The tussle for power between Punjab chief minister Manzoor Wattoo and the PPP is the talk of the day. Some people say that Mr Wattoo’s days are now definitely numbered. Others remain convinced that, somehow or the other, he will live to spin his webs again. Meanwhile, the induction of Governor Raja Saroop has done little to moderate the disarray and infighting within the PPP camp. What are the prospects for the PPP-PML(J) alliance?
When Ms Bhutto was trying to knock out Mian Nawaz Sharif in 1993, she desperately sought the cooperation of six people who had a crucial role to play — Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan (then Pakistan President), Mir Afzal Khan (then NWFP chief minister), Mr Manzoor Wattoo (then Punjab chief minister), Chaudhry Altaf Hussain (then Punjab Governor), Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (then a pro-PPP MNA) and Mr Hamid Nasir Chattha (then a minister in Mr Sharif’s cabinet). When Ms Bhutto stuck an alliance with all these gentlemen, she did so on the basis of certain promises and commitments. A review of her unkept promises sheds light on her Punjab predicament and explains why her former allies are so disgruntled with her today.
Ms Bhutto promised President Ishaq Khan that he would be the PPP’s candidate in the next Presidential elections. So Mr Khan rolled out of retirement and landed up in Islamabad when the Presidential election came around. But Ms Bhutto went back on her word, toyed with the idea of a “consensus candidate” (Mr Wasim Sajjad) and eventually nominated Mr Farooq Leghari. Mr Khan retreated to Lakki Marwat, a broken and bitter man. That is why he is not averse, we understand, to offering advice to Mr Wattoo today.
Ms Bhutto promised Mir Afzal that he would become NWFP Governor or Senate chairman if she became prime minister. When she didn’t keep her word, Mir Sahib retreated to London and set about conspiring against her government. It was he who released the Mehrangate tapes which showed up Mr Aftab Sherpao in a dubious role during the “Get-Sabir Shah” operation in 1994.
Ms Bhutto promised Mr Jatoi a number of seats in the national and provincial elections of 1993. Then she turned her back on him and halved her commitment. Since then, Mr Jatoi has sulked in a corner of the national assembly, nursing his wounds and weighing his options.
Ms Bhutto promised Chaudhry Altaf that he would become Punjab Governor as soon as she became prime minister. In the event, she kept Chaudhry Sahib dangling for six months before she reluctantly made him Governor. Before he died, however, Chaudhry Sahib was muttering about his “differences” with the prime minister who had begun to suspect that he might have an “agenda” of his own in the province. Chaudhry Sahib was about to be removed from the post before he fell ill and passed away.
Ms Bhutto’s approach to Mr Chattha and Mr Wattoo was different because she lacked a PPP majority in Lahore and Islamabad and was compelled to give them their due share. Mr Wattoo quickly roped in a dozen independents, relaid claim to the chief ministership and eventually signed a power-sharing formula with the PPP in the Punjab. Mr Chattha followed up by negotiating a few important federal ministries for his PML(J) colleagues and entrenching himself in the cabinet next to the prime minister. All’s well that ends well, thought Ms Bhutto, and turned her attention to the NWFP where Mr Aftab Sherpao was conspiring to oust the opposition government of chief minister Sabir Shah.
Unfortunately, the power-sharing formula in Punjab was untenable from Day-One. Two intrinsic conditions were required to make it work and neither has been available to date: (1) An environment of mutual give and take based and accepted on the relative electoral strengths of the two alliance partners in the ruling PDF coalition. (2) A PPP provincial leader who commanded the unequivocal trust and confidence of the rank and file as well as that of the prime minister so that the dominant party in the alliance could speak with one voice and act in unison in trying to implement the formula.
The power-sharing formula ran into difficulties straight away when Ms Bhutto decided to bypass her provincial party and nominated Mr Faisal Saleh Hayat, an MNA, as Mr Wattoo’s “principal advisor” and the PPP’s C-in-C in the Punjab. This was an unwise appointment for several reasons: Mr Hayat lacked the political and administrative experience necessary for dealing with a wily fox like Mr Wattoo; nor did he possess the quality of leadership and stature of character required to whip the provincial PPP into becoming a disciplined and well-knit party. More significantly, it sent the unmistakable signal to Mr Wattoo that, in the event of serious trouble between the alliance partners, the PPP would not be in a position to field a single candidate against him as a potential Punjab chief minister, despite commanding over 90 MPAs in the province!
Mr Hayat also made the grievous strategic mistake of opting for the S&GAD/Home departments without insisting on a chief secretary of his own choice. With the finance ministry under his belt (to bestow largesse as he deemed fit) and chief secretary Javed Qureshi in tow (to throw a spoke in the wheels of Mr Hayat whenever necessary), Mr Wattoo was bound to emerge as the chief power-broker in the province even before the ink had dried on the agreement.
As expected, Mr Hayat was soon on the run. Neither Mr Wattoo nor his PPP parliamentary colleagues were in a mood to subscribe to his orders. Worse, without the seniormost position in the provincial party hierarchy, Mr Hayat couldn’t count on the support of the rank and file of his party. Within months he was back in the pavilion in Islamabad and the PPP was desperately angling for a change in the power-sharing formula with Mr Wattoo.
When Mr Wattoo reluctantly acquiesced, Makhdoom Altaf assumed charge of the finance ministry and became the “senior minister” in the cabinet. Mr Wattoo now took control of the S&GAD/Home Departments and retained the services of chief secretary Javed Qureshi. Once again, however, the PPP had mistaken tactics for strategy and landed itself in the soup — without the chief secretary in his pocket to ring changes in the administration and approve implementation of financial projects, Makhdoom Altaf was fated to become a toothless tiger.
But that wasn’t all. By making Mr Mushtaq Awan president of the Punjab PPP (thereby establishing a second centre of power within the PPP), Ms Bhutto effectively swept the carpet from under Makhdoom Sahib and eroded his authority to negotiate effectively with Mr Wattoo. The chief minister was duly able to exploit this division in the PPP and consolidate his own position.
Governor Altaf’s demise has now opened a fresh chapter in the PPP-PML(J) power-struggle in the Punjab. The appointment of a new Governor should have been an occasion for the PPP to close ranks under Makhdoom Altaf and put up a united front against Mr Wattoo. It was therefore imperative that the new Governor should have been appointed exclusively and immediately on the recommendation of the Makhdoom. But this hasn’t happened.
Ms Bhutto first said that there was no hurry to appoint a Governor. Then she said that she was thinking of appointing someone with administrative rather than political experience. She changed her mind midway and thought that either Mr Mustafa Khar or Mr Aitezaz Ahsan would be suitable for the job. In the event, she has pulled Raja Saroop out of the hat and confounded everyone.
Raja Sahib’s first move, as expected, was to call in Mr Wattoo and demand yet another change in the power-sharing formula. This time it was argued that all matters pertaining to the S$GAD/Home departments should be sent to the Governor for “approval” before implementation. Mr Wattoo has rejected the demand out of hand because, he says, the rules of government do not allow any such thing. Meanwhile, Mr Nazim Shah, the PPP’s local government minister, has sown further confusion within the PPP ranks by trying to set himself up as a rival claimant to Makhdoom Altaf. What next?
The federal government has two options if it doesn’t like the status quo. It can either “order” Mr Javed Qureshi out of Punjab and send in a new man who enjoys Ms Bhutto’s confidence. Or it can try and oust Mr Wattoo and install its own chief minister.
Both options are fraught with serious implications. If Islamabad tries to enforce Mr Qureshi’s exit, Mr Wattoo might respond in the same fashion as Mr Nawaz Sharif (then chief minister Punjab) did in 1990 when Ms Bhutto (then prime minister) tried to fire his chief secretary Mr Anwar Zahid — that is, order Mr Qureshi to refuse to heed the federal government’s order. That would lead to a crisis in the PML(J), split the PDF alliance, lead to a run on the PDF governments in the Punjab and Islamabad and end up like the constitutional crisis of April 1993. An attempt to oust Mr Wattoo through a vote of no-confidence would encounter the same sort of political and legal problems that Mr Sharif faced when he returned as prime minister in May 1993. Having already opened so many fronts, Ms Bhutto might be advised to think carefully before she takes the leap.
Mr Manzoor Wattoo knows the score. He knows that when Ms Bhutto is desperate, she is quick to make many promises. He also knows (from the experience of Mr Ishaq Khan, Mr Mustafa Jatoi and Mir Afzal) that she is likely to break them rather nonchalantly when she is off the hook. More significantly, Mr Wattoo is aware of the fact that Ms Bhutto is reluctant to concentrate provincial power in the hands of Makhdoom Altaf, a man known for his integrity and independence of mind — virtues that don’t sit too well with the prime minister’s obsession with blind loyalists. The fact that President Leghari reposes the fullest confidence in Makhdoom Altaf has become, ironically enough, a blot against his name in Ms Bhutto’s book.
If drastic change in the Punjab set-up were to take place soon, it would definitely impinge on the federal government in Islamabad. Can Ms Bhutto take this risk and hope to survive, given that the crisis in Karachi is already looming larger than life? We think not.
Ms Bhutto’s best bet is to keep the PDF alliance going and put a lid over its internal differences. Mr Nawaz Sharif wants an early election because he thinks he will sweep the polls. If Ms Bhutto gives him an opportunity to exploit a constitutional or political deadlock of her making, she should not expect him to sit back and allow her to consolidate power. Nor can she safely assume that the army will look the other way if a crisis of 1993 proportions raises its head again.
By the same token, however, Mr Chattha and Mr Wattoo should take heed and try to accommodate the PPP on the basis of the spirit of the original power-sharing formula. They should know that there is no secure place for them in Mr Sharif’s larger scheme of things. If Ms Bhutto goes down, she will most likely take the political system with her. Then everyone, including her friends and foes, can all eat cake!