General Pervez Musharraf’s recent press conference in Rawalpindi reflected his usual candour, sincerity, determination and optimism to set Pakistan right. That was wonderful. But it also betrayed his continuing blind spots and pet peeves. That was unfortunate. More significantly, there was no indication that he is thinking like a political visionary seeking paradigm change. That was frustrating.
His rescue, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction strategy seems seamless. His assurance of the will and ability to marshal the financial and human resources for the plan is heartening. His warm appreciation of the efforts of the UN, NATO, the international community (especially the United States), the NGOs and the media was timely. His idea of holding an international donor conference in Islamabad in which UN Sec-Gen Kofi Annan will participate is great. Clearly, he is seized of the moment and will do his all to help the grieving survivors.
But how will General Musharraf deal with the sociological and political imperatives of the situation? One can reconstruct buildings, even colonies, possibly housing societies, but cities are organic constructions anchored in timeless human endevour. When they are fully destroyed – as in Kashmir more than just brick and mortar have to be restored. Their souls have to be breathed into them again, as in the case of Germany and Japan after WW2. And that requires political-paradigm shifts towards sustainable grass roots development, accountability, good governance, democracy and regional peace. In the absence of that, angry displacement and forced migration will take their toll, resulting in ghettoization, criminalization and radicalization in both the sending and receiving community.
General Musharraf’s blind spot is the army, of course, and his pet peeve remains the media. The army is his first and last resort. Like a good politician he will see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil of his constituents. Unfortunately, elements of the cynical media which don’t readily buy into the military’s notions of national security, remain a pain in the neck. Thus it wasn’t surprising to see General Musharraf getting hot under the collar when questions relating to defence expenditures were raised. No, he fumed, there will be no cuts because notions of national security are not aborted in the face of earthquakes. It didn’t remotely occur to him that a majority of Pakistanis might be more concerned about bread and butter issues rather than the army’s meticulously ratcheted notion of a poor country’s national security based on expensive conventional and nuclear weapons. Frankly, it is galling that we should be spending billions of dollars on fighter jets and surveillance systems when we could be using some of that money to generate full literacy and employment and real (rather than the current nominal) economic growth. His argument that defence expenditures are only 17% of the budget is palpably disingenuous, considering how some huge military expenditure items have been shifted into government expenditures and how many military-related receipts never find their way into government revenues (the military will give only 25% of the receipts of the sale of military land at market rates – originally bought from earlier governments at subsidized rates to the current government and use the rest to build the new GHQ whose land has been bought from the current government at subsidized rates). Indeed, if one were to look closely at the source of our domestic and international debt we would find that much of it is due to whopping military expenditures since 1947.
One particular statement by General Musharraf was revealing. “For the first time”, he explained in reference to the quake rehabilitation effort presided over by two serving generals hand picked by him, “the army is under the prime minister”. Hello, come again. For one, the poor prime minister, Shaukat Aziz is nowhere in sight when President Musharraf lords it over all matters great and small. For another, isn’t the army supposed to be always under the prime minister in a prime ministerial democratic system? But gone are the days when a prime minister could sack an army chief and hire another. It is the other way round in the Musharrafian presidential system.
General Musharraf opened his address by condemning the “dastardly terrorist attack in Delhi”. He then went on to offer help to India in tracking down the terrorists. And he expressed the hope, even the assurance, that the peace process would not be derailed by the provocative incident. That was an excellent and hopeful move. But when two hours later the Indian prime minister suggested that the mysterious bombers might have links with militant groups in Pakistan, the Pakistani Foreign Office jumped to protest and deny the charge. A more suitable response might have been to reiterate the earlier offer to investigate the terrorists, considering that it is well known that most Kashmiri militant groups have links with jihadi counterparts in Pakistan. But such a response would have suggested a paradigm shift. And that is still not the case . How can the peace process between India and Pakistan become irrevocable without a final end to jihadi militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan?
That is still the most unfortunate part of General Pervez Musharraf’s politico-strategic philosophy.