Relations between Pakistan and the United States, allies-in-arms for over four decades, soured after Washington accused Pakistan of “crossing the nuclear red light” in 1990 and cut off all economic and military aid to Islamabad. Matters worsened in 1991 after the then army chief General Aslam Beg publicly denounced US policy in the Gulf war and advocated a strategic defiance of Washington. A year later they hit rock bottom when Washington seriously threatened to stamp Pakistan as a “terrorist state”.
However, a change of all-round guard in Pakistan in 1993-94 — president, prime minister, COAS, D-G ISI — seems to have created the necessary conditions for some sort of a rapprochement. There is now mutual talk of forgetting about the F-16s and concentrating on “a more meaningful, longer-term relationship” between the two countries. Although aid hasn’t been restored, Washington is actively encouraging US private capital to invest in Pakistan. The threat of branding Pakistan as a terrorist state also seems to have dissipated. Have the visits to Washington of General Abdul Waheed and President Farooq Leghari coupled with those to Pakistan of US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel and US energy secretary Hazel O’Leary resolved the underlying issues or merely served to paper over the cracks?
For the benefit of Ms Robin Raphel, who is due in Pakistan shortly, it needs to be pointed out that anti-US sentiment is increasing among Pakistanis of most shades and opinions. In the old days, apart from a handful of “anti-imperialism” espousing leftists, all the moderate, rightist and Islamicist forces in Pakistan were pro-US. This was partly due to the close aid and trade links which Pakistani ruling elites maintained with Washington and partly due to the deference accorded to the House of Saud, a Washington ally, by local religious parties. That Washington turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s budding nuclear programme during the 1980s only served to confirm the enduring warmth of US-Pak relations.
All that has changed. After the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia is no longer sacrosanct in Muslim eyes. Also, rightists, leftists, moderates, Islamicists and secularists, bureaucrats and men in uniform, businessmen and traders, the man in the street — most Pakistanis are increasingly turning to the view that “the US is a hypocritical, immoral, self-serving, anti-Islamic bully” who should be told where to get off. Part of the explanation for this perception may have to do with the mass Pakistani resentment deriving from Washington’s callous abandonment of an old friend which has left it defenceless against its old enemy India. But there is much more to it.
The US aid cut-off to Pakistan in 1990 was seen here as an unprovoked, premeditated and cold blooded effort to sever “the umbilical chord” between the two countries after Pakistan lost its cold war “utility” to Washington. The Gulf war was viewed in Pakistan as a prime example of US military might in the defence of bare economic interests in the Middle-East. In sharp contrast, Washington’s dithering policies in Muslim Bosnia have effectively sanctioned the most gruesome genocide in recorded history. When Washington insists upon human rights or acts under cover of the UN, Pakistanis wonder what has happened to its “principles” in Kashmir. When Washington delinks human rights from trade policy in China, the answer is driven home even more forcefully. When Washington talks of democracy in Haiti, Pakistanis ask why it is supporting the military dictators in Algeria and Indonesia. And so on.
Not many people in Islamabad or Rawalpindi are likely to spell out to Ms Raphel the grave implications of the rise of anti-American, anti-West emotions in Pakistan. Nor are they likely to explain what might happen if and when Islamic fundamentalists succeed in exploiting these sentiments for their own purposes. The fact, however, remains that Pakistanis are becoming increasingly xenophobic. Anti-American, nationalist sentiments are running high. Things have become so bad that even moderate people are beginning to question the wisdom of attracting large doses of US private investment in the energy sector and thereby becoming “dependent” on US-controlled sources of oil. Such fears coincide with the rebirth of Islamic identity, often as a result of the “attack” on Islam (or its misrepresentation) in the West.
It is in this context that Washington should reassess its South Asia policy. The US thinks India is more “important” than Pakistan. It is pressurising Pakistan while bending over backwards to appease India. This is misplaced and dangerous thinking. The US-Pak relationship should not be predicated on the assurances of a moderate or liberal political and military leadership in this country. There is an angry storm brewing in the bowels of this country. Pakistan is not Algeria, nor even Iran or North Korea, for this threat to be taken lightly. It is a nation of 120 million people armed with nuclear weapons. Washington, India and the rest of the world will rue the day Pakistan is driven into becoming a rogue nation. The US must be seen to act fairly and squarely where Pakistan’s Muslim values and nationalist interests are concerned.