometimes opposed to short term American objectives – and the war dragged on with mounting American casualties, culminating in a Vietnam-type defeat for America last year and provoking bipartisan American cries of “betrayal” by “double-crossing” Pakistan.
During these two decades, Pakistan’s self-interest motivated it to move closer to China even as America was beginning to worry about the economic and political challenge posed to its global hegemony by Beijing and was edging into a strategic partnership with India to counter it. This has now acquired confrontationist proportions between China and America. The war in the Ukraine has pushed Russia and China closer and Pakistan finds itself squeezed in between. Pakistan has inextricable and overwhelming trade and aid links with the West. Nearly 10 million Pakistanis are working in the West and allied Middle Eastern countries, remitting over USD30b every year to prevent the Pakistani economy from sinking. But China has invested nearly USD20b in Pakistan’s economy and the Pakistani military is dependent on it for upgrading and replenishing its hardware. It has also used its veto power in the UN to stop India-sponsored moves backed by the West to sanction Pakistan for sponsoring armed resistance in India-Occupied Kashmir. So, when push comes to shove at any international forum, Pakistan tends to vote with China against America.
Pakistan’s new National Security Policy framework outlined by the Miltablishment stresses geo-economics instead of geo-strategy in the region because Pakistan desperately needs trade and aid to buttress its failing economy and society. The problem with this formulation is that Pakistan’s geo-economics is dependent on America and the West whose geo-strategies Pakistan is unable or unwilling to support. China’s CPEC initiative for regional connectivity is stalled, partly because the gateway to Central Asia – Afghanistan – is highly unstable and Iran is tightly sanctioned by America. The rise of militant Hindu majoritarianism in India that has diminished prospects for conflict-resolution on Kashmir has also blocked avenues for Pakistani connectivity with a growing powerhouse.
Pakistan’s ruling civil-military elite-establishment is caught in a web of contradictions and misplaced concreteness. Externally, its economics is tied to America and its Western allies but its politics is tied to China, making its shift to geo-economics connectivity a non-starter. Internally, its politics is blatantly undemocratic, its divide and rule hybridity creating political instability and economic uncertainty.
Ishaq Dar, the embattled finance minister, admits he is seeking rescheduling of about USD27b in bilateral debt, mostly from China and Western finance institutions. He is also petitioning the international community, mainly the Paris Club, for billions of dollars in grants to defray the loss to the economy from the devastating floods. The dismal state of the economy is reflected in a downgrading of business confidence from B to C by Moody’s Investors Service and a forecast of only 2-3% GDP growth by the World Bank, coupled with a rising yield on Pakistan’s international bonds for 2024 and beyond, that reflect a high risk of financial default.
At 75, Pakistan faces the spectre of internal economic collapse and political instability in an international environment of alienation and isolation, sparking fears about the safety of its nuclear arsenal. Our continuing tragedy lies in making matters worse by destabilizing “long marches” for regime change without policy prescriptions for radical reform of foreign and economic policies that lead to a viable restructuring of state and society.
The Last Round
One respected newspaper called Imran Khan’s win in six recent by-elections a “stunning” victory. Absolutely Not! The conclusion was foregone for several reasons. The PMLN didn’t pull out the stops to contest in earnest because it was given to understand that the ECP intended to postpone the polls for a variety of reasons. Certainly, the ECP’s final decision came only days ahead of the scheduled date. By that time, Maryam Nawaz had already made plans to leave the country instead of canvassing and pulling the crowds as she has so successfully done in recent months. The PMLN also felt it was a waste of time, effort and money to contest these polls because they would make no difference to the numbers game in parliament. The fact that Imran Khan couldn’t hold on to any of the seats and elections would have to be held again on all of them was not lost on anyone. The entrenched PTI government in KP was also expected to help Khan rout the likes of past due-date JUI and ANP contestants. This contest was in marked contrast to the earlier round of by-elections on 20 MNA seats which were swept by the PTI, partly because of disarray in PMLN ranks owing to bad choice of candidates and partly because of the unpopular economic hardships imposed on the electorate by the PDM government on the derring-do of the IMF.
Much the same sort of misplaced enthusiasm was demonstrated by headlines that screamed popular “uproar” following the ECP’s decision to disqualify Imran Khan in the Toshakhana case. Nothing of the sort happened. A couple of hundred PTI loyalists scuffled with the police and then camped outside the ECP office for a few hours after the decision was announced. Across the country, scattered protests broke out with a few dozen or score protestors at every site burning tyres — a symbolic gesture — except in Karachi where over a thousand supporters screamed abuse at all and sundry institutions.
To be sure, however, the main reason for the lack of widespread uproar was Imran Khan’s decision not to call for protests that night – ostensibly to conserve the energy of his supporters for the Long March — but to retreat to Bani Gala with his advisors to chalk out a viable strategy going forward, even though he admitted that he knew of the adverse decision beforehand. Indeed, that was a big reason for his continuing attack on the ECP and its CEC. He was also assured that the decision is likely to be “stayed” quickly by the higher courts and poses no threat to his plans just as the recent by-election wins do not give him any advantage or leverage.
The big question is unaffected by such “positive” or “negative” developments. Should he opt for the promised “Long March” or not? He has been threatening it and postponing it constantly. On the one hand he admits that President Arif Alvi is negotiating on his behalf with both the Miltablishment and PDM to agree to a consensus candidate as the next army chief and a mutually acceptable date for general elections before the scheduled date late next year and doesn’t want to precipitate a crisis-conflict Long March that derails these talks without dislodging the government. On the other hand, he thinks that without the pressure generated by a mass protest march on Islamabad the PDM government and Miltablishment are not likely to concede anything significant. The problem with this way of thinking is that PDM and Miltablishment leaders have collectively dug their heels in and are in no mood to accept his demands unequivocally. But if the Long March option is finally and forcefully adopted, it is bound to lead to violence. That could be a trigger for regime change, certainly, but probably for military intervention for its own sake rather than for Imran’s, with unfavourable consequences for political leaders and parties.
It is significant that the army chief decided to announce his retirement five weeks hence on the same day the CEC announced its decision against Khan. But what the COAS said (off the record) about his experience at the hands of Imran Khan suggests that he and his close colleagues have had enough of him. Can anyone blame them? They put all their hybrid eggs in Khan’s basket and have been abused black and blue for their noble intentions. But the usual conspiracy theorists will be inclined to suspect sinister designs if the next chief isn’t announced forthwith while Khan goes ahead and launches his march on Islamabad.
This is the last round. The Miltablishment, PDM and judiciary are all urging Imran Khan to return to parliament and resolve his issues at that forum. No one has a taste for destabilization of economy and polity at a time when the country faces the threat of financial default and continuing international scrutiny. Imran Khan’s enduring popularity with the rising urban middle-classes ensures his political future. But his stubborn refusal to accept the rules of the democratic constitutional game in which other political players are accorded a degree of legitimacy is a recipe for authoritarian one party rule either by a civil or military dictator. This is an option that has consistently failed to deliver in the past and is a non-starter in the future.
Ironies Of Liberation
Will November prove to be the cruelest month of all? It all depends on the answers to some burning questions. Will the COAS, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, go home on 29thNovember, 2022, as he has pledged several times, or will some extraordinary development “compel” him to stay on? Will Imran Khan’s long march of thousands end with a whimper or a bang (literally)? Will Imran Khan and Shehbaz Sharif enter into negotiations to end civil strife by setting a mutually acceptable date for the next general elections? What role will the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP), Umar Bandial, play in mediating or exacerbating political conflict?
With less than one month to go, General Bajwa’s departure is clouded by the reluctance of the PDM government to announce his successor. Just as rumours abounded earlier about Imran Khan’s offer of an extension to the COAS in exchange for help in defeating the vote of no-confidence against him launched by the opposition in March – now proven true – it is no secret that the PDM leadership would like to scratch his back in exchange for help in warding off the looming threat from the PTI. Even Imran Khan has suggested that if the PDM government can be packed off this month and caretakers installed, General Bajwa may stay on as COAS until after the elections have returned a new government to office. Thus, despite his avowed “apolitical” stance, if push comes to shove during the PTI’s long march, it is not inconceivable that General Bajwa may be “compelled” to step in, pry apart the two warring sides, knock some sense into them and gain an extension in tenure by virtue of his “good deed”. That would open the door to an early election rather than a late one. Under the circumstances, CJP Bandial might see the wisdom of approving another extension for General Bajwa until a new government is installed after the elections.
Much will therefore depend on how Imran Khan’s long march pans out in the next week or two. It has begun on a soft note, partly because Imran knows that, after the DGISI’s unprecedented public intervention, the Miltablishment could take off its gloves if he crosses their red lines again, and partly because he is still hoping that the PDM government will succumb to the threat of violence and open the door to negotiations that fulfil his objectives. Both sides are propagating their intent to fight despite admitting pressure to talk.
Significantly, too, both parties are begging CJP Bandial to take their side. Imran Khan wants to march and the PDM government wants to stop him in his tracks. Khan insists his marchers will remain peaceful but Rana Sanaullah, the interior minister, has offered evidence of the PTI’s intentions to incite violence. The CJP says that the PTI has a right to march but notes his power to stop it at any time. Meanwhile, the good judge is exploiting this opportunity to browbeat the government and pack the court with handpicked junior judges. The threat of blocking the acquittal of Maryam Nawaz and outlawing the amended NAB law that has reprieved the top leaders of the PDM has sent the government scurrying for compromise, even to the extent of sacrificing its law minister, Azam Tarar, who was compelled to vote in favour of CJP Bandial’s nominees in the Judicial Commission against the interests of the bar which he has long represented.
Another struggle is manifestly unfolding in the background. At least five top generals are vying for the top slot in the army on November 29th when General Bajwa is scheduled to doff his uniform. If he doesn’t do so because of some extraordinary development, they will all go home before he does. So they have a vested interest in forestalling violent conflict, keeping Imran Khan at bay and showing their chief to the door.
It is a perverse comment on the state of Pakistan that the two institutions that are supposed to be “politically neutral” – the army and the judiciary – have become the most intrusive and controversial. Worse, their heads are flaunting their unaccountable powers and prejudices without restraint.
The double irony built into the situation should not be lost on us, too.
Even as the army high command is insisting that it has become apolitical and neutral and intends to stay that way in the future, both the PTI and PDM are knocking on its door for salvation. The former is threatening them and the latter is cajoling them. Under the circumstances, the probability is that the generals will not shy away from upholding the “national interest” when the state is threatened by instability and destabilization in the face of financial bankruptcy, as always.
The other irony lies in the nature of the unprecedented popular attack on the army’s political interventionism launched by Imran Khan. In normal circumstances, this would be viewed as a belated but welcome development to strengthen constitutional democracy. Indeed, this is the common thread running through the long struggles of liberals, leftists, democrats, human and women’s rights groups and ethnic/sub-nationalist, religious minorities on the periphery. The problem has arisen because the current struggle for “real liberation” led by the PTI is not aimed at defanging the army to strengthen multi-party constitutional democracy but at sharpening its claws to clamp down on the PTI’s political opponents to entrench populist one party fascism.
Not so long ago, the people of Pakistan passionately backed the Lawyers Movement for Independence of the Judiciary as a veritable “revolution” in the offing. A decade later, we have been lumped with the most unaccountable and politically biased judiciary in history as exemplified by the likes of ex-CJPs Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, Saqib Nisar and Asif Khosa. Today, we are in the throes of another such populist upsurge against another repressive state institution that threatens to further enslave us instead of liberating us.
Regime or Course Change
Was this a Booster shot (to boost Imran Khan’s popularity) or a Warning shot (to stop him from continuing on the Long March and lambasting the Miltablishment)? Or, if it wasn’t a conspiracy tied to either of these two possibilities, was it a Lone Wolf incident by an incensed Tehreek Labaik Pakistan supporter? There are so many loop holes in each explanation, and such high passions and powerful interests involved in this incident, that the jury is likely to remain out interminably as happens in such cases.
The fact that Imran Khan survived with only four pieces of shrapnel (and not bullets) in his leg supports the Booster and Warning shot theories. If someone had really wanted to kill him, Khan wouldn’t have got off so lightly. There was no bullet proof protection shileld on the container for Khan, no professional security cordon around it, he wasn’t wearing a bullet proof vest, etc., despite his own admission both before and after the incident that his sources in the security agencies had warned him to expect an attack on that day.
But if the Booster theory is to be believed, one must assume a conspiracy in the rank and file of his own supporters, including the Miltablishment. And if the Warning theory is to hold water, one must attribute the motive to the Miltablishment that is under his constant fire. In both cases, the common factor is the Miltablishment. This would explain Khan’s insistence on naming a serving two-star general in the ISI in the FIR and the reluctance of Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervez Elahi (a long-term asset of the Miltablishment) to oblige him. In fact, Khan has been banging on about this same general as the proverbial “Dirty Harry” who has been roughing up Khan’s supporters and instilling fear in them.
Understandably, the Lone Wolf theory holds the field for the Miltablishment and Government because it lets them off the hook. That would also explain how and why the alleged religious extremist was facilitated in making a swift confession on camera about how and why he attempted to snuff out Khan’s life. This was perfectly in line with similar incidents in which high profile people like Salmaan Taseer, Ahsan Iqbal, Khawaja Asif etc., were attacked in the past.
There are other misgivings too. Khan says he was shot at from the front and bottom of the container, implying that there were at least two assassins, one of whom fired a burst from a rifle from some height. But if this was the case, it boggles the mind why he and several others on the container’s roof weren’t hit above the waist and shot dead instantly. But the Lone Wolf denies this, insisting that he fired a burst of eight rounds or so before his pistol jammed. Given the bullets’ trajectory from ground to container roof, this would explain why Khan was hit in the leg and shrapnel fragments hit several others or bullets whizzed past or grazed them. But it can’t explain why, according to the police, at least 11 empties were found by the police at the scene of the crime, unless it comes to light that a guard on the container shot at the Wolf and killed an innocent father of four in the line of fire.
Still, the Wolf may have been a lone shooter who was put up to an arms-length job at the behest of the Booster or Warning agent. This is a proven method behind political assassinations across the world. It leaves no trace and relies on the simplest explanation to close the case.
Whatever the facts of the case – and the truth may never be known or believed by the protagonists – Imran Khan’s popularity has surged in the midst of rage and incredulity at his “miraculous” survival as if by some Divine hand. If the unexplained killing of anti-Miltablishment journalist Arshad Sharif in Kenya kick-started the Long March, this botched assassination attempt will serve to put wind in Khan’s sagging sails. In both cases, he and his supporters have marked the Miltablishment.
Imran Khan’s response has been swift and focused. He has shrugged off his injury and held a press conference, accusing the Miltablishment and Government of conspiring to eliminate him. By naming the prime minister, interior minister and a senior Intel officer, he has simultaneously demanded “regime change” and “course change” from the Miltablishment.
But it is significant that he hasn’t hoisted his wheelchair to the container’s roof and continued on his long march, nor made a clarion call to his supporters to wreak vengeance on the Miltablishment and Government – those who have erupted on the streets are relatively few and spontaneous — nor indicated when exactly he expects to resume his project for early elections. Is he worried that another attempt on his life may take place on the road to Islamabad? Is he waiting for his Handler in the Miltablishment to brief and update him on the way forward? Is he going to opt for some back-channel solution?
To be sure, Imran Khan has significant support in the rank and file of the Miltablishment. But a majority of generals in the ruling GHQ/Commanders clique, who have borne witness to his erratic and unscrupulous rule for four years and been the subject of his unrelenting personal and institutional attacks in the last few months, are wary of allowing him back into power. All are also united in stamping out internal and external dissent and destablisation. The PDM government, too, has dug its heels in and won’t be easily pushed out in a hurry. A twist in the tail of this situation is demonstrated by a scramble among the top generals for the coveted slot of COAS when the incumbent retires on 29th November, complicated by the latter’s bid to install his favourite and the government’s attempt to pick its own man.
The next three weeks are critical. When will Imran Khan resume his Long March? How much muscle will he be able to wield? Will there be violence and bloodshed? Will the generals stand by the government and risk further alienation and censure? If they can’t abide by either Imran Khan or the Government, how will they take the law into their own hands? And if they do, what will be the political and economic consequences? Or, to take a positive stance, will the Miltablishment, PDM and PTI succeed in a last ditch compromise to save the situation for state and society going forward into the next year?
We should know soon enough, but not without some scary brinkmanship and sleepless nights for all stakeholders.
It Ain’t Over …
Abig majority in the Miltablishment High Command comprising three star generals has reportedly agreed to abide by four major decisions. (1) COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa will not seek an extension in tenure, nor accept one if offered by the government, and will duly retire on 29th November as scheduled. (2) The three senior most generals in the Pakistan Army on that date – General Asim Munir (ex DG ISI), General Sahir Shamshad (Corps Commander Pindi) and General Azhar Abbas (Chief of General Staff) — will be shortlisted for selection by the federal government to the two slots of Chairman Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff later this month. (3) The Miltablishment High Command should remain apolitical or neutral between the political protagonists and may facilitate, but not pressure, the PDM and PTI leaderships to negotiate conflict resolution that leads to a free and fair general election on a level playing field in a mutually acceptable time frame. (4) Even in the event of continuing conflict between the PTI and PDM that spills over into political deadlock, the Miltablishment should not step in to impose Martial Law.
But the devil is in the detail. It appears that General Bajwa and Imran Khan would like to see General Shamshad and General Abbas in the two top slots while Mian Nawaz Sharif is keen on General Munir as COAS. So who will it be?
Imran Khan is determined to throw a spanner in the works. He has already said that if Nawaz Sharif is going to pick the next army chief, he (IK) won’t accept it. In other words, he wants General Bajwa and not the Prime Minister to select the two top slots going forward. His grudge against General Munir is well known. Imran Khan removed General Munir as DG-ISI in 2019 barely nine months into the post when the latter presented him with documents proving the corruption of a clique in Punjab close to Khan’s wife, aided and abetted by the then Punjab Chief Minister Usman Buzdar, who’d been handpicked by Khan. He has already launched an unprovoked and unsubstantiated tirade of allegations against Maj-Gen Faisal Naseer, currently DG-Counter-Terrorism in the ISI, who is known to be close to General Munir, having served under him in Military Intelligence.
Khan’s Long March is aimed at pressurizing the PDM government not to appoint General Munir as the next COAS while conceding a general election by March 2023. One way to ensure that he succeeds in his twin objectives is to trigger the fall of the PDM government this month, so that caretakers are sworn in to hold elections three months hence (in February-March) and an extension is contrived for General Bajwa by the Caretakers until an elected prime minister is in office to appoint a new army chief. Khan has said on several occasions that he would accept a six month extension in service for General Bajwa under such terms. Since he expects to win the next election, he wants to appoint the next COAS.
The PDM government can be ousted this month if the Long March leads to bloodshed and political gridlock that shipwrecks the economy and gives an excuse to General Bajwa to “step in”. The general can do so by putting a gun to the head of PM Shehbaz Sharif to dissolve parliament or, failing that, putting it to the head of some PDM partners and allies to ditch the PMLN, enabling President Alvi to ask Shehbaz Sharif to prove he has the required majority in the House. And if nothing works, he can impose Martial Law with the approval of the Supreme Court (that is packed with anti-Sharif judges) pending general elections next year.
Imran Khan has calibrated his Long March to Long Walk precisely in order to give time and space to the anti-PDM lobby in the Miltablishment to pressure the government to concede his two demands or to gear up to oust it later this month if it refuses. It is ominously significant that the Long March is scheduled to arrive in Rawalpindi/Islamabad on or about the 20th of November when the Prime Minister will be in receipt of the three names for consideration to the post of CJCOS and COAS.
Two other reported facts are important in assessing the situation. The first is located in London and can be catalogued as the “London Plan”. Shehbaz Sharif and Khwaja Asif rushed to London two days ago to discuss these issues with Nawaz Sharif. Since we know that these two gentlemen were instrumental in persuading Nawaz Sharif, against his instincts, in 2019 to agree to support a three year extension in service for General Bajwa, we can reasonably surmise what advice they may have given Nawaz Sharif in the current situation. We are also informed that PMLN MPA Malik Ahmad Khan, who is known to be close to the Sharifs and to General Bajwa and is suspected of being a go-between, was present in the huddle in London.
The second is located in Lahore and can be catalogued as the “Pindi Plan”. As we write these lines, it is reported that General Bajwa, President Arif Alvi and Imran Khan are all quite coincidentally ensconced in Lahore. Since Mr Alvi has admitted to playing a role in bridging the gap between General Bajwa and Imran Khan, including facilitating at least two secret meetings between them, is it inconceivable that a third “final” meeting is on the cards?
Say no more. The next two weeks are critical. It ain’t over till it’s over.
Implosion
The Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, says the process for the appointment of the next army chief has started and should conclude by next Wednesday. But his colleague, the interior minister, Rana Sanaullah, claims the process is over, a decision has been taken and an announcement is due any day. Meanwhile, the finance minister, Ishaq Dar, who is the de facto deputy prime minister, is reported to have dashed to the Presidency to ensure that when the Prime Minister’s advice to appoint so-and-so finally reaches Arif Alvi only days ahead of the incumbent chief’s retirement there will be no foot dragging at that end, provoking Fawad Chaudhry, Imran Khan’s loudspeaker, to reassure PTI supporters that Mr Alvi will do exactly what Imran Khan orders him to do rather than what Mr Dar begs him not to do. Meanwhile, the prime minister, Shahbaz Sharif, is reported to be quarantined with Covid-19 but is engaged in hectic consultations with his allies and partners, notably Maulana Fazal ur Rahman (who called on him!) and Asif Zardari. If this is bewildering, consider what is transpiring on the other side of the fence.
Imran Khan has taken so many different positions on this issue that one has lost track. He began by blasting General Qamar Javed Bajwa in words that cannot be repeated but ended by advocating a six-month extension for him until after the next elections when the new elected government should appoint his successor. Then he opined that the next army chief could be chosen by the PDM government but should be chosen on merit, only to later change “merit” to “seniority” as in the rules governing elevation to the office of the chief justice of Pakistan. Imran Khan has also explained that the purpose and goal of the Long March is to pressure the PDM government to agree to an early rather than late general election but, curiously, the Long March is consciously planned to enter Islamabad exactly on the eve of the announcement of the next army chief, suggesting its aim is to influence the latter decision rather than the former.
Not to be left behind, GHQ is not immune from its share of back stabbing and embracing. One group is plugging one “senior-most” general and another group is backing another “senior-most” general. The confusion is compounded by a debate over the issue of seniority and how easy or difficult it will be for the government to solve this matter. In all this, the current chief has his own vested interest to protect by backing one or the other candidate: who will help get Imran Khan off his back, facilitate safe passage for him and guarantee he won’t be harassed or hounded after retirement like General Pervez Musharraf was after he doffed his uniform. And failing that, getting a six month extension to oversee the next elections and manipulate the selection of the next Chief himself.
The incredible irony in this pushing, shoving and jostling is laid bare by one fact of history and life: every army chief has bit the hand that fed him. General Ayub Khan turfed out President Iskandar Mirza, General Yayha Khan sent Ayub Khan to pasture, General Zia ul Haq sent Z A Bhutto to the gallows, General Waheed Kakar packed off President Ishaq Khan, General Pervez Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif, General Ashfaq Kayani eased out General Musharraf, General Raheel Sharif rustled up a dharna to try and get rid of Nawaz Sharif, and General Qamar Javed Bajwa facilitated, by turns, the ouster of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan (the fate of Shahbaz Sharif still hangs in the balance). As the late COAS General Asif Nawaz famously quipped: “Yara, see this Chief’s ‘chichi’ finger? When it can move half a million armed men by a twitch, how can the Chief be anyone other than his own man?”
In the next ten days, we shall witness a desperate, mad, scramble for power within various sections of the ruling elites. There will be betrayal, duplicity, treachery, perfidy, back-stabbing, possibly even bloodshed. The PDM government wants to appoint its “own man” who will commit to backing it in office until late next year at least while keeping Imran Khan at bay. Imran Khan seeks the opposite, that is, someone who will kick out the PDM and facilitate his return to power as in 2018. General Bajwa doesn’t care a fig about the fate of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, he just wants to pick his successor who can give him a royal send-off so that he can enjoy his hard-won perks and privileges, a difficult goal in such vengeful times, or, failing that, another lease of tenure.
And the next Chief? Will he retreat into the shadows like General Waheed Kakar until he is pulled out to march into the prime minister’s house? Or will he hoist Shahbaz Sharif on his shoulders like General Bajwa did Imran Khan until it’s time to drop him? There is an uncanny, ominous, sense of deja vu
Niro was fiddling while Rome was burning. Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal Emperor, was penning verse when Hindustan was crumbling. The Pakistani elites are clambering for power when the country is imploding.
The Right Path
Bajwa’s “Double Game”
It’s confirmed. General Qamar Javed Bajwa was playing a “double game” all the time. The truth has been outed by Chaudhry Pervez Elahi and Moonis Elahi. They say the army chief advised them at the nth hour to renege on their commitment with the PDM to form government with them in the Punjab, and to side with Imran Khan. All this while Gen Bajwa kept assuring the PDM that he was “neutral” and wouldn’t try to swing the vote against them by leaning on the PTI’s disgruntled allies who were lining up behind them. There’s more.
PDM sources admit that General Bajwa also tried to persuade them to withdraw the VONC in exchange for a dissolution of the National Assembly by Imran Khan but they didn’t follow his advice because they couldn’t trust Imran Khan or him to keep their word. In turn, Imran Khan felt betrayed by General Bajwa when the VONC neared conclusion and threatened to sack him, which prompted a midnight SOS to the Islamabad High Court and Supreme Court to stand by and thwart the prime minister.
It’s not just Imran Khan who has accused General Bajwa of playing a “double game”. The PDM has its share of allegations too. After General Bajwa’s spat with Imran Khan over the matter of shunting Lt- General Faiz Hameed from the ISI to Peshawar Corps in late
His motive for playing a double game was to get another extension in service from Imran Khan and/or the PDM, seeking assurances from one or the other on that count. But when he realized that Imran Khan was bent on making Lt-Gen Faiz Hameed army chief in November 2022, he started to play footsie with Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari. Both seasoned politicians let him believe they would scratch his back if he scratched theirs.
General Bajwa’s last ditch effort to sway the Chaudhries to back Imran Khan was aimed at signaling his support for Imran Khan so that the latter wouldn’t get wise to his machinations and sack him. He didn’t offer the same advice to the MQM and other PTI allies because he didn’t want the PDM to lose faith in his “neutrality”. He wanted Khan to dissolve the National Assembly so that he could manipulate the new elections and bring the PDM to office in exchange for a second extension. But when neither Khan nor Sharif bought his advice, the government changed hands and a new scenario presented itself in April 2022. General Bajwa now tried to persuade the new government to call fresh elections immediately and would have succeeded if Imran Khan hadn’t hurled his threat to besiege Parliament on May 25. Under the circumstances, the PDM felt that to throw in the towel under threat from Khan would be bad for optics and prove costly in the elections. So Nawaz Sharif dug his heels in and vowed to resist both General Bajwa and Imran Khan.
Imran Khan now went on the warpath against General Bajwa for not helping him enough. Matters worsened when a perceptible backlash against the military’s interventions in politics in general, and against General Bajwa’s machin
The formula was roundly rejected. General Bajwa became threatening. Nawaz Sharif wouldn’t budge. His argument was that the PMLN had lost significant capital in implementing the hardship policies of the IMF and would be routed at the polls if these were held in March. General Bajwa now changed tack. He insisted that Generals Azhar Abbas and Saher Shamsad, who were close to him and tilted towards Imran Khan, should be elevated to the post of COAS and CJCSC respectively, failing which he would not send any suitable summary to the Ministry of Defence. Once again, Nawaz Sharif held his ground. General Bajwa was told that If he didn’t send the name of General Asim Munir, the PM would simply “retain” the service of the senior most general, namely Asim Munir, and appoint him army chief. The tensions of the last week of November were palpable. In the end, General Bajwa backed down, General Asim Munir became army chief and General Shamshad was the compromise CJCSC.
General Bajwa’s last wish was to disappear into nothingness. So he requested the Chaudhrys to bail him out with Imran Khan and the PTI in the hope that he and his family would not be constantly harassed by the PTI trolls. But even though the trolling against General Bajwa has temporarily
This is just as well. General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s role in the last six years of instability and constitutional aberration should not be forgotten or forgiven. It should serve as a lesson for self-serving adventurers.
Imran Is Done
Until recently, Fidel Castro, the revolutionary leader of Cuba who presided over its affairs for nearly fifty years, held the world record for the most number of speeches and “addresses to the nation”. Now our very own home spun hero, Imran Khan, is well on his way to breaking that record, having notched up a speech, interview, address or briefing every other day for the last year or so. But there is a critical difference between the two. Castro’s exhortations focused on principles of socialist-nation building that enabled him to transform Cuba from an exploited and impoverished American colony into a thriving, progressive and proud country. Khan’s pearls of wisdom , on the other hand, are replete with opportunistic U-turns, propaganda and downright lies which brought Pakistan to the brink of constitutional breakdown and economic mismanagement while in office and political instability and economic upheaval while in opposition.
Imran Khan’s “strategy”, if it can be called that, is to pressure the Miltablishment to abandon political “neutrality” and take his side in pushing out the PDM government and enabling him to return to office via a quick general election while the PDM’s popularity graph is dipping. He threatened a long march to besiege the National Assembly. Then he offered General Qamar Javed Bajwa a short extension to oversee a caretaker regime so that he could win the election and appoint General Faiz Hameed as army chief. When Nawaz Sharif didn’t bite into his formula, he tried to pressure the PDM and Miltablishment to appoint anyone but General Asim Munir to the coveted slot. Now that this move has also failed, again because Nawaz Sharif dug his heel in, he is threatening to dissolve the Punjab and KP provincial assemblies and drown the country in unchartered waters.
Is this move, like the Long March, an empty threat that will end with a whimper?
He says he will, on December 17, announce the date when the dissolution threat will be carried out. That could be a week or two or more hence, which is exactly the way the dates for the Long March were periodically announced and then pushed back. But one should note the deliberate opening provided by such an announcement to the PDM to preempt any such move by launching a vote of no-confidence or vote of confidence., including a challenge in the higher courts to review a couple of judgments against floor crossing, to stave dissolution or capture the assembly.
Mr Khan’s idea is, of course, to get back into the game of negotiating an early election with the PDM. He has put President Arif Alvi in charge of back-door talks with the Miltablishment and PDM to give him a face-saving entry back into the National Assembly where the terms and conditions of the next election, including the composition of the caretaker regimes, are to be mutually hammered out. It is interesting that the Supreme Court of Pakistan also seems keen on nudging him in this direction, ostensibly to submit PTI resignations in person before the Speaker, which may be a face-saving peg on which to return to Islamabad and then take a suitable U-Turn after a deal is struck with the government to set a mutually acceptable final date for the election.
But what if this plan fails to materialize? What if the PDM doesn’t give him a face-saving exit and compels him to carry out his threat and dissolve the two provincial assemblies?
Two fundamental views are well known. Neither the Miltablishment not the PDM government is interested in a quick general election simply because the former thinks it is against the national interest that requires political stability for economic turnaround and the latter believes it is against its party political interest until it has bought time to create popular will in its favour. So if Khan goes ahead, he can be sure that the two will join hands to knock him out. This could precipitate disqualification from contesting elections in any one of the several cases hanging over his head and even criminal conviction and detention if so required.
Imran Khan is also misguided if he thinks that by continuing to publicly attack General Bajwa, he is reaping the seeds of division in the Miltablishment, or by not attacking General Asim Munir he is endearing himself to the new army chief. The fact is that the Miltablishment is united in protecting its institutional interests by protecting the repute of its ex-army chief, as it has done on other occasions in the past. Khan is also mistaken if he thinks he can pressure the new army leadership to shunt or sack some of the officers named in the letter written by the mother of the slain journalist, Arshad Sharif, to the chief justice of Pakistan.
Imran Khan is done. He can either play by the rules of the constitutional game, return to parliament and wait for the next elections to roll out as scheduled, or he should get ready to contest on a level playing field by facing disqualification and possible imprisonment like Nawaz and Shehbaz Sharif.