A fresh start in Indo-Pak relations is mooted. The initiative comes from Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif. It is reciprocated by Indian prime minister Dev Gouda and backed by the United States. Given that both neighbours remain hostage to unyielding and bitter perceptions, can we expect anything significant to come of the talks? Past experience may serve to illustrate the roadblocks ahead.
In 1989, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi tried to break the deadlock. An agreement was hammered out in Islamabad on demilitarisation of Siachin. However, with general elections due, Mr Gandhi succumbed to the pressure of the hawks in South Block and reneged on his word soon thereafter.
Then, in 1990, a full scale civil disobedience movement erupted against New Delhi in Kashmir. India accused Pakistan of fueling the revolt. Pakistan denied the charge but insisted upon its legitimate right to assist the Kashmiris “morally, politically and diplomatically”. As the Kashmiri struggle acquired the proportions of a full-fledged guerilla war for “azaadi”, both countries appeared to edge towards a confrontation. Alarmed, the United States despatched Robert Gates to cool down tempers on both sides. Washington also proposed a series of “confidence-building” measures to reduce chances of accidental conflict in the region. “Second-track” diplomacy involving unofficial “talks” and “contacts” between Indian and Pakistani academics, journalists, retired officials and senior citizens took off during this time.
It has been a long, hard grind since. Much blood has also been shed in Kashmir where the people are totally alienated from India. Their war against New Delhi continues, despite the installation of Farooq Abdullah’s puppet regime in the valley. In January 1994, India and Pakistan tried to talk things over once again. But the dialogue failed to yield results because neither side was willing to concede an inch. New Delhi insisted that Kashmir was an integral part of India over which there could be no discussion. Pakistan responded by arguing that without opening up the core issue of Kashmir for negotiation, there could be no dialogue on any other problem. Will this stalemate be broken now?
There are several good reasons why it should be broken. Trade, for instance, is one. Both sides are formally committed to reducing trade barriers under formal WTO and SAARC agreements. Both countries stand to benefit from trade considerably. An estimated US$ 1 billion in smuggled goods flows between them annually. Legalising trade would yield revenues to both governments. Cheap imports from India would ease the burden of many Pakistani consumers. Exports of surplus electric power to India would shore up Pakistan’s trade balance. An overland oil pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India would be equally beneficial. And so on.
A demilitarisation of Siachin would also be timely. India spends about US$ 500 million annually on the upkeep of its war machine in the glacier. Pakistan’s yearly budgetary allocation for Siachin is proportionate to this amount, about US$ 100 million. Neither side can afford such wasteful expenditures indefinitely. Will reason and economic compulsion come to prevail and lead to a thaw in relations?
India has made one unilateral concession on the eve of the talks. It has allowed freer Visa facilities to a host of Pakistani groups who wish to visit India. But Mr I K Gugral, the Indian foreign minister, has already jeopardised the talks by insisting that Kashmir is not negotiable. This has prompted a stiff response from the troika in Pakistan. President Leghari and Mr Sharif have strongly reiterated the old Pakistani position that unless there is a meaningful dialogue on the core issue of Kashmir, Islamabad is not interested in moving ahead on other fronts. The army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, has also poured cold water on the prospect of any quick settlement in Siachin. Is this a case of one step forward, two steps backwards?
Mr Gugral now says that we should not expect much from these talks. Will the Indians try and persuade the Pakistanis to talk about everything except Kashmir? Will the Pakistanis insist on talking only about Kashmir and nothing else? Will there will be an amiable deadlock, followed by a change of venue to the SAARC conference next month when Mr Sharif and Mr Gouda are scheduled to meet for “one-on-one” talks?
The positions of both countries are truly rigid. But there is a big difference. India’s position on Kashmir is illegal and indefensible. The strategy of talking about the other issues first and putting Kashmir into cold storage suits India. If Mr Sharif were to agree to this policy, he might be accused of demoralising the Kashmiris and undermining their long and heroic struggle for “azaadi”. In the event, a political uproar could destabilise the new Sharif regime.
No, New Delhi must, at least, formally and irrevocably concede the fact that Kashmir is an outstanding “territorial dispute” between India and Pakistan rather than an integral, non-negotiable part of India. The two countries should then agree to consider some give and take on the issue, including proposals involving the Kashmiris as a third party to the dispute. Progress on trade, Siachin, arms limitation and other such issues could, in the meanwhile, be allowed to gather momentum in the background.