General Pervez Musharraf has “revamped” the National Security Council (NSC) and unfurled his plan to “empower the people and make them masters of their own destiny”. What do these steps signify?
The idea of the NSC, with top military participation, standing “above” a cabinet of ministers, may be relevant in a “representative” civilian system that is hostage to authoritarian cultures, praetorian traditions and periodic coups. But in a hands-on military regime it makes no sense to have the NSC and a cabinet, both headed by the army chief and comprising civilians as well as serving and retired men in uniform. The post-coup NSC was particularly superfluous, given the conservative and timid demeanour of its civilian members. But matters became more complicated when a clique of “supergenerals” in GHQ/ISI, assisted by the corps commanders, actually began to call all the shots and made a mockery of provincial governors and cabinets. Has anything of significance changed in the recent NSC reshuffle?
No. Five civilian non-entities in the NSC have been shunted to advisory or cabinet positions, in effect making the trimmed NSC look like the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, with a military man rather than a civilian as its chief executive-head. Ridiculous. A “higher” body is looking like a “lower” limb of the cabinet, while real power still resides in the invisible, supergeneral kitchen-cabinet (from which even the wretched air and navy chiefs are excluded) which decides on strategic matters like the CTBT, Kashmir jihad, relations with America, India, Afghanistan and domestic political restructuring and reinventing.
General Musharraf’s “devolution” programme is more noteworthy. Promising to “revolutionise” state and society, the plan seems to have even stirred the restless souls of some of our more perspicacious commentators. But we need to be careful in rushing to judgment.
Yes, of course, the base of the proposed district government system will comprise directly elected men and women. But won’t the top two tiers consist largely of indirectly elected representatives who might be susceptible to all sorts of dubious pressures and unsavoury deals? If so, how would this be essentially different from the “basic democrats” and “local body politicians” so beloved of yesteryears’ military strongmen? Yes, of course, the ubiquitous 19 grade DC of the “steel-frame” will be no more. But won’t he be reinvented as a more powerful 20 grade DCO hailing from the same District Management Group controlled by Islamabad? Yes, of course, the most corrupt and inept party-political rascals will be excluded from the “non-party” polls. But won’t a further depoliticisation of the body politic exacerbate caste, ethnic, regional, sub-nationalist, religious and sectarian tensions in the country, much as the same sort of initiative by General Zia ul Haq did in the 1980s?
In the new system, the source of power will be the Nazims and not the councils. In the hierarchy of power, this will translate, in ascending order, into the Union Nazim, Tehsil Nazim, District Nazim, Provincial Governor, and the President of Pakistan. The scheme therefore seems set to achieve two objectives: it evolves into a presidential form of government without actually appearing to do so a la Ayub Khan; and it does away with the dyarchy of power created by the presidential powers under the scheme of the original 8th amendment. At the same time, the framers of the plan have tried to obviate the possibility of “divisive politics” by electing members through direct vote from single or multiple members constituencies — which seems like a first step towards some kind of a proportional representation system which, far from making the system democratic and efficient, may simply lead to a weakening of the two-party system as well as to a dilution of the powers of the legislative assemblies. The late Captain Liddel-Hart would be delighted by this “indirect strategic approach” to Presidential politics-in-the-making.
One last point. We know that good governance in Pakistan is precluded by debilitating client-patron relationships in given socio-economic structures. Does this scheme offer any radical solutions to this problem? No, it doesn’t. In fact, by putting undue emphasis on the Nazim or Mayor, and creating difficult procedures for his removal, it may tend to strengthen the office of the executive to which everything and everyone is likely to gravitate. So the checks and balances touted by the scheme could veritably wilt under this arrangement.
Let us be clear. The local government plan, the NSC, etc., are all inseparable elements of the political matrix adopted by the supergenerals of GHQ/ISI rather than political or security initiatives worthy in their own right. This leads us to an uneasy sense of déjà vu involving military coups, ousted prime ministers, banned parties, martyred politicians, thundering legatees and nervous generals atop runaway tigers. In the end, there is no stopping the relentless historical march towards unadorned civilian rule. Everything that can go wrong with contrary philosophies is likely to go wrong. Therefore General Musharraf might be advised to take a longer look at his grand plans to outlast himself.