In 1974, Z A Bhutto, a “progressive-socialist-secularist” decreed the Ahmedis “non-Muslim”. In 1977, he outlawed alcohol and nominated Friday as a weekly holiday. He hoped to fend off an “Islamic” threat from the Pakistan National Alliance which sought to overthrow him and install an “Islamic” state. In the event, these opportunistic sops couldn’t save him. More significantly, these “concessions” to political Islam marked a turning point in the political evolution of Pakistan.
General Zia ul Haq capitalized on the prevailing religious sentiment for legitimizing himself and transformed Pakistan into a sham “Islamic state” with hypocritical and unjust laws. This Ziaist state went on to spawn violent sectarianism, ethnicity, Talibanism and jihad, eventually alienating the international community and condemning itself as a pariah and “failing” state. Of the two democrats who followed, Benazir Bhutto was powerless to redress the injustice while Nawaz Sharif actually rode to power on the back of the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad in 1990, passed shariah laws in 1991 and was on the brink of declaring himself Amir ul Momineen (in the spirit of the contemporary Hisbah Bill of the NWFP) when he was hoist by his own petard in 1999.
Seven years later, after many false starts and opportunistic retreats, another dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, has made bold to try and lead the wretched Pakistani state back into moderation, enlightenment and integration with the modern world. But the remarkable thing is that he has taken the plunge – enacting the Women’s Protection Bill which challenges the Hudood Laws – seemingly at the most inopportune and weakest moment of his seven year rule. The mullahs who helped him amend the constitution in 2003 to remain army chief and President are now baying for his blood because of his allegedly “pro-moderation” policies. His popularity too has hugely dipped in the wave of anti-Americanism sweeping the country. His Muslim League is fearful of losing the next general elections. So the last thing that it wanted was a new law that has led to a split with the mullahs. Thus two questions arise: why has General Musharraf thrown caution to the wind and bulldozed the WPB at this juncture? What is the significance of the Women’s Protection Bill?
To be fair to General Musharraf, he has been personally keen on amending the Hudood laws, including the blasphemy laws, and ending discrimination against women from Day-One. But his tactical alliance with the mullahs against the mainstream Peoples Party has precluded any remedial action. That is why the PMLQ has constantly shunted such proposals from one pious committee to another and sabotaged his plans. It was mortally afraid of losing its conservative vote bank to the mullahs or dividing it and enabling the PPP to trump it in the next elections. That is why it desperately sought to convince General Musharraf to postpone any amendment to the Hudood laws until after the next general elections. So why has General Musharraf defied the pundits, naysayers and oppositionists and rammed the bill through with help from his nemesis, the Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto?
It is simplistic to say that he did it under American pressure. Of course, they have been urging him to fulfill his pledge. It is also true that his credibility as a reformer has evoked negative comment. But the fact is that if he had postponed the decision, his international benefactors would hardly have scolded him, far less ditched him, under the circumstances. He is, after all, their mainstay in the global war against terror and they believe there is no alternative to him. Nor was his decision based on political pique against the mullahs or personal gratification. He has proved to be a hard-headed, shrewd and pragmatic operator not given to emotional decisions. No, there has to be a strategic explanation. And it is most likely along the following lines.
Pakistan’s national security demands a strong and stable economy aligned with the international community. The economy does not brook religious fundamentalism, extremism or anti-Westernism because these outcroppings create a trust-deficit with Pakistan’s major aid and trading partners and are therefore bad for it. Consequently, the Pakistani state and political system have to be re-crafted to face new global realities. This is where the Peoples Party comes into the equation. Since General Musharraf cannot solely on the basis of the PMLQ or the army create the larger consensus needed to turn the state around, a mainstr eam, national, secular, popular party is needed to help mediate the transition and accomplish the objective. That is also the requirement of the international community which doesn’t want to put all its eggs in one basket. This explains the increasing exhortation by General Musharraf to the public to vote for “progressive” and moderate elements.
It is in that sense that the WPB purports to become the most significant legislative marker in Pakistan’s history since 1974. It is the first serious attempt by the state to redefine its national security framework in the new international environment. Whether General Musharraf will succeed or not will depend, however, on the nature of his new alliances and the extent to which he is prepared to share power with the moderately enlightened civilians.