Last week President Bill Clinton spent five days in India gushing about the virtues of the “new” India and lauding its “leadership” role far beyond South Asia. But in Islamabad it looked as if Mr Clinton were treading on egg-shells in New Delhi after he was publicly rebuked by the Indian president for depicting South Asia as the “most dangerous place in the world”. This, of course, is the same India which was a pro-Soviet leader of the “non-aligned world” and a fierce US critic during the cold-war.
Mr Clinton then hopped over to neighbouring Pakistan where he spent five hours warning the Pakistanis not to support terrorism or violate the line of control with India. He lectured them about the risks of international “isolation” and the costs of becoming a “failed state”. In New Delhi it looked as if Mr Clinton had landed in Islamabad all guns blazing. This, of course, is the same Pakistan that was Washington’s “most allied ally” against the “communist menace” during the cold war.
Mr Clinton should have been more circumspect in Pakistan if he wasn’t inclined to be less one-sided in India. Our fear is that instead of promoting peace between two belligerent countries this sudden “shift” in American policy could spell more trouble in the region. India has been itching to give Pakistan a bloody nose since its military humiliation at the hands of the Pakistan army in Kargil last year. Might not Mr Clinton’s perceived policy “shift” in South Asia embolden resurgent India to provoke a conflict with prickly Pakistan? Was it wise to leave the region in this frame of mind?
It is, of course, perfectly understandable why Mr Clinton went to such lengths to convey the impression that it would not be “business as usual” with Pakistan’s new military regime. The US President had, after all, personally persuaded Mr Sharif last year to withdraw forces from Kargil, thereby triggering tensions between Mr Sharif and General Musharraf. But Washington also bore some responsibility for emboldening Mr Sharif to try and get rid of General Musharraf, thereby provoking a military coup. In fact, that is why during his talks with General Musharraf in Islamabad March 25, Mr Clinton pointedly sought assurances that Mr Sharif would not be “executed” by the military regime for any alleged crimes.
Mr Clinton was originally not sure that he should grace Pakistan with a visit at all. His advisors said that his presence in Islamabad might be construed as “legitimising” or “endorsing a military regime”, thereby reducing Western pressure for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. But in the end it was thought better to engage a nuclear-armed military regime (which enjoyed a degree of popularity with Pakistanis) in a “constructive dialogue” than to ostracize or alienate it. Accordingly, strict protocol conditions were laid down by Washington.
President Clinton spent only five hours in Pakistan. He directly addressed the Pakistani people on TV rather than through a press conference or speech before an audience in the company of his military hosts; he was received at the airport by the country’s civilian foreign minister rather than by any top general; the country’s civilian president welcomed him at the Presidency in Islamabad; he “engaged” with General Musharraf and his civilian aides in the company of his own advisors and not alone.
The gist of Mr Clinton’s lecture to General Musharraf and the Pakistani nation was loud and clear. Pakistan must restore democracy quickly. It must disavow terrorist activities in India and respect the sanctity of the line of control in Kashmir. It must support the cause of nuclear-non-proliferation and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It must hold an unconditional bilateral dialogue with India to resolve its outstanding disputes. It must channel scarce economic resources towards building prosperity rather than be drawn into an arms race with India. If it chose the right path, it would benefit from friendship with the United States. If it didn’t, it could end up being isolated internationally as a failed state. There was also a clear indication that in the event of conflict with India, Pakistan should not expect the US to side with it. Equally, the US would not agree to mediate the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir without a nod from New Delhi. Was General Musharraf listening?
In a press conference after Mr Clinton’s departure, General Musharraf dilated upon his “exchange of views” with the American President. Pakistan, he said, had assured Mr Clinton that it would not export nuclear technology, know-how or fissile material. But he held out no promise on some of the other issues raised by the Americans. The CTBT would be signed only after a “national consensus” on it had been obtained. Pakistan had no leverage on the forces of Islamic jehad fighting in Kashmir but would try to “moderate” them provided India “reciprocated” with a dialogue on the “central” issue of Kashmir. Democracy would be restored in the country since he (General Musharraf) had “no desire to stay in power for too long” but no definite timetable could be given. Mr Sharif’s fate rested with the courts but he (General Musharraf) was not “personally vindictive”. Observers were quick to note that the general was unusually cautious and moderate during the press conference and went the extra mile to downplay the import of policy differences with the Americans while emphasising that his talks with President Clinton were held in a cordial and frank manner — there was even some banter about golfing handicaps, he told us.
More significantly, in a departure from his usually bristling references to the BJP government in India, General Musharraf said that he was ready to hold talks with India’s prime minister “anytime, anyplace”, adding however that Kashmir’s “centrality” in the Indo-Pak dialogue should not be undermined. This was in marked contrast to his earlier statements that there would be no talks with India unless the “core” issue of Kashmir was first resolved to the satisfaction of Pakistan. General Musharraf, it may be recalled, had earlier frowned on the dialogue between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan in Lahore in January 1999 when both sides agreed to put all their outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, on the table for discussion, without putting any pre-conditions about the resolution of any “core” dispute. Does this mean that General Musharraf has softened his stance toward India and is inclined to heed at least some elements of Mr Clinton’s advice?
General Musharraf has proceded on a visit to four South East Asian states. He has not yet ordered a review of foreign and domestic policies in the wake of the recent American “advice” he has received. Nor has he had time to brief his senior military colleagues of what, if anything, transpired behind the scenes during President Clinton’s stop-over in Islamabad. But there are some straws in the wind.
Seen in the context of General Musharraf’s press conference, a statement by Yussuf Bin Allawi Abdullah, the Foreign Minister –in-Waiting of Oman, who received Mr Clinton in Oman when he was en route to Syria, suggests that a dialogue between India and Pakistan may not be too far away. This is what he said: “President Clinton expressed his optimism over an adequate solution to the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan, in particular the problem of Kashmir”. Equally, a dash to New Delhi from Islamabad by Mr Rick Inderfurth, the American assistant secretary of state for South Asia, after the conclusion of Mr Clinton’s trip to Pakistan, has fueled speculation that some sort of peace initiatives between the two countries at the behest of the Americans cannot be ruled out. This could conceivably take the form of an immediate and marked reduction in Mujahideen attacks on civilian targets in Kashmir and unexplained bomb blasts elsewhere in India and a reciprocal reduction in the violation of human rights in Kashmir by India’s security forces and bomb blasts elsewhere in Pakistan. But there are bound to be many obstacles in this proposed thawing process.
Both countries have earlier raised stiff preconditions for a resumption of dialogue which will make any quick backtracking by both sides difficult. India has insisted that Pakistan should stop aiding and abetting cross border terrorism before it will agree to a dialogue even in terms of the framework of the Lahore Summit in 1999. Pakistan has insisted that India should publicly agree to focus on the Kashmir dispute before talks can begin. Neither side trusts the other – the Indians constantly refer to a “betrayal” over Kargil and the Pakistanis to Indian backtracking over Siachin in 1989 and promised discussions on Kashmir in 1997. The problem is accentuated by hawkish elements in the national security establishments of both countries who are against any dialogue at all. The hawks in Pakistan want to “bleed India dry in Kashmir” by encouraging the forces of Islamic jehad to infiltrate into Kashmir and conduct “suicide missions’ against India’ s security forces. The hawks in India want the Indian army to launch “hot pursuit” operations against the Mujahideen and destroy their training camps in Pakistan-controlled areas across the line of control. The months of April and May, when the snows melt and cross border operations are possible, are ideally suited for both countries’strategies. The logic of the situation is such that if a dialogue doesn’t start quickly enough and enable tempers to cool down, existing tensions on the line of control could provoke a wider military conflict. Of course, a losing or stalemated war with India would claim many political and military scalps in Pakistan and plunge the country into political turmoil and economic anarchy, with unforeseen consequences for the state.
As General Pervez Musharraf ponders a review of his difficult foreign policy options, he must contend with certain new developments on the home front. President Clinton’s firm demand for the restoration of electoral democracy has galvanised mainstream political parties to echo the same yearnings more forcefully. If these spill over into the streets, the government’s repressive measures will alienate world opinion. Also, a court decision regarding the fate of deposed prime minister Nawaz Sharif is expected soon. If Mr Sharif is adjudged guilty of attempted hijacking, kidnapping and murder on October 12, 1999, and awarded the death sentence, there are bound to be strong protests from his party as well as the international community. That would create similar difficulties for General Musharraf. But if Mr Sharif is declared innocent, General Musharraf’s lawyers will have a hard time convincing the supreme court of Pakistan that his military coup was justified and that he cannot give a timetable for the restoration of democracy. Add to all that the announcement of a tough budget in May-June and we may be sure that political temperatures will rise in the country soon.
Following Mr Clinton’s warnings, the business community also seems to be increasingly persuaded that a military regime might not be good for business, especially if Washington is compelled to lean on the IMF and World Bank to withdraw critical financial assistance to the Pakistan government in the months ahead. Pakistan would tilt into financial default next year if the donor community abandoned Islamabad for one reason or another. Under the circumstances, how will General Musharraf’s military regime fare?
If President Clinton has been successful in persuading the military junta in Rawalpindi to recognise that the country is at a historic crossroads and that provocative, non-democratic, isolationist policies will spell serious trouble, there may be light at the end of the tunnel. But if the message hasn’t got through, or if attempts will be made to bluff our way through, General Musharraf would be advised to shun the over-confident hawks who have monopolised decision-making so far. However, if he is unable or unwilling to do that and change course perceptibly, the chances are that the political crisis of Pakistan will deepen and there could even be a limited military conflict with India. Since Pakistan cannot sustain a war stretched out over a few weeks, given its weak economy and international isolation, such a conflict would definitely derail General Pervez Musharraf and his regime. What might follow after that cannot be predicted. But if the war transcends nuclear blackmail into nuclear conflagration, the political, military, social and environmental consequences for the entire region would be cataclysmic.
Pakistan desperately needs some breathing space to sort itself out. We should put its internal stability and economic prosperity above everything else. We have said this many times before. But if Bill Clinton’s powerful voice was needed to bolster our arguments, we are glad he came to Islamabad.