The US and India are pushing Pakistan to take action against the Quetta Taliban Shura and Lashkar-i-Taiba respectively. Both are old demands that have acquired urgency in view of new ground realities.
The Obama administration is facing Congressional elections next year and wants to notch up some concrete successes in Afghanistan so that public opinion at home can be deflected from insisting on “pulling the boys out and bringing them home”. But this is not possible until Pakistan’s national security establishment stops viewing and protecting the leaders of the Afghan Taliban as potential national assets for precisely such an eventuality in which the Americans tire of fighting in Afghanistan and leave Pakistan to clean up the mess, just as they did in 1988 when the USSR vacated the region and a bloody civil war followed for nearly a decade. Pakistan is also concerned that the US-NATO high command in Afghanistan is not sufficiently inclined to consider Pakistan’s legitimate concerns regarding the influence of anti-Pakistan elements in the US-supported state and government structure in Kabul, including the developing influence and impact of India in Afghanistan.
In much the same manner, India is not relenting on its position that the composite dialogue for conflict resolution with Pakistan cannot begin formally or via any back channel until Pakistan’s national security establishment visibly cracks down on the Lashkar and disbands it for all time to come so that another Mumbai cannot happen again. But this is not possible until Pakistan’s national security establishment stops viewing the Lashkar as a potential asset to be used to pressure India into settling its disputes with Pakistan. The notion of “composite dialogue” was first mooted by India in 1997 but not a single dispute has been resolved on its basis either because India remains intransigent and is given to dragging its feet or because Pakistan tends to get frustrated and ends up provoking conflict in India.
The US-NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, has now formulated a slightly different approach to the question at hand. He has stuck to his guns about the pressing need for Pakistan to ditch the Taliban Shura and go into Waziristan in pursuit of the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists who are making life hell for US-NATO troops. But he has also taken note of some Pakistani concerns about India’s rising influence in Afghanistan and advised New Delhi to close down some consulates in southern Afghanistan where there is no development activity by India. Pakistan has long accused these consulates of fueling the Baloch insurgents as well as the Pakistani Taliban.
But this is not sufficient to get Pakistan on board. Discernable progress needs to be made on the India-Pakistan conflict-resolution front and much trust needs to be built before Pakistan’s national security establishment will forego its “assets”. Indeed, even General McChrystal’s advice to India to shut down a couple of consulates in Afghanistan is not likely to be heeded until and unless it becomes a part of a step-by-step mechanism in the composite dialogue to resolve issues between India and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the US-NATO military command has held out the threat of targeting the Afghan shuru in Quetta by means of its drones. The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, has backed this assessment. Together, they have built up suitable international media flap to facilitate this action if the need arises. India has done much the same thing. It has leaked the Indo-Pak dossiers on the involvement of the Lashkar and built up considerable international opinion demanding a unilateral Pakistani crackdown on the group. But Pakistan has not succumbed to such pressure. Indeed, General Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistani army chief, has stated rather forcefully that drone attacks on targets in Balochistan will “not be allowed”. This statement is quite different from the usual protests by the Pakistani government and military establishment regarding the use of drones in Waziristan. The implication here is that Pakistan’s military would dare to knock out the drones over Balochistan!
Therefore the situation is precipitous on both Pakistan’s eastern and western borders. What is the way out?
First, the Obama administration must stop sending conflicting signals about its Af-Pak strategy. General McChrystal cannot be seen asking for a troop surge in Afghanistan even as other American officials in Washington wring their hands in despair about the rising public pressure to “bring the boys home”. This strengthens the spine of the Taliban in the region and also confirms Pakistan’s fear that it will have to retain its Pashtun “assets” in order to protect its long term interests of seeking a “friendly” Afghanistan on its western border. Second, General McChrystal must lean on the Karzai regime – which is struggling for legitimacy after the botched up presidential elections – to democratize Afghanistan by compromising and sharing power with elements of the Taliban and Pashtun commanders so that Al-Qaeda can be isolated and crushed. Third, the US must nudge India into unconditional conflict-resolution mode so that Pakistan’s eastern border can be stabilized and secured peacefully.
At the end of the day, the Indo-Pak paradigm impacts on the Af-Pak paradigm rather than the other way round. That is why it is important to resume the composite dialogue unconditionally.